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Summary (300 words)
This dissertation gathers three essays on public economics. The first chapter studies
the effects of local income taxation on tax base and individual mobility since the early
2000s in Italy. I combine novel fine-grained data on the universe of tax residence’s
transfers with 89,860 local income tax changes and income bracket-by-municipality-
level panel data on the tax base. I propose different empirical strategies, resting on tax
rate variations both over time and across individuals within locations. I find that taxa-
tion significantly affects the location of the tax base. The mobility response mostly re-
flects tax residence relocation and involves a separation between residence and work-
place. Yet, my estimates imply that efficiency losses due to tax-induced mobility are
relatively small, thus making local redistribution feasible at least in the medium-run.
The second chapter studies the effects of stricter tax enforcement on tax collections,
public goods provision and local tax rates. I study these links in the context of the
Ghost Buildings program: an anti-tax evasion policy that detected buildings not re-
ported on land registry in Italy. Using cross-municipality variation in scope for enforc-
ing buildings’ registration, I show that tax collections account for around three-fourth
of the projected revenue increase. I find complementarity between enforcement and
local tax rates on property and income, which ultimately led to larger investments in
schools.
The third chapter studies the effect of regulation on intergenerational transmission
of occupations. Focusing on the case of Italy since the early 2000s, we exploit the im-
1
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pact of two major reforms in the regulation of professional services. Leveraging the
differential effect of regulation among occupations and over time, we show that the
progressive liberalization of professional services has affected the allocation of individ-
uals across occupations, leading to a substantial decrease in the propensity to follow
the parents’ career.
Introduction
This dissertation gathers three essays on public economics. Namely, I provide em-
pirical evidence on how taxpayers and workers responded to different public policy
reforms in Italy. At the turn of the 21st century, Italy carried out several large-scale
reforms aiming to promote fiscal justice, curb tax evasion and spur social mobility. In
this dissertation, I focus on three main public policy changes. First, I study how tax
decentralization affects the spatial allocation of taxpayers within a country. Second, I
evaluate the local public finance effects of a large scale anti-tax evasion policy, which
used an innovative monitoring technique to detect unregistered (taxable) buildings.
Third, I focus on the deregulation of professional services to test whether reducing
entry barriers to (high-income) occupations leads to a more efficient and equitable al-
location of talents.
The first chapter analyzes the effects of tax decentralization on tax base and individ-
ual mobility. Since the seminal contribution of Tiebout (1956), there is a controversial
debate about the degree of tax autonomy that should be granted to local governments.
This debate is not limited to the academic world, but attracts much attention in public
and policy debate. At the center of the debate lies the trade-off between the benefits
of diversity in fiscal policies and the costs of loosing tax bases when individuals “vote
with their feet.” The threat of tax base mobility puts hurdles on the ability of govern-
ments to redistribute income and finance spending through progressive taxation (Mir-
rlees 1982; Piketty and Saez 2013) and might trigger socially inefficient tax competition
3
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(Lehmann et al. 2014).
Despite the recent economics literature has seen an increase in research on migra-
tion, a recent survey of the literature (Kleven et al. 2020) has emphasized that “direct
empirical evidence on the responsiveness of individual locations to taxes has been re-
markably scant”. Two empirical challenges are likely to explain the paucity of empir-
ical evidence. First, information on migration patterns across locations is difficult to
retrieve. Second, tax variations need to be orthogonal to all the other factors influenc-
ing location choices, such as local labor market conditions, public goods provision and
amenities.
The chapter offers novel evidence on tax-induced mobility since the early 2000s in
Italy. Over this period of tax decentralization, regions and municipalities have been
granted greater power to set different tax rates across income brackets. I combine novel
fine-grained data on the universe of tax residence’s transfers with 89,860 local income
tax changes and municipality-level panel data on the tax base. I propose different em-
pirical strategies, resting on tax rate variations both over time and across individuals
within locations. I find that taxation significantly affects the location of the tax base.
The mobility response mostly reflects tax residence relocation and involves a separa-
tion between residence and workplace. Responses strongly vary by gender, education,
civil status and occupations.
Yet, my estimates imply that efficiency losses due to tax-induced mobility are rela-
tively small, thus making local redistribution feasible at least in the medium-run. Thus,
the results are consistent with Epple and Romer (1991) and Agrawal and Foremny
(2019), who show that local redistribution is feasible with migration even if it gener-
ates a relocation response, but in contradiction to Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), who
show that local redistribution involves large efficiency costs. A possible caveat is that
mobility could rise in the long run given demographic shifts and technological inno-
vations, which may impose additional constraints on redistributive policy.
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The second chapter studies the local public finance effects of curbing tax evasion.
Economists and policy makers often advocate tackling tax evasion as a key policy for
the development of fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson 2009; Besley and Persson 2013),
to finance worthy government projects (Myles 2000; Lindert 2004), and to set tax in-
struments more efficiently (Saez et al. 2012; Keen and Slemrod 2017). The interest
in fighting tax evasion ramps up routinely during economic downturns, when gov-
ernments face challenges in raising revenue and financing public spending. Despite
technological development has enhanced the ability of governments to retrieve reli-
able information and monitor tax payments, relatively little is known on the economic
returns from anti-tax evasion policies.
Whether curbing tax evasion is a successful strategy for improving the fiscal budget
and global welfare is not obvious (Slemrod 2007; Slemrod 2019). First, the effective-
ness of anti-tax evasion policies can be limited when tax authorities face constraints in
enforcing tax payments. Enforcement may in fact be difficult and costly, in particular
in weak institutional environments (Carrillo et al. 2017) and when the decision to pun-
ish evaders overlaps with political considerations (Casaburi and Troiano 2016). Sec-
ond, even if stricter tax enforcement would eventually raise revenue, overall welfare
depends on how revenue are spent and whether tax rates complement or substitute
stricter enforcement (Keen and Slemrod 2017). Additional revenue might indeed not
improve welfare if they are diverted in political rents (see, e.g., Brollo et al. 2013; Caselli
and Michaels 2013).
In the chapter, I ask the following questions: How successful are anti-tax evasion
policies when tax authorities face enforcement constraints? Is curbing tax evasion an
effective strategy for financing public goods provision? Does the threat of tax evasion
deter the desired degree of tax progressivity? I study these questions in the context
of the Ghost Buildings program: an anti-tax evasion policy that detected buildings
not reported on land registry in Italy. Using cross-municipality variation in scope for
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enforcing buildings registration, I show that tax collections account for around three-
fourth of the projected revenue increase. I find complementarity between enforcement
and local tax rates on property and income, which ultimately led to larger investments
in schools. Exploiting a discontinuity in incentives for complying with the program, I
show that constraining local administrators’ discretion in enforcing tax collection was
a crucial mechanism.
The third chapter, written with Sauro Mocetti and Giacomo Roma from the Bank of
Italy, studies the effect of regulation on intergenerational transmission of occupations.
Distinguishing career following that is motivated by an intergenerational transfer of
occupation-specific human capital (through either nature or nurture) from that caused
by regulation and positional rents is empirically challenging. To address this issue, we
exploit two reforms relating to the regulation of professional services that have been
implemented in Italy since the 2000s: the “Bersani decree” in 2006 and the “Monti
reform” in 2011.
Although the liberalization of Italian professional services was remarkable in some
respects, initial conditions differed substantially across occupations, while the pace
and extent of regulatory reform also varied substantially. To measure the strictness of
regulation, we build an index for 14 occupations and for three different cohorts (i.e.,
before and after each reform). The propensity of children to follow their parents’ career
is measured using data from the Labor Force Survey, matching the degree program
on which they are enrolled with the occupation of their parents. Namely, we proxy
occupational persistence with an indicator that is equal to 1 if children pursue a course
of study that naturally leads to the same occupation as their parents.
We find that the progress toward a more market-friendly regulatory environment
leads to a substantial decrease in the propensity for career following. These results sug-
gest that intergenerational persistence in certain occupations depends to a large extent
on the existence of positional rents generated by lack of competition. In other words,
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our findings suggest that regulation significantly biases the allocation of individuals
across occupations based on the parental occupation. The impact is stronger for pro-
fessions in social sciences and in areas where the demand for professional services is
higher. Moreover, the impact of regulation on occupational persistence is stronger for
less able children, thus confirming allocative inefficiencies in the distribution of talents
across occupations.
Chapter 1
Tax-induced Transfer of Residence:
Evidence from Tax Decentralization in
Italy
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1.1 Introduction
Since the seminal contribution of Tiebout (1956), there is a controversial debate about
the degree of tax autonomy that should be granted to local governments. At the center
of the debate lies the trade-off between the benefits of diversity in fiscal policies and
the costs of loosing tax bases when individuals “vote with their feet.” This debate is not
limited to the academic world, but attracts much attention in the public debate.1 The
threat of tax base mobility puts hurdles on the ability of governments to redistribute
income and finance spending through progressive taxation (Mirrlees 1982; Piketty and
Saez 2013) and might trigger socially inefficient tax competition (Lehmann et al. 2014).
Despite the recent economics literature has seen an increase in research on migra-
tion, a recent survey of the literature (Kleven et al., 2020) has emphasized that “direct
empirical evidence on the responsiveness of individual locations to taxes has been re-
markably scant”. In particular, most of the existing literature has focused on specific
segments of the population (e.g., football players, highly paid foreigners, inventors or
star scientists) that might be substantially sensitive to taxes, both because they tend
to be less tied to specific firms and because their skills are less likely to be location-
specific. Two empirical challenges are likely to explain the paucity of empirical evi-
dence. First, information on migration patterns across locations is difficult to retrieve.
Second, tax variations need to be orthogonal to all the other factors influencing location
choices, such as local labor market conditions, public goods provision and amenities.
In this paper, we study whether local income taxation distorts the location choice of
broader segments of workers. We focus on Italy, which offers suitable variation in local
income taxation across the nearly 8,000 municipalities and 20 regions along with novel
fine-grained data on tax base and individual mobility. To identify the effect of taxation
1Within-country transfers of tax residence have recently received much attention in the public debate,
following episodes of wealthy taxpayers moving their tax residence for tax purposes (see, e.g., New
York Times, “Trump, Lifelong New Yorker, Declares Himself a Resident of Florida”, October 2019).
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on mobility, we exploit a series of recent tax decentralization reforms that gave rise to
variation both over time and across income brackets within locations.
As shown by Figure 1.1, while the income tax rate set by local governments was sub-
stantially similar across places in the early 2000s, significant variation began to emerge
after 2007 and 2011, when the national government granted municipalities and regions
greater power to set different tax rates across income brackets. The local average tax
rate on personal income faced by top incomes (summing up the tax rate set by regions
and municipalities) varies across locations for a given income level by as much as 4.9 per-
cent. The tax rate presents variation not only across locations over time, but also across
income brackets for a given location (see Figure 1.2). These reforms thus give us a unique
opportunity to study how taxation affects location choices in a country where income
taxes are purely residence-based and several local public goods (e.g., education, public
healthcare, voting) are exclusively provided to their residents.2
Our analysis focuses on two outcomes: the location of the tax base and the probabil-
ity of changing tax residence across locations. To study the effect of local taxes on the
tax base, we use taxable income data from tax returns grouped at municipality-income
bracket-year cell and a newly compiled dataset on tax rates and tax exemption cutoffs
set by municipalities and regions. Our main empirical approach relates changes in the
tax base with within-municipality cross-income bracket tax rate changes generated by the
adoption of a progressive local tax scheme. This strategy allows to flexibly control for
municipality-specific time-varying amenities or economic shocks, and to account for
secular trends in inequality and cost of living across places and/or income groups. In
our final dataset, we exploit 89,860 local tax rate changes implemented since the early
2000s.
To estimate the effect of taxation on the probability of moving, we make use of
administrative data that record the origin and destination municipality of almost 12
2Income taxes are residence-based in several countries, including Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and some
states in the US.
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Figure 1.1: Evolution in the local average tax rate on personal income
Note: The figure depicts the evolution in the local average tax rate on personal income defined at the
99th income percentile (%). The black line indicates regional boundaries.
millions of tax residence’s transfers registered over the last decade. We use this in-
formation to compute the outmigration odds-ratio, that is the probability of moving
from an origin to a destination location relative to the probability of not moving at all.
Then, we relate changes in the outmigration odds-ratio with changes in the net-of-tax
rate differential across location pairs to estimate the mobility elasticity. By focusing on
changes over time, within a given location pair, our model absorbs all time-invariant
factors that can shift the demand and supply of individuals across locations, as well as
any origin location- or destination location-specific shock.3
For a simple illustration of our methodology, consider a wealthy taxpayer working
and living in Rome. Suppose she owns two homes: a main residence in Rome and
a second home in Costa Smeralda (Sardinia), an attractive venue for the rich where
3This strategy is similar to the approach implemented in Moretti and Wilson (2017) to study migration
of star scientists across states in the US.
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Figure 1.2: Local average tax rate by bracket in 2015
Note: This graph depicts the local average tax rate on personal income (%) in 2015 for taxpayers in bot-
tom, lower middle, upper middle and top income bracket. The black line indicates regional boundaries.
income is taxed at a lower rate. After the decentralization reforms, moving the tax
residence from Rome to Costa Smeralda would reduce the tax burden by 9,783 euros
per year.4 Following a tax increase in Rome, we can compare post-reform change in
transfers of residence towards Costa Smeralda, that suddenly became a more attractive
location for tax purposes, with transfers of residence towards locations with a similar
tax rate change, where tax-related reasons for moving the residence remain constant.
Since a tax change in Rome affects the net-of-tax rate differential with respect to all the
other potential destinations, we can identify the effect of taxes by accounting for any
political economy or business cycle factors that may have coincided with or led to a
tax rate change in Rome (or in a destination location).
We find that taxation affects the location of the tax base. On average, switching
4This figure is based on the 2015 local top tax rate differential between the two places and the average
income reported in Rome’s top income group.
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from a flat to a progressive local income tax schedule reduces the municipal tax base
by about 1.2 percent. In an event study exploiting the staggered introduction of a
progressive tax across municipalities, we show that both the tax base and the stock
of taxpayers in the top bracket and in the bracket just below were on very similar
trends before the local tax scheme switch. Following the local tax scheme change,
taxable income and number of taxpayers in the top bracket began to gradually fall. We
estimate a tax base elasticity of around 1.2, which mostly reflects an effect taking place
over the extensive (mobility) margin.5 The impact is significantly dampened when
higher taxes translate in improved municipality amenities, but it is more intense in
places with a higher concentration of capital owners. This result is qualitatively similar
when we implement a border discontinuity approach, which exploits regional income
tax differentials across municipalities located close to the regional border. Delving into
a specific case study, we find results in accordance with our main identification strategy
by exploiting an unique episode of a tax cut imposed by the national government to a
region after an “illegal” tax increase.
We then provide evidence that our municipality-level results can be explained by
taxpayers actively moving their tax residence to minimize their tax liability. We find
that the probability of moving from an origin location o to a destination location d
significantly increases when the net-of-tax rate in d increases with respect to o. On
average, a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate differential raises transfers of tax
residence by around 2.2 percent (from a baseline of around 49 individuals moving
within a location pair).
To get a sense of the magnitude of our estimated mobility elasticity, consider the
effect of the increasing tax differential within the Milan (origin)-Rome (destination)
province pair. Rome and Milan had the same local tax rate (1.4 percent) in 2007, but
5The fact that this elasticity estimate is larger than those based on country-level variations (see Saez et al.
2012) reflects the mechanical relationship between elasticities and jurisdiction size (Kanbur and Keen
1993).
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in 2015 the top marginal tax rate differed by 1.7 percentage points (Rome tax rate was
4.23 percent, while Milan had a tax rate of 2.53 percent). According to our estimate, the
number of individuals moving from Milan to Rome would decrease by around 47.9
individuals every year. Assuming that these individuals were located in the Milan’s
top income bracket, these “missing” movers would reduce the projected increase in the
Rome’s tax base (revenue from local income taxes) by 13,400 (560) thousands of euros.
We cannot completely rule out the possibility that our estimates are biased by the
presence of unobserved local shocks, but the credibility of our estimates is enhanced
by the weight of available evidence. First, we do not find any pre-trend: tax base and
mobility patterns were not systematically correlated with the tax rate change before
any tax reform. Second, the baseline effects are qualitatively similar when we use the
national government decentralization reform as instrument for local tax rate changes.
Third, estimated elasticities are qualitatively similar when we control nonparametri-
cally for time-varying shocks to origin or destination places.
The fact that the local business cycle appears to be a trivial issue would suggest that
mobility purely reflects a change in tax residence instead of any labor market shocks.
Transfers of tax residence data, however, do not allow us to disentangle a real from a
fraudulent move, where a taxpayer changes the tax residence to a second home with-
out physically moving. Distinguishing between a labor market-driven response from
a simple change in home address does not matter under a municipality-specific tax
revenue perspective, but it is crucial in terms of welfare conclusions and policy recom-
mendations (Chetty 2009).
We shed light on the nature of the migration response by comparing workplace
changes vis-à-vis with the place of residence using labor force survey data. We find
limited, if any, evidence of job-related changes. In contrast, we find a change in the
place of residence, in line with our main findings from transfers of tax residence data.
This fact can be visually detected by looking at the raw data presented in Figure 1.3: the
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2011 tax decentralization reform generated a sharp change in the probability of trans-
ferring the residence, but not in the workplace location. One simple interpretation for
these findings is that taxpayers changed their tax residence by “the mere stroke of a
pen” (Slemrod 2010). This tax-induced separation between workplace and residence
location is substantially larger for chief executive officers, high-skill men, and unmar-
ried individuals.
Figure 1.3: Comparing tax residence and workplace
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Note: The figure compares the evolution in the share of individuals living in the same municipality
where the workplace is located (red solid line) and the share of individuals changing the workplace
with respect to the previous quarter of year (blue dashed line). The dashed vertical line refers to the
decentralization reform, which gave rise to larger spatial differences in the local income tax rate. The
two series are normalized to 100 in the reform quarter.
In the last part of the paper, we study the efficiency costs of local income taxation
and discuss the implications of our results for tax revenue and the revenue-maximizing
local income (top) tax rate. Although migration is an often-cited justification in propos-
als to avoid tax progressivity at local level, we find that the benefit of additional rev-
enue from adopting a progressive tax greatly exceeds the cost of foregone revenue due
to relocation. Our results, at least over the medium run, are consistent with Epple and
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Romer (1991) and Agrawal and Foremny (2019), who show that local redistribution is
feasible with migration, but in contrast to Feldstein and Wrobel (1998), who show that
local redistribution involves large efficiency costs. Building on the elasticity estimate,
we find that the optimal income tax-revenue maximizing rate would be larger than
any existing ones set by local governments in Italy.
Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature studying the effect of taxation on mobility (see Kleven et al. (2020) for a recent
review). A series of recent papers has provided suggestive evidence on the impact
of taxation on mobility of football players (Kleven et al. 2013), highly paid foreign-
ers (Kleven et al. 2014; Schmidheiny and Slotwinski 2018), inventors (Akcigit et al.
2016), star scientists (Moretti and Wilson 2017), elderly taxpayers (Bakija and Slemrod
2004) and the rich (Schmidheiny 2006; Young et al. 2016; Martinez 2017; Agrawal and
Foremny 2019). However, these studies do not allow us to provide a conclusive com-
prehensive answer on the effect of taxation on migration, given that they target specific
segments of the population that might be substantially more mobile. In fact, as pointed
out by Kleven et al. (2020), a key question that has not been addressed by the literature
is whether income tax rates distort the location choice of broader segments of workers
and, if they do, how large are the responses and what are the implications for policy.
We attempt to fill this gap by using administrative data covering the whole population.
Second, we contribute to the literature studying the responsiveness of the tax base to
income taxation (see Saez et al. 2012 for a review). To the best of our knowledge, how-
ever, no quantitative evidence exists for Italy, a high-tax evasion and relatively high-tax
burden country.6 Moreover, this paper relates with a growing literature exploiting state
or local taxes for identifying the impact of tax policies on several economic outcomes,
including corporate tax incidence (Fuest et al. 2018), reallocation of business activity
(Giroud and Rauh 2019), welfare of workers, firms and landowners (Suárez Serrato and
6One exception is Rubolino and Waldenström (2019), which focus on rich taxpayers and estimate an
elasticity of 0.19 by exploiting historical variation in top marginal tax rate and top income shares.
Chapter 1. Tax-Induced Transfer of Residence 17
Zidar 2016), incidence on welfare of heterogeneous residents (Brülhart et al. 2020), job
creation (Slattery and Zidar 2020), misallocation costs (Fajgelbaum et al. 2019), cross-
border income shifting (Milligan and Smart 2019), foreign direct investments (Hines
1996), and innovation (Moretti and Wilson 2014; Akcigit et al. 2018).
Finally, our findings have implications for the debate on costs and benefits of fiscal
decentralization. The economic implications of decentralization have been discussed
by economists since the pioneering contribution of Tiebout (1956). Tiebout’s core idea
emphasizes the benefits of diversity in public good provisions and taxation across local
jurisdictions. Yet, the threat of tax base mobility is likely to undermine attempts of local
governments to perform redistributive policies (Musgrave 1959; Oates 1972; Feldstein
and Wrobel 1998). Our paper shows that efficiency looses from local income taxes
are limited, thus making local redistribution feasible at least in the medium-run. This
finding can be important for several countries with a federal tax structure (see Glaeser
(2013) and Brülhart et al. (2015) for a review on city-level taxation across countries).7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides background infor-
mation on local income taxation in Italy. In section 1.3, we describe our data sources.
Section 1.4 presents the effect of local income taxation on the location of the tax base.
In Section 1.5, we analyze and discuss the effect of local income taxation on the proba-
bility of changing residence. Section 1.6 studies the implications of our main findings
for tax revenue. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Local income taxation in Italy
Italy is composed of three different sub-national tiers of government: there are 20 re-
gions (Regioni), 107 provinces (Province), and 7,918 municipalities (Comuni). The 1998
tax reform granted regions and municipalities the possibility to levy a surtax on per-
7Despite many countries allow cities to raise taxes, there is very limited empirical evidence on the re-
sponsiveness of the tax base to city-level taxes. One notable exception is Haughwout et al. (2004), which
estimate a very large elasticity focusing on four US cities.
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sonal income on top of the income tax rates set by the national government.8 However,
spatial tax rate differences were limited, as i) the government capped the regional and
municipal tax rates to 1 and 0.5 percentage points, respectively; ii) any tax rate increase
could not be larger than 0.2 percentage points; iii) the tax rate could not differ across in-
come groups. Geographical dispersion has begun to emerge since 2007, when regions
and municipalities have been allowed to raise the tax rate to a maximum of 1.4 and 0.8
percent, respectively, and to introduce an exemption threshold. The final step was the
2011 reform, which granted regions and municipalities the possibility to set different
tax rates across income brackets and lifted the top regional marginal tax rate cap to 4
percentage points.9
Revenue from local income taxes contribute to finance local public spending and ac-
counts for nearly 16 percent of total personal income tax revenue raised in Italy (around
28,300 millions of euros). To simplify the tax collection process, the national govern-
ment set restrictions on the definition of the tax base and on the structure of tax rates
and tax brackets. First, the tax base is uniformly defined and composed of taxable
income (i.e., gross income minus deductions), which includes positive incomes from
all sources. Second, in the case regions or municipalities implement a graduated tax
scheme, the rates are required to i) be structured according to the same income brack-
ets defined by the national personal income tax; ii) diversified and increasing with
income. The fact that regions and municipalities share the same tax base and tax brack-
ets guarantees comparability both across places and over time. Moreover, local income
tax rates cannot be deducted from income taxes paid to the central government. The
municipal and regional tax rates are salient to taxpayers: when filing their tax forms,
employees find information on both the central, regional and municipal income tax
rate paid.
8See article 50 of law 446/1997 for the regional income tax and article 1 of law 360/1998 for the municipal
income tax. Appendix subsection A1 offers a detailed description of the fiscal decentralization process.
9This reform was sudden and unanticipated as it was part of a larger reform approved to face a sovereign
debt crisis with the aim of increasing local revenue and promote fiscal equity.
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Italy has a residence-based tax system: the tax rate applies to the taxpayer’s tax
residence at the beginning of the year. While the tax residence is unambiguously de-
termined when a taxpayer spends the entire year in a single municipality, uncertainty
arises when she lives in different locations over the year. According to the Italian In-
come Tax Code, the relevant criterion to define the tax residence is the physical location
in a municipality for at least 183 days (see Article 2 of Testo Unico Imposta sui Redditi). In
practice, this might be cumbersome to verify for some categories of workers (e.g., man-
agers or chief executive officers working for several firms located in different places)
or if taxpayers engage in ad hoc manipulation of the (self-reported) tax residence (e.g.,
by moving the tax residence to second homes). The home address of each individ-
ual is recorded in the population registry, which is managed by towns and updated
daily. Individuals disclose this information for accessing to public goods exclusively
provided to residents, such as voting in local elections, public school enrollment and
public healthcare.
Any adult individual can transfer her residence by communicating the new address
to the registry office of the previous municipality of residence. Applications are sub-
mitted online at zero cost. Local police will then inspect the veracity of the trans-
fer within 45 days.10 While changing residence can generate a change in tax liability,
changing domicile does not matter.11 In short, what matters for local taxation is the tax
residence: workplace and domicile location have not any (direct) effect on the income
tax burden.
10If the change of residence is not accepted by the origin municipality’s local administrators or verified
by the destination municipality’s police, local administrators cancel the registration and restore the
previous registry position. False declarations of residence entail the payment of a fine and up to two
years’ imprisonment (articles 75 and 76 of D.P.R. 445/2000; article 485 of criminal law).
11The law defines the residence as the “place of usual residence” and the domicile as the “place of
business and interests” (see article 43 of civil code). As a response to larger tax differentials induced
by the 2011 reform, we observe a substantial spike in the number of google search for “difference
domicile and residence.” (see Figure A9).
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1.3 Data
Our empirical analysis rests on three main sources of data. First, we collect income
group ×municipality-level panel data on the tax base, stock of taxpayers and local tax
rates. Second, we use administrative data on the universe of tax residence’s transfers.
Third, we compare residence and workplace location using labor force survey data.
1.3.1 Taxable income, stock of taxpayers and tax rates
The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (Ministero Economia e Finanza) provides
data on income and stock of taxpayers for seven income intervals and for each mu-
nicipality as reported in tax returns over the 2001-2015 period. Income intervals are
constant both over time and across municipalities to guarantee comparability. Nomi-
nal income data are then converted to real income using the consumer price index and
2015 as the base year. The tax unit is the individual and the definition of income is
taxable income (i.e., gross income minus deductions) as defined by the national gov-
ernment. Taxable income consists of all sources of income, such as labor (including
pensions), business and capital.12
Table 1.1 reports information on the aggregate average tax base and the stock of
taxpayers in each income group. In the first four columns, we display information
on the average tax base (expressed in millions of 2015 euros); the last four columns
provide information on the average population in each bracket. Considering that the
median (average) population size of a municipality is of 2,436 (7,418) individuals, the
detailed nature of the data allows to study even very tiny groups of taxpayers exposed
to different tax rates over time and across places under a uniformly defined tax system.
For instance, the median (average) number of taxpayers observed in the top income
12In the case a municipality has introduced a tax exemption cutoff, we are still able to observe incomes
reported by those below the exemption cutoff as they still have to fill tax returns to pay the national
income tax.
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group of a municipality in a given year is only 13 (60).
Table 1.1: Tax base and stock of taxpayers data
Income group Tax base (1,000 of 2015 euros) Stock of taxpayers
mean sd min max mean sd min max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1-10,000 8,604 39,950 17 2,834,531 1,753 8,616 4 638,911
10,001-15,000 10,304 48,514 44 3,478,410 821 3,859 6 276,612
15,001-28,000 30,371 164,778 68 1.09e+07 1528 8192 3 545,725
28,001-55,000 27,536 224,610 108 1.84e+07 802 6,353 2 513087
55,001-75,000 6,921 66,598 223 4,944,214 109 1,044 9 77,506
75,001-120,000 8,056 80,449 0 5,743,228 88 873 0 62,438
120,001- 12,983 157,921 0 8,518,113 60 629 0 32,888
Note: For each income group, this table reports the tax base (columns 1-4) and the stock of taxpayers
(columns 5-8) as reported in tax returns. The tax base is converted in 2015 thousand of euros. Tax returns
data covering 7,918 municipalities averaged over the 2001-2015 period.
We then match these data with a rich comprehensive panel dataset that we com-
piled on local income tax rates for each income bracket and year set by regions and
municipalities. In computing the bracket-specific tax rate, we calculate the marginal
and average bracket-specific tax rate by also taking into account the tax exemption
cutoff set by municipalities or regions. As tax brackets thresholds are fixed in nominal
terms over time and cannot be modified by municipalities or regions, we are able to
match the bracket-specific tax rate to its tax base very precisely.13
The fact that the local income tax schedule is fixed in nominal terms generates a
bracket creep: inflation leads taxpayers to “creep” to a higher bracket and, thus, to face a
higher marginal tax rate (Saez 2003). In fact, we observe an upward (downward) trend
in the share of taxpayers located in top (bottom) brackets (see Appendix Figure A2).
One concern is that this source of real change in tax rate schedules might systematically
differ across places.14 If this is the case, then taxpayers located in places with higher
13Measurement errors might arise when we account for the municipality-specific tax exemption cutoff.
As municipalities do not face any constrain in setting the cutoff below which income is untaxed, we
have cases where the exemption cutoff differs from the tax bracket cutoffs we observe in tax data. In
this case, the marginal tax rate in an income bracket is a linear combination of zero and the marginal
tax rate applied to the bracket above the tax exemption cutoff. This measurement error affects around
1.2 percent of observations.
14Boeri et al. (2019) show relatively small dispersion in nominal wages across Italian provinces, but
substantial heterogeneity in real wages (mostly driven by differences in housing costs).
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inflation rate would be more likely to “creep” to a higher bracket and thus experience a
rise in the marginal tax rate than those located in places with a lower inflation rate. Our
main empirical approach will account for this issue by interacting year dummies with
dummies for each income bracket and dummies for each province, thus accounting for
any change in cost of living that differ across provinces and/or income groups.15
Out of the potential 7 × 7, 918 × 15 = 831, 390 income bracket-municipality-year
cells, we observe the total tax base, population stock and the tax rate of 704,609 cells.16
For a given income bracket-municipality-year cell, we observe 89,920 tax rate changes.
As shown in the Appendix Figure A3, tax rate changes were mostly implemented in
2007 and 2012, the years after the tax decentralization reforms. Obviously, tax rate
changes became more common in the post-2012 period, when local governments were
allowed to set different tax rates across brackets. The modal (average) number of tax
rate changes observed in a given income bracket-municipality group over the 2001-
2015 period is 2 (1.63). In around one-fifth of income bracket-municipality cells, we do
not observe any tax rate change (see Appendix Figure A4).
Table 1.2 displays the statutory local tax rate (summing up both the regional and
municipal rate) on personal income set in the low, middle and top income bracket for
the 20 largest Italian cities. We present here the tax rate in years 2001, 2011 and 2015
(for a graphical representation of the local tax rate over time, see Appendix Figure A5).
Two remarks emerge from this table. First, the local tax rate varies across locations for a
given income level. For instance, in 2015 a rich taxpayer in Rome can reduce her marginal
tax rate by 2.3 percentage points by moving the tax residence to Florence. This transfer
of residence would allow to save around 5,277 euros of taxes per-year.
Second, the tax rate presents variation across income groups for a given location over
15Furthermore, when we alternatively deflate the tax base by municipality-specific house prices, which
should absorb part of the change in cost of living, we find very similar results.
16Taxable income data are not subject to censoring: 94.7 percent of missing values can be attributed to
a “real” missing value, i.e., we do not observe any taxpayer in an income bracket-municipality-year
cell. In the remaining cases, we were unable to match tax data with income data because of changes
in the municipality identifiers across census waves or by unions or divisions between municipalities.
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Table 1.2: Local statutory marginal tax rate on personal income in Italian cities
City Year: 2001 Year: 2011 Year: 2015
Low Middle Top Low Middle Top Low Middle Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Rome 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.400 1.400 1.400 1.730 4.230 4.230
Milan 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.200 1.400 1.400 1.230 2.530 2.530
Naples 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.900 1.900 1.900 2.030 2.830 2.830
Turin 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 1.900 1.900 1.620 3.550 4.130
Palermo 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.800 1.800 1.800 2.530 2.530 2.530
Genua 1.170 1.170 1.170 1.370 1.870 1.870 1.230 3.110 3.130
Bologna 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 2.000 2.100 1.330 2.830 3.130
Florence 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.420 1.880 1.930
Bari 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.400 1.400 1.400 1.330 2.510 2.530
Catania 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.600 1.600 1.600 1.730 2.530 2.530
Verona 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.200 1.700 1.700 1.230 2.030 2.030
Venice 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.400 1.400 1.230 2.030 2.030
Messina 1.400 1.400 1.400 2.200 2.200 2.200 2.530 2.530 2.530
Padua 1.100 1.100 1.100 0.900 2.000 2.000 1.230 1.930 1.930
Trieste 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.700 1.700 1.700 0.700 2.030 2.030
Brescia 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.200 1.400 1.400 1.230 2.530 2.530
Parma 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.300 1.400 1.330 2.830 3.130
Taranto 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.700 1.700 1.700 1.330 2.510 2.530
Prato 1.200 1.200 1.200 1.400 1.400 1.400 1.920 2.180 2.230
Modena 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.600 1.800 1.900 1.830 2.550 3.130
Reggio C. 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.400 1.400 1.400 2.530 2.530 2.530
Reggio E. 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.300 1.500 1.600 1.330 2.520 3.130
Perugia 0.900 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.800 1.800 1.230 2.480 2.630
Ravenna 0.900 0.900 0.900 1.700 1.900 2.000 1.880 2.600 3.130
Livorno 1.100 1.100 1.100 1.300 1.300 1.300 2.220 2.480 2.530
Note: This table displays the local marginal tax rate on personal income (summing up the regional and
municipal rate) in low, middle and top bracket for the 20 largest Italian cities.
time. This source of tax rate variation has emerged after the possibility of introducing
a tax exemption cutoff and to set a graduated tax scheme. For instance, the tax rate
in Rome’s top bracket increased by 3.3 percentage points over the 2001-2015 period,
while the bottom tax rate raised by 0.83 percentage points over the same period.
Focusing solely on the municipal income tax schedule, Figure A6 displays whether
a municipality set its own tax rate and, if so, whether it is a single flat rate or a series
of different increasing tax rates across brackets. We find that nearly half of the mu-
nicipalities in our sample taxed income with a flat rate in 2015, despite the share of
municipalities with a progressive tax has firmly risen since 2007 (up to around 35 per-
cent). Moreover, the number of municipalities without an income tax has shrunk from
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3,341 (42 percent) to 1,223 (15 percent) over the period being analyzed (see Figure A7).
We present the evolution in the bracket-specific municipality tax rate in Figure A8. On
average, we observe a threefold increase in the difference between the top and the bot-
tom bracket since the early 2000s. Differences across middle brackets have emerged as
well, but are relatively less marked.
In addition to local personal income tax rates, we also retrieve data on the property
tax rates applied both on the main residence and on second homes. Property tax data
are provided by the Italian Institute of Finance and Local Economy (Fondazione IFEL)
for each municipality over the period of interest.
1.3.2 Transfers of tax residence
To study individual mobility, we use a dataset covering all the transfers of tax residence
registered within the country. These data are based on administrative forms (called
modello APR.4) filled out and organized by the Italian Civil Registry and provided by
the Italian Institute of Statistics. Our sample consists of all the 11,932,720 transfers of
tax residence observed over the 2007-2015 period.
For each individual moving the tax residence in a year t, the dataset lists the origin
address of residence in year t − 1 and the destination address in year t, allowing us
to track the origin and destination municipality of each transfer. We will perform the
analysis at the province-pair level (107× 107), since a municipality-level analysis would
be cumbersome both for computational issues (we would need to calculate 7, 918 ×
7, 918× 9 triplets of origin municipality - destination municipality - year) and because
there would be no observations in the vast majority of the municipality pair-year cells.
Using the origin and destination province of each transfer of residence, we com-
pute the number of individuals moving in a year within each origin-destination pair
of provinces (including those where origin and destination are the same). We use this
number to compute our outcome of interest: the outmigration odds-ratio, that is, the
Chapter 1. Tax-Induced Transfer of Residence 25
probability of an individual moving from an origin province to a given destination
province relative to the probability of not moving at all.
Table A1 shows the bilateral average annual outflows among the largest 20 provinces.
Most of the transfers happens along the main diagonal, i.e., within the same province.
Geography appears to be the main determinant even when we focus on mobility in
cells different from the main diagonal: most of transfers still occur across provinces
within the same region (e.g., Caserta - Naples, Varese-Milan, Salerno-Naples). Over-
all, within-region transfers account for around 63 percent of the observed changes of
residence. Considering only movements across places located in different regions, the
province pair with the most bilateral flows was Naples-Rome, where 2,949 individu-
als per year transferred their residence from Naples to Rome and 1,040 moved in the
opposite direction.
The average number of transfers of residence within a province pair-year cell with
positive migration outflow is 127 (which drops to 49 when we exclude within-province
mobility). Out of the 107× 107× 9 = 103, 041 origin × destination × year cells, 92,651
have positive migration flows. Not surprisingly, province pairs without migration
flows involve sparsely populated and far away provinces. Since our outcome variable
- the log odds-ratio - is undefined when the migration flow is 0, 92,651 is the number
of observations used in our baseline regressions.17
One caveat of the data is that we do not observe income of movers. To account
for this issue, we compute the average tax rate by simulating taxes in all years and
provinces for a representative taxpayer in the top percentile of the pre-tax national
income distribution. This allows to hold fixed variations in income across provinces,
thus guaranteeing that the variation in the tax rate is only due to statutory changes and
not to local income shocks. We find similar results if we use the top marginal tax rate.
17The presence of cells with zero mobility flows might represent a bias if systematically associated with
tax changes. We regress the probability of a missing cell on net-of-tax rate differentials, conditioning
on our set of baseline controls. The estimated coefficients are not distinguishable from 0, indicating
that missing cells are not systematically correlated with changes in tax differentials across pairs.
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Although migration decisions should theoretically depend on the average tax rate, the
marginal tax rate might be more salient and easy to retrieve.
1.3.3 Labor force survey
Our third source of data is the Italian Labor Force Survey (LFS), conducted by the Na-
tional Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) during every week of a year. The annual sample
is composed of over 600,000 individuals and represents the leading source of statisti-
cal information for estimating the main aggregates of the Italian labor market at the
national and local levels.
One advantage of this dataset is that each individual self-reports past and current
municipality of residence and workplace. This information allows us to track the loca-
tion of their workplace vis-à-vis with her tax residence. Our main outcome variable is
the probability of (fiscally) living in the same municipality of the workplace. The data
also contain detailed demographic information, including age, civil status, education
and occupation.
As in transfers of tax residence data, we need to stress that we do not observe in-
dividual income. However, we can impute the income group based on the reported
occupation. Following the ISCO classification of occupations, we calculate both the
average and marginal tax rate on personal income based on an income level equal to:
i. the top income bracket for legislators, senior officials and managers (ISCO group 1);
ii. the median income for professionals, associate professionals and technicians (ISCO
groups 2 and 3); iii. the bottom income bracket for clerks, service workers and all the
other low-skill workers (ISCO groups from 4 to 8).
Respondents in survey might report a different location from that reported in ad-
ministrative data. Any discrepancy between information reported on tax residence
data and labor force survey would suffer from measurement errors if systematically
correlated with the local tax rate. In the spirit of the “traces of true income” approach
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(Pissarides and Weber 1989) to detect tax evasion, administrative data would be more
sensitive to tax changes than information provided in anonymous surveys. If this is
the case, then tax-induced transfers of tax residence estimated from labor force sur-
vey data would provide a downward biased coefficient relatively to that estimated from
administrative data.
A well-known criticism is that survey data are hardly reliable when it comes to
analyzing richest individuals, given that response rates to surveys are plummeting for
them. If the rich are undersampled and their mobility response to taxes is larger, then
we would yield downward biased estimates. To assess the magnitude of this issue, we
will perform a separate analysis on internal mobility within the football labor market.
The football data allow us to focus on a segment of the workforce that it is both very
wealthy and mobile (see Kleven et al. 2013 for an analysis of tax-induced mobility in
the European football market).
1.4 Local taxation and location of the tax base
In this section, we study the effect of local income taxation on tax base mobility. We
present different empirical approaches. First, we study tax base responsiveness to the
effect of introducing a progressive local tax scheme. Second, we estimate the tax base
elasticity by exploiting within-municipality cross-bracket variation in the (net-of-)tax
rate generated by the adoption of a graduated tax schedule. Third, we perform a bor-
der discontinuity approach, where we relate the discontinuous change in the regional
tax rate with variation in tax base across municipalities located close to the regional
border. Finally, we leverage a tax cut imposed by the central government to the region
of March following an illegal tax increase.
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1.4.1 The impact of implementing a progressive tax schedule
We start our empirical analysis by comparing municipalities according to their local
tax scheme in a difference-in-differences (DiD) empirical setting. We first split munici-
palities according to their local tax scheme:
i ∈

Flat if τb = τb−1 ∀τb ∈ Ti(b1, ..., b7)
Prog otherwise,
(1.1)
so that municipality i belongs to the progressive tax group if it exists at least a single
marginal tax rate in the tax schedule Ti(b1, ..., b7) such that τb > τb−1.
Then, we compare cross-municipality variation in the tax base in the year before and
after the local tax scheme switch. This exercise allows us to assess whether the tax base
in these two groups of municipalities followed a similar trend before the tax scheme
switch, but diverge afterwards. Formally, we run a two-way fixed effects DiD event
study specification of the following form:
log(yi,t) = ∑
j 6=−1
β j · 1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t = tj) + γi + δt + ui,t, (1.2)
where yi,t denotes the tax base in municipality i at year t. The interaction between
a dummy for municipalities with a progressive tax schedule and years, 1(i ∈ Prog) ·
1(t = tj), omits the year before the local tax scheme switch (denoted by j = −1), so
that the DiD coefficient β j can be interpreted as the effect at year t relative to the year
before the local tax scheme change. In the absence of differential pre-existing trends,
β j = 0 ∀j < −1. By contrast, for j > −1, the coefficients β j show the dynamic effects
of implementing a progressive tax schedule on the tax base. γi and δt are municipality
and year fixed effects, respectively. In some specifications, we also include province or
local labor market × year fixed effects to account for any local shocks or policies. In
our baseline approach, we cluster the standard errors at the municipality-level.
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Our results are presented in Figure 1.4, which reports β j estimates and 95 percent
confidence intervals for up to 6 years before and after the local tax scheme switch.
The graph shows that the difference in taxable income between progressive and flat
tax municipalities was not significant when measured during the period before mu-
nicipalities were allowed to switch to the progressive tax scheme, thus validating the
parallel trends assumption. Then, we observe a gradual drop in the tax base, persistent
up to 6 years after the implementation of a progressive tax schedule.
Figure 1.4: The impact of implementing a progressive local tax schedule
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Note: The figure depicts the impact of switching from a flat to a progressive local income tax schedule.
The figure plots coefficient estimates and the 95 percent confidence intervals: each point shows the
effect of having implemented a progressive tax schedule for j years (if j >-1) or of starting the policy
in j years (if j < -1) relative to the year before the tax scheme switch was implemented. Regressions
include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects. The sample includes 7,918 municipalities over
the 2001-2015 period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
Coefficient and standard errors estimates are reported in Table 1.3, where we esti-
mate standard DiD specifications by interacting the dummy for municipalities with a
progressive tax with a dummy for the period after the local tax scheme switch. The
baseline model with municipality and year fixed effects shows that switching to a pro-
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gressive tax scheme reduced the mean tax base by 1.2 percent. This translates in an
average reduction of around 1,123 thousand euros per-municipality.
We investigate the robustness of this effect in the rest of the table. First, we con-
trol for province × year fixed effects (column 3) or local labor market × province ×
year fixed effects (column 4). The point estimates remain substantially similar. In col-
umn (5), we show that the impact is robust to the inclusion of several socio-economic,
political and demographic municipality-specific controls.18
Table 1.3: Local tax scheme and tax base
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 118,770 118,770 118,770 118,770 118,770
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
LLM × province × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Tax base (€1,000) 93,659 93,659 93,659 93,659 93,659
Note: This table shows the effect of switching from a flat to a progressive income tax. The sample is
composed of 7,918 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-
level in parentheses.
In the appendix A3, we report alternative specifications and robustness checks to
test the sensitivity of our baseline results. First, we show that our results are mostly
concentrated in municipalities where the slope of the tax rate progression is steeper.
Second, we test the sensitivity of our DiD estimate to the presence of negative weights.19
Following the recommendations of de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2020), we
18We include the following control variables: property tax rates on main dwelling and on second homes,
share of population above 65, share of population below 15, a dummy for fiscal deficit, election-year
fixed effects, gender, education attainment and age of mayor and each member of the town council,
municipal public spending share in administration, development, law and order, education, and social
welfare. Because these variables are likely endogenous to local income tax rates, we prefer not to
include them in our baseline specification, but rather verify that our coefficient estimate is not sensitive
to their inclusion.
19Negative weights emerge because β is a weighted sum of several DiD, each comparing the evolution
of the outcome between consecutive time periods across pairs of municipalities. Given the staggered
adoption of the progressive tax scheme, the “control” group in some of the comparisons might be
treated at a later period. Then, its treatment effect at a later period gets differenced out by the DiD,
thus generating the negative weights.
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find that only 0.853 percent of the estimated average treatment effects receives a nega-
tive weight, and the ratio between negative weights attached to the regression and the
standard deviation of weights is very large. We thus conclude that negative weights
are not a strong concern in this setup. Third, we report similar effects when we deflate
the tax base by the average housing price in a municipality, that allows to absorb, at
least in part, any municipality-specific change in cost of living. Finally, we show that
our estimates remain highly significant when we allow for spatial correlation in the
error term by clustering the standard errors on a higher level of aggregation (Angrist
and Pischke 2009).
Next, we explore heterogeneous responses. First, notice that our baseline estimates
should be interpreted as measuring the effect of implementing a progressive tax scheme
on tax base mobility after any endogenous change in the provision of public goods or
improved amenities. If higher taxes translate in enhanced provision of public goods,
our estimates are a lower bound of the effect of local taxation on the tax base. For in-
stance, consider the case when a municipality raises the tax rate for improving schools.
If taxpayers value schooling as an important determinant in choosing the residence, the
disincentive effect of higher tax progressivity will be in part offset by improved munic-
ipality amenities. Therefore, if taxation is internalized in enhanced public goods, the
mobility response would be in part dampened. To test this hypothesis, we split our
sample according to the median value of municipal school spending (using municipal
balance sheets data provided by the Ministry of Interior) to explore whether responses
to the introduction of a progressive tax scheme are smaller where school spending is
higher. Column (1) in Table 1.4 confirms this hypothesis: we find a positive effect on
the interaction between implementing a progressive tax and a dummy for municipali-
ties with larger spending to finance schools.
Second, we study whether tax base mobility is relatively larger in places with a
higher share of property owners. Since the mobility response might actually involve
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Table 1.4: Heterogeneity effect of implementing a progressive tax schedule
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.024*** 0.013*** -0.018*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
... · 1(i ∈ Good schools) 0.011*
(0.006)
... · 1(i ∈ Property owners) -0.036***
(0.005)
... · 1(i ∈ South) 0.006
(0.007)
... · 1(i ∈ Special region) 0.000
(0.014)
Observations 118,770 118,770 118,770 118,770
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
LLM × province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tax base (€1,000) 93,659 93,659 93,659 93,659
Note: This table shows the effect of switching from a flat to a progressive local income tax on taxable
income from a model that interacts the progressive tax post-reform indicator with four dummy vari-
ables: i. municipalities where school spending is larger than the median value, 1(i ∈ Good schools); ii.
municipalities where the share of total income accruing from rental income is larger than the median
value, 1(i ∈ Property owners); iii. municipalities located in Southern Italy, 1(i ∈ South); iv. municipal-
ities located in a region with special autonomy, 1(i ∈ Special region). The sample is composed of 7,918
municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level in parenthesis.
just a pure change in tax location rather than a real labor-market driven response, we
might expect higher effects in places where residents would easily respond to higher
taxes by moving their residence to second homes. To test this hypothesis, we create a
dummy equal to 1 for municipalities where the share of rental income (as a share of
total taxable income) is larger than the median. In column (2), we show that the erosion
in the tax base is relatively larger in municipalities where the share of rental income is
larger than the median.20
Finally, we interact the progressive tax dummy with a dummy for municipalities
located in the Southern part of Italy (column 3) or in regions that are granted more
autonomy in managing their public resources (called Regioni a Statuto Speciale). In both
cases, we do not find any significant difference. In Figure A12, we also test whether
20As long as the mobility response reflects a strategy to elude taxes (e.g., relocation to less taxed second
homes), this result is in line with Marino and Zizza (2012), which show positive correlation between
rentiers and attitude towards tax evasion. They estimate that rentiers evade, on average, 80 percent of
their income, while the average population value is 13.5 percent.
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the magnitude varies by population size. We find that the impact did not differ with
respect to population size.
1.4.2 Cross-bracket analysis
Even in the presence of flat pre-trends, the research design presented in equation (1.2)
would be invalid if local shocks systematically affected tax rates and tax base. Indeed,
if other policies or shocks specifically hit a municipality at the same time it changed
taxes, our estimates would be biased. We attempt to overcome this issue by focusing on
tax rate variation across income brackets within a municipality generated by the adoption
of a progressive tax scheme. The main advantage of using income bracket-level data is
that it allows to directly control for any municipality-specific time-varying shock.
We start by focusing on top incomes to compare the evolution in the tax base and
stock of taxpayers between the top income group and the income group just below.
Although implementing a progressive tax is likely to affect taxpayers in both groups,
we expect taxpayers in the top bracket to be relatively more affected than those in the
bracket just below.21
Figure 1.5 shows tax base and population stock trends in the two groups before and
after the year when a municipality switched from a flat to a progressive tax. The two
series are normalized to match in the pre-reform year. The upward-sloping pattern in
these graphs is driven by the aforementioned “bracket creep”: inflation leads taxpay-
ers to “creep” to higher income brackets. The figure also reports DiD estimates of the
elasticity of taxable income or population stock with respect to the net-of-marginal tax
rate.22 Three key insights emerge from this figure. First, the two groups were on a
21This strategy is similar in spirit to the studies exploiting the differential exposure of tax rate changes
across income brackets or income groups, such as using lower income brackets as control group (Eissa
1995; Kleven and Schultz 2014; Akcigit et al. 2016) or across households with different family size or
different income composition (Eissa and Hoynes 2006).
22The difference-in-differences elasticity estimates are based on regressions of log of taxable income or
population stock on year dummies, dummies for income group-municipality interactions, and the log
net-of-tax rate. Elasticity estimate is similar when using the net-of-average tax rate.
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parallel trend over the six years leading up to the reform, whereas they started diverg-
ing immediately after the implementation of a progressive tax scheme. Second, tax
base and population stock differences between the two groups are gradually increas-
ing over time, which is consistent with the results relying on cross-municipality DiD.
The effect of implementing a progressive tax schedule is larger both in absolute terms
and in elasticity terms, as shown by the DiD elasticity estimates. Third, the fact that
the evolution in the tax base mirrors the population stock trend suggests that most of
the response takes place over the extensive (mobility) margin.23
Figure 1.5: Tax base and population response in top brackets
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Note: The figure compares the evolution in taxable income (top graph) and number of taxpayers (bottom
graph) in the top income bracket (red solid line) and in the bracket just below (blue dashed line). The
dashed vertical line refers to the year before a municipality switched from a flat to a progressive local in-
come tax, that raised the tax rate relatively more on the top bracket with respect to the bracket just below.
We display DiD estimates of the elasticities of taxable income (population stock) based on regressions
of log of taxable income (population stock) on year dummies, dummies for income group-municipality
interactions, and the log net-of-tax rate.
In Appendix A3, we extend this graphical analysis by adding a wide set of fixed
effects. Our most conservative estimate suggests that, on average, implementing a
23We also perform the same exercise by comparing the very bottom income bracket and the bracket just
above. Figure A13 shows limited responses to the implementation of a progressive tax scheme.
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progressive tax scheme would induce at most 3.904 top taxpayers to outmigrate from
a municipality (that is, around 3.2 percent of the stock of taxpayers in the top bracket).
This response amounts to a drop in the tax base by 854 thousand of euros. A rough
comparison with the cross-municipality DiD estimate suggests that nearly fourth-fifth
of the erosion in the tax base is driven by the migration response in the top bracket.
We then extend this analysis to each income group by exploiting all the 89,860 tax
rate changes to estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticity of tax base and stock of taxpayers.
This measure is informative about the excess burden of taxation and in predicting the
revenue impact of tax changes. Formally, we run regressions as the following:
log(yb,i,t) = β · log(1− τb,i,t) + γb,i + δi,t + ηb,p(i),t + ub,i,t, (1.3)
where yb,i,t is the tax base or population stock in the income bracket b in municipality
i at time t. We include income bracket×municipality fixed effects, γb,i, to filter out per-
manent unobserved heterogeneity across municipalities within a given income bracket
and across income brackets within given municipality. These fixed effects account for
the fact that the rich in metropolitan cities might be more responsive to tax rate changes
than the rich in a rural area, as well as for the fact that, within a specific city, prefer-
ences (or possibility) for tax residence relocation are not equally distributed along the
income distribution. Municipality × year fixed effects, δi,t, account for municipality-
specific time-varying amenities or economic shocks. If a municipality becomes more
attractive after tax rate changes because of policy changes correlated with the change
in taxes (e.g., improvement in public amenities or increase in public spending), then
these fixed effects would absorb such difference. Income bracket × province × year
fixed effects, ηb,p(i),t, control for any different reasons (including regional policies or
cost of living) for why tax base or population stock at different points in the income
distribution and/or in different local labor markets might experience different income
or population growth rates, aside from tax changes. Moreover, the inclusion of ηb,p(i),t
Chapter 1. Tax-Induced Transfer of Residence 36
absorbs any region-specific change in income taxes, thereby leading our estimate to
rely exclusively on municipality-level variation in the net-of-tax rate.
The tax base (or population stock) elasticity, β, yields the approximate percent change
in taxable income (population stock) in a tax bracket, yb,i,t, when 1− τb,i,t changes by
1 percent. In interpreting the elasticity estimate, we need to make four considera-
tions. First, our empirical model captures the long-run mobility effect of tax changes.
Since people need time for moving, the long-run effects are likely to be larger than the
short-run effects. Second, the elasticity estimate needs to be interpreted net of any en-
dogenous variation in local amenities and public services. As previously stressed, if
higher taxes translate into improved amenities, then our elasticity estimate is a lower
bound. Third, the size of the elasticity depends on the size of the jurisdiction (Kan-
bur and Keen 1993). As municipalities are very small open economies located next to
each other, relocation costs are likely to be negligible and elasticity estimate larger than
those estimated from larger jurisdictions, such as countries or states.24 Fourth, the mo-
bility response likely depends on whether tax rate changes are perceived as permanent
or temporary. Temporary tax changes are likely to have smaller effects than permanent
changes.
In estimating standard errors, we need to account for two issues. First, the error
term might be correlated over time within the panel dimension, that is the income
bracket × municipality (Bertrand et al. 2004). Second, the error term might be cor-
related, within a given income group, across municipalities because of any policy or
shock directly affecting a specific income group. Likewise, the error term might be
correlated, within a given year, across income groups sharing the same municipal-
ity because of any common municipality-specific shocks and for the fact that the tax
rate did not vary across income brackets over the period before the implementation
24In the extreme case of very small jurisdictions, the elasticity becomes infinite. By contrast, very large
jurisdictions present lower elasticities as it is costly to relocate (and in the extreme case of the full
world, the migration elasticity is naturally zero).
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of a progressive tax scheme. This source of bias gives rise to the classical clustering
concern discussed in Moulton (1990). To account for these issues, we present stan-
dard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and allow for three-way clustering by
municipality-income bracket, income bracket-year, and municipality-year (using the
estimator proposed by Cameron et al. 2011).25
Elasticity estimates are presented in Table 1.5, which shows the elasticity of the tax
base (top panel) and of the population stock in an income bracket (bottom panel) with
respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate (we find similar results using the average net-
of-tax rate). Columns (1) displays the elasticity estimate obtained from the full sample,
while columns (2), (3) and (4) report the elasticity for the bottom bracket (or those
below the tax exemption cutoff), middle bracket and top bracket, respectively. Our
baseline elasticity is 1.188 for the tax base and 1.210 for the population stock, thus
implying that the behavioral response to local tax rate change is over the mobility
margin. We also find heterogeneous responses over the income distribution: the tax
base elasticity is significantly larger at the top of the income distribution, while it is zero
at the bottom. This trend is quite similar for the population stock elasticity, although
the elasticity is less precisely estimated for the top group (where the average stock of
taxpayers is 60).
1.4.3 Border discontinuity approach
One challenge with estimating the effect of local tax rates on tax base mobility is that
tax rates might reflect local economic conditions. The basic idea of the border discon-
tinuity (BD) approach is to get around this issue by focusing on municipalities close
to the regional border, where there are sharp discontinuities in the regional tax rate,
25This three-way clustering strategy would allow us to deal with the first issue by allowing for un-
restricted autocorrelation within each income bracket-municipality observations, which is the cross-
sectional unit in our dataset; it accounts for the second issue by allowing for income bracket-year
and municipality-year clusters. We are unable instead to use Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator of
standard errors since it is based on large T asymptotics.
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Table 1.5: Tax base and population stock elasticity
Sample of taxpayers:
All Bottom Middle Top
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Outcome: log(taxable income)
log(1− τb,i,t) 1.188** 0.019 1.106** 2.602*
(0.552) (0.359) (0.454) (1.445)
Mean dependent (1,000€) 15,740 9,454 30,371 12,983
B. Outcome: log(population stock)
log(1− τb,i,t) 1.210** 0.059 1.108** 0.923
(0.556) (0.357) (0.443) (1.087)
Mean dependent (#) 849 1,287 1,528 60
Observations 704,609 235,799 117,912 56,335
Income bracket ×municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × year FE Yes No No No
Income bracket × province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table shows the elasticity of taxable income (top panel) and population stock (bottom panel)
in an income bracket with respect to the marginal net-of-local tax rate on income. Columns (1) is com-
posed of 7,918 municipalities× 7 income brackets over the 2001-2015 period. Column (2) reports elastic-
ity estimate for the bottom bracket (or below the exemption cutoff); column (3) for the middle bracket;
column (4) for the top bracket. Standard errors in parenthesis, with three-way clustering by municipality
× income bracket, income bracket × year and municipality × year.
but social and economic differences are at their minimums and there are no barriers to
crossing the border. Border regions usually cover short commuting distances, allowing
continuity of family, social, and business ties.26
We test whether there is a discontinuous change in the outcome variable as one
crosses the regional border by running the following regression:
yi = β · 1(i ∈ LowTaxSide) + γ · Distancei + δ · Distancei · 1(i ∈ LowTaxSide) + ui,
(1.4)
where yi is tax base or population stock in the top income bracket in municipality
26Previous studies have used a similar approach to study how state minimum wage rates affect employ-
ment (Dube et al. 2010), the effect of anti-union right-to-work laws on the location of manufacturing
employment (Holmes 1998), and the effect of income taxes on US millionaires (Young et al. 2016).
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i, and 1(i ∈ LowTaxSide) is a dummy variable that it is equal to 1 if municipality i
is located in a region where the (top) tax rate is lower than its neighboring region.
Distancei is the algebraic distance (in driving time) of municipality i from the regional
border. By explicitly controlling for driving distance, we approximate more closely the
transaction costs associated with moving the tax base across locations.27 We cluster the
standard errors by municipality and regional border pairs (Dube et al. 2010).
The key identifying assumption of this approach is that any unobserved factors do
not change discontinuously at the border, i.e., the conditional distribution of ui, given
Distancei, is continuous at Distancei = 0:
limε↑0E[ui|1(i ∈ LowTaxSide) = ε] = limε↓0E[ui|1(i ∈ LowTaxSide) = ε]. (1.5)
The sensitivity of this assumption can be assessed by using information before spa-
tial differences in the regional tax rate began to emerge.28
The coefficient of interest, β, computes the impact of local taxes on tax base mobility
as the discontinuous change in the tax base (or population stock) as one crosses from
LowTaxSidei = ε to LowTaxSidei = −ε, where ε is some small number. Therefore, β
yields the “local average treatment effect” (LATE) that it is only relevant for munici-
palities near the regional border. The main difference with respect to the cross-bracket
analysis is that the BD approach allows us to compare top incomes located in neigh-
boring municipalities and subject to a different regional tax rate, instead of relating
top incomes with those in the bracket just below to exploit municipal tax rate differ-
27Driving distance would better approximate mobility costs with respect to air distance because it ac-
counts for any geographical barriers, such as mountains or rivers, between municipalities that look
adjacent on a map. The empirical analysis restricts the sample to municipalities located no farther
than 30 minutes car drive from the border.
28Accounting for pre-existing spatial differences in the outcome variable leads our empirical approach
to a difference-in-border discontinuity design. An additional assumption is that the municipal income
tax rate does not offset the regional tax rate differential. We validate this assumption in Figure A16,
showing a discontinuity estimate of -.009 (.080).
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ences. As long as the cost of migrating is a positive function of the distance, we would
estimate a relatively larger β compared to that estimated from equation (1.3).
Following the recommendations of Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Gelman and
Imbens (2019), we estimate β by running local linear regressions and restricting the
sample to municipalities at a distance εd from the border, that is |Distancei| < εd.
The optimal distance is computed using the standard bandwidth selection criterion
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014).
Figure 1.6: Relocation of the tax base at regional border
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the differential in the regional (top) tax rate on personal
income and mobility. We implement a border discontinuity approach on the sample of municipalities
located close to the regional border for two periods: i. the pre-reform (left-hand side graphs), where the
tax rate differential was zero or negligible; ii. the post-reform period (right-hand side graphs), where
spatial differences began to emerge. The vertical axis in top graphs is the total tax base reported in
the top bracket (in 2015 euros); bottom graphs show the stock of taxpayers in the top bracket. The
horizontal axis is the algebraic distance (in driving time) of a municipality from the regional border.
Scatter points are sample average over intervals of 2-driving time minutes bins. Optimal bandwidth is
computed following the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014). We report discontinuity estimate
and standard errors with two-way clustering by municipality and regional border pairs standard errors.
Figure 1.6 plots tax base (top graphs) and stock of taxpayers in the top bracket (bot-
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tom graphs) in 2-driving minute bins against the municipality’s distance from the re-
gional border. Positive distance (red circles) denotes the outcome in municipalities
located in the low-tax side of the border. We analyze the existence of any discontinuity
at the regional border specifically over the period before the 2011 tax decentralization
reform (when tax rate differentials across regions were, if any, limited) and the follow-
ing years (when spatial tax variation started to emerge).
Left-hand side graphs show that there is no clear evidence of any discontinuity at the
border in the pre-decentralization period, thus validating the continuity assumption
stated in equation (1.5). This suggests that the regional tax rate change was not endoge-
nous to any pre-existing difference in the distribution of rich taxpayers at the border.
By contrast, a clear discontinuity emerged over the post-reform period. In line with
previous evidence, we find that the tax base change mirrors the change in the stock
of top taxpayers, indicating tax-induced sorting of top incomes. Comparing pre- and
post-decentralization period, the figure presents a discontinuity of 9.439− 0.759 = 8.68
rich taxpayers. In tax base terms, the discontinuity in the regional tax rate (which
amounts to .74 percentage points, on average, see Figure A15) generates a discontinu-
ity of 1, 899− 23 = 1, 877 thousand of euros.29
In Table A7, we use the BD estimate to derive tax base and population stock elas-
ticities. On average, we find that the tax base (population stock) reported in the top
bracket increased by 9.7 (9.4) percent in the low-tax side of the border when tax rate
differentials began to emerge. These estimates translate in a net-of-tax population stock
elasticity of 2.6 and a tax base elasticity of 1.4 (although the latter is less precisely esti-
mated).30 As expected, the BD elasticity estimate is larger than the elasticity computed
using tax variation across brackets within a municipality (see Table 1.5), as the former
29In Figure A14, we replicate the BD analysis for the bracket just below the top. We find a positive effect,
although not statistically significant and of lower magnitude relative to the impact uncovered at the
very top bracket.
30The elasticity is computed by regressing log tax base (or population stock) on municipality dummies,
post-decentralization reform dummy and log marginal net-of-tax rate differential.
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is a LATE effect, that is relevant for municipalities close to the regional border where
the cost of moving the tax base is relatively lower.
1.4.4 Marche tax reform
Finally, to dig deeper into the identification of the effects of local tax rates, we leverage
the quasi-experimental variation provided by a tax cut imposed by the central govern-
ment following an “illegal” tax increase. In 2002, the region of Marche increased the
income tax rate from 0.9 to 4 percentage points. In 2005, a tax commission declared
the tax rate increase to be not legal, as it violated the 1.4 percent cap on the regional
tax rate established by the national government during that period. This tax cut was
sudden and unanticipated, as was the result of a legal dispute advanced by a citizen.31
Following this episode, we can compare the evolution of the tax base between Marche
and a similar control region, before and after the tax rate cut. We construct a control
region by using the synthetic control method algorithm, developed by Abadie et al.
(2010), and we plot the result of this exercise in Figure A17. The figure depicts a
positive and persistent increase in the tax base following the tax cut imposed by the
national government. On average, the tax base was 2.62 percentage points higher in
Marche compared to the synthetic control region. This tax cut translates into a long-
run tax base elasticity of 0.968, which is fairly similar to the baseline elasticity that we
estimate using cross-bracket within-municipality variations.
1.5 Local taxation and transfer of tax residence
We have shown that local taxation affects the location of the tax base. Yet, we do not
know exactly towards where taxpayers (and tax bases) are moving. Although the na-
ture of the mobility response did not matter for a municipality-specific tax revenue
perspective, it is instead crucial for global welfare. Aggregate welfare losses of local
31See Ordinanza dalla Commissione tributaria provinciale di Ascoli Piceno, N.270, 18 March 2005.
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taxation depend on whether the tax base is moved in another (less-taxed) place that it
is still within the country or not, such as in cases when it is shifted into the informal sec-
tor, to the internet, or in tax havens. In order to analyze whether local taxation induces
relocation of the tax base across places within the country, we now study mobility by
using individual-level data from transfers of tax residence and labor force survey.
1.5.1 Location pair analysis
If taxpayers are mobile, differences in local tax rates have the potential to significantly
affect the geographical allocation of taxpayers within the country. Standard models of
migration (see, e.g., Kennan and Walker 2011) show the decision of moving depends
on expected (net-of-tax) income as well as on any difference in amenities and cost of
moving. In fact, even in a simple model with low mobility costs, location-specific
amenities might be so strong to completely offset any tax incentive.
To identify the effect of taxes on the probability of changing the tax residence net
of any fixed mobility cost and amenities, we conduct a location pair analysis following
Moretti and Wilson (2017). Specifically, we first compute the outmigration odds-ratio
relative to each pair of provinces in Italy and for every year. Then, we relate changes
in transfers of tax residence across province pairs with changes in the net-of-tax rate
differential between the two provinces. Formally, we run regressions as the following:
log(Po,d,t/Po,o,t) = β · log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] + γo,d + δt + uo,d,t, (1.6)
where Po,d,t/Po,o,t is the population share that moves from an origin province o
to a destination province d, Po,d,t, relative to the population share in o that does not
move, Po,o,t. log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] is the net-of-average tax rate differential within
the province pair considered. Our baseline tax rate is the average tax rate defined at
the income level equal to the top percentile of the pre-tax national distribution. The
rationale for using this tax measure is driven by the evidence presented in Section 1.4,
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where we showed that most of the response to local taxation comes from the top tail of
the income distribution. In alternative specifications, we will also use the top marginal
tax rate. The parameter of interest is β, which computes the mobility elasticity with
respect to the net-of-tax rate differential across location pairs.32 δo,d are province pair
fixed effects, which capture the cost of moving for each province pair and differences
in consumption and production amenities within the province pair. Moreover, these
fixed effects capture any time-invariant policy of the provinces or secular patterns in
migration across provinces. For example, if individuals tend to move from one origin
province located in the South of Italy to cities in the North of Italy, because the latter
has higher labor demand, then province pair effects will account for these factors as
long as they are permanent. In estimating standard errors, we follow Moretti and Wil-
son (2017) to allow for three-way clustering by origin × year, destination × year, and
origin-destination pair.33
Equation (1.6) is our baseline model, although, in alternative specifications, we will
include origin or destination province × year fixed effects or origin-destination time
trends to account for non-tax related factors driving mobility and any time-varying
shocks in origin or destination location. We will also control for the differential in local
public spending and property tax rates (on both the main residence and second homes)
to account for any change that might ameliorate amenities or might make a location
more attractive.
Figure 1.7 presents our main results as a series of bin scatter-plots of the log of out-
migration odds-ratio on the log of net-of-tax rate differential. We start by presenting
32The resulting average elasticity of the probability of moving with respect to the net-of-tax rate will be
equal to: E[dlog(Po,d,t)/dlog(1− τo,t)] = β(1− P), where P is the weighted average of Po,d,t observa-
tions (where each combination is weighted by the number of individuals in that observation cell). As
in our sample P < 0.001, the elasticity is very close to β.
33Formally, we allow for unrestricted serial correlation within the o-d pair: corr(uo,d,t, uo,d,t+j) can differ
from 0, for any j; but we assume that corr(uo,d,t, up,q,t+j) = 0 if p 6= o or q 6= d. This assumption seems
consistent with the data. We test for first-order serial correlation between the residual for a given
origin-destination pair in year t and the residual for each other pair in year t− 1 (even in cases when
they share a common origin or destination province.) A regression of the former residual on the latter
residual yields a statistically insignificant coefficient of 0.008 (p-value 0.421).
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the impact of local taxation on the probability of changing the tax residence after con-
ditioning on province-pair fixed effects. In other words, we depict the slope estimated
by regressing the log of the odds-ratio and net-of-tax rate differential demeaned by
the province pairs dummies. We then cumulatively add year fixed effects and pair-
specific time trends, the differential in spending and property taxes, origin or des-
tination province-year fixed effects, and region pair-year fixed effects. All the graphs
depict a positive relation between the probability of changing the tax residence and the
net-of-tax rate differential. This suggests that higher destination-origin net-of-tax rate
(after-tax income) differentials are associated with higher origin-to-destination trans-
fers of tax residence.
Figure 1.7: Tax-induced transfer of tax residence
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Note: The figure compares the log outmigration odds-ratio from an origin location o to a destination
location d (vertical axis) with the differential in the log net-of-average tax rate differential between d and
o (horizontal axis). We depict the residuals obtained by (cumulatively) regressing the two variables on
origin-destination location pair fixed effects, year fixed effects and pair-specific time trends, differential
in property taxes and public spending, origin province × year fixed effects, destination province × year
fixed effects, and region pair × year fixed effects. The figure plots the residuals in 20 equal sized bins
and shows the line of best fit. The positive slope suggests that, on average, mobility from o to d increases
as the tax rate in o becomes larger than in d. The sample includes 4,549,111 transfers of residence moving
within 11,449 province pairs over the 2007-2015 period.
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Regression results are shown in Table 1.6, which reports the coefficient β estimated
from variants of equation (1.6). Each column shows the effect of log of net-of-tax rate
differential on the outmigration log odds-ratio and it is equivalent to the fit lines shown
in Figure 1.7. All the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at convention
levels. Our baseline coefficient, which absorbs year fixed effects, location pairs fixed
effects, and pair-specific trends (column 2), is 2.2. Given that the average number of
transfers of tax residence within a location pair is 49, our most conservative estimate
suggests that a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax differential would induce 0.98 indi-
viduals, on average, to transfer the tax residence within a province pair.
Table 1.6: Local income taxation and transfers of tax residence
Outcome: log of outmigration odds-ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] 6.180*** 2.230* 3.226*** 3.810*** 3.560*** 4.295***
(1.039) (1.173) (1.229) (1.290) (1.233) (1.308)
Origin-Destination pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending and pr tax controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin province x year FE No No No Yes No No
Destination province x year FE No No No No Yes No
Region pair x year FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table presents the effect of net-of-average tax rate differential on the probability of transfer-
ring the tax residence. Our outcome is the log outmigration odds-ratio: the probability of an individual
moving from an origin province to a given destination province relative to the probability of not moving
at all. The sample includes 4,549,111 transfers of residence moving within 11,449 province pairs over
the 2007-2015 period. Standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by origin-province ×
year, destination-province × year and province-pair.
When comparing the cross-location mobility elasticity with the population stock
elasticity (previously shown in Table 1.5), it is natural that the former is larger because
the base (that is, the number of individuals who moves each year within a province
pair) is smaller.34 The elasticity estimate is in line with the existing evidence on within-
country migration in countries applying the residence-based tax (see, e.g., Agrawal and
Foremny (2019) for Spanish regions; Martinez (2017) for Swiss cantons). As stressed
34The average number of individuals moving in an origin province - destination province - year cell is
49, while the average population stock in a municipality - income bracket - year cell is 846.
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previously, the fact that these elasticities are larger than cross-country migration elas-
ticity estimates (see, e.g., Kleven et al. 2013; Akcigit et al. 2016) reflects the mechanical
relationship between mobility elasticity and jurisdiction size (Kanbur and Keen 1993).
Next, we test the robustness of our findings. First, notice that our identification strat-
egy relies on the assumption that, absent any tax rate change, changes in transfers of
residence across location pairs would have been constant over time, conditional on our
set of fixed effects. To test this possibility, we perform an event study where we com-
pare the log outmigration odds-ratio between observations in which the destination-
origin tax differential changes and those in which it does not, relative to the year prior
to the tax rate change. Our identifying assumption would be valid if mobility patterns
for these two groups were similar over the period before a tax change.
Formally, we estimate the coefficients β j by regressing the log outmigration odds-
ratio on an event indicator Do,d, which takes value 1 if the destination-origin differen-
tial in the net-of-tax rate increases between t and t + 1; -1 if the tax differential decreases
between t and t + 1; and 0 if the tax differential does not change:35
log(Po,d,t/Po,o,t) = ∑
j 6=−1
β j · Do,d · 1(t = tj) + γo,d + δt + uo,d,t. (1.7)
We present the β j coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals in Figure 1.8. Each
point shows the difference in log outmigration odds-ratio between observations in
which the destination-origin tax differential changes and those in which it does not,
relative to the year before the tax change.36 The figure shows that migration patterns
were not systematically correlated with tax rate changes: we do not uncover any ob-
vious pre-trend in the period before the tax rate change. Then, in the years following
35For parsimony, we impose symmetry by restricting the transfer of residence response to a tax differ-
ential increase to be equal, but of opposite sign, to the response to a tax decrease. Results are similar if
we re-weight the observations by the magnitude of the tax change. In the case of multiple tax changes
within an origin-destination pair, we select the largest in absolute terms.
36Since our data cover the 2007-2015 period and the vast majority of tax changes happened after the tax
decentralization reform, we are able to plot this difference for up to 4 years before and 3 after a tax rate
change.
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the change in the tax differential, taxpayers appear more likely to transfer their tax
residence from a province to another when taxes in a destination province fall relative
to the origin province. In line with earlier municipality-specific evidence, the effect
seems to manifest immediately after the tax change. On average, transfers of residence
increase by 1.3 percent following a tax change event.37
Figure 1.8: Outmigration before and after a tax change event
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Note: The figure depicts the difference in outmigration odds-ratio between observations in which the
destination-origin tax differential changes and those in which it does not, relative to the year before the
tax change. We plot estimated coefficients and the 95 percent confidence intervals. Regressions include
province pair fixed effects, year fixed effects, and pair-specific trends. Standard errors are three-way
clustered by origin-province × year, destination-province × year and province-pair.
Second, our results so far have been proved robust to allowing for origin or destination-
specific shocks, and not systematically correlated with underlying mobility patterns.
Since tax rate changes are not random, one may still be concerned about other location
pair-specific shocks that might drive tax rate variations. For this end, we exploit the
2011 decentralization reform to instrument the net-of-tax rate differential by a dummy
equal to 1 if the tax rate differential changes in 2012, 0 otherwise. Although not per-
37We do not find any significant heterogeneous response when we look separately at tax raise vs tax cut
or large tax changes vs small tax adjustments.
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fect, this instrument is useful since it allows to exploit tax rate changes that followed
a policy change rather than any time-varying pair-specific factors. In Table A8, we
show that our baseline elasticity estimates are remarkably similar to those estimated
by using this instrumental variable approach.
Finally, one caveat of the transfer of residence data is that we do not observe in-
come of movers. In our baseline analysis, we use the average tax rate computed by
simulating taxes in all years and provinces for a representative taxpayer in the top per-
centile of the pre-tax national income distribution. In Table A9, we test the sensitivity
of our results to using the top statutory marginal tax rate. Although migration deci-
sions should theoretically depend on the average tax rate, the marginal tax rate might
be more salient and easy to retrieve. We find that our estimates remain substantially
similar.
1.5.2 Is mobility real or “the mere stroke of a pen?”
Does mobility reflects a change in the (tax) residence or is it a real (i.e., job-related)
change? Transfers of tax residence data do not allow us to disentangle a real from a
fraudulent move, where a taxpayer changes the tax residence to a second home with-
out physically moving. Distinguishing between a labor market-driven response from
a simple change in home address does not matter under a municipality-specific tax
revenue perspective, but it is crucial in terms of welfare conclusions and policy recom-
mendations (Chetty 2009).
To shed light on this question, we perform two exercises. First, we focus on work-
place mobility - using information from labor force survey data. For this end, we first
compute the outmigration odds-ratio relative to workplace changes for each province
pair. Then, we regress the odds-ratio on the net-of-tax rate differential as in our base-
line specification presented in equation (1.6). Top panel in Table 1.7 displays the co-
efficient estimate. We estimate a positive effect of net-of-tax rate differentials on the
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probability of changing the workplace, although we are unable to uncover any statis-
tically significant estimate. Even in the less conservative scenario, our elasticity esti-
mate is always lower than the elasticity estimated from transfers of tax residence data
(and although the average number of observations in an origin province-destination
province-year cell is always smaller in labor force survey data). This result suggests
that the tax-induced mobility response involved small, if any, real responses.
Table 1.7: “Real” mobility response to taxation
Outcome: log of outmigration odds-ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Sample: Labor force survey
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] -1.013 1.368 1.358 1.379 1.585 1.696
(2.693) (2.560) (2.542) (2.577) (2.511) (2.565)
B. Sample: Football players
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] 0.267 -0.062 0.129 -0.401 0.703 0.291
(2.755) (2.152) (2.440) (2.531) (2.459) (2.587)
Orig-dest pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sp and pr tax controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin province x year FE No No No Yes No No
Destination province x year FE No No No No Yes No
Region pair x year FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table presents the effect of net-of-average tax rate differential on the probability of changing
province (panel A) or region (panel B) of workplace. Our outcome is the outmigration odds-ratio: the
probability of an individual moving from an origin location to a given destination location relative to
the probability of not moving at all. Standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by origin-
location × year, destination-location × year and location-pair.
Second, we recognize the fact that our job-related mobility elasticity estimated from
labor force survey data provides a lower bound, given that response rates from the rich
- which are usually more sensitive to tax changes - are comparatively lower. To account
for this issue, we focus on internal mobility within the Italian football labor market
following Kleven et al. (2013) and using data on football clubs’ players transfers.38
38Data on football clubs’ player transfers are scraped from https://www.transfermarkt.it/. To
increase the average number of transfers within each cell, we group transfers at the origin-destination
region pair.
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The reason of using the football market for the study of (real) mobility and taxation is
twofold. First, mobility is high in the professional football market, making it a valuable
and visible laboratory to study mobility responses. Second, football players cannot live
far away from their club as they are required to train almost daily with their teammates.
Hence, football players almost always face the (top) local marginal tax rate of the place
in which they work. Following these considerations, we believe this exercise likely
provides an upper bound on the job-related migration response to taxation. Using the
same specification as in equation (1.6), we do not find any significant effect (see panel
B in Table 1.7). In light of this evidence, we conclude that job-related reasons explain
only a modest part of the migration response.
1.5.3 Separation between residence and workplace
The fact that the migration response mostly involved a transfer of tax residence would
suggest a separation of place residence from the workplace. To what extent taxes
affects the probability of living close to the workplace? Is the possibility to live far
away from the workplace only accessible to specific workers or jobs? We study these
questions by leveraging workplace and residence information from labor force survey
data.39
If taxation matters, the probability of living in the same municipality of the work-
place will positively depend on the net-of-tax rate. To test this hypothesis, we estimate
how the probability of having the tax residence in the same municipality of the work-
place varies with respect to the log of net-of-tax rate observed in the municipality of
residence by running the following equation:
39A small literature has studied the impact of tax policies on the spatial structures of cities (see, e.g.,
Wildasin 1985 and Schmidheiny 2006). Agrawal and Hoyt (2018) provide a notable contribution to the
literature focusing on the impact of taxes on commuting by exploiting the discontinuous change in
the tax system at geographic borders in the US. They show that taxpayers are willing to accept longer
commute times in return for lower income tax rates.
Chapter 1. Tax-Induced Transfer of Residence 52
1(Residence = workplace)j,i,t = β · log(1− τj,i,t) + γi,t
+ δo(j),i + ηo(j),p(i),t + ϕXj,i,t + uj,i,t,
(1.8)
where 1(Residence = workplace)j,i,t is a dummy equal to 1 if the municipality of
residence i coincides with the location of the workplace for individual j in cohort (i.e.,
observation year) t. log(1− τj,i,t) is the log of the net-of-average tax rate, which varies
across individuals within a municipality depending on the individual’s occupational
group. Recalling that we impute the income group (and then the local tax rate) of each
taxpayer based on her occupational group, we are thus able to estimate the effect of
local tax rates on mobility by exploiting variation across groups of taxpayers within
a municipality. Our coefficient of interest, β, measures the percentage change in the
probability of (fiscally) living in the same municipality of the workplace when the net-
of-tax rate changes by 1 percent.
We account for a wide set of fixed effects and individual-specific characteristics.
The inclusion of municipality fixed effects allows us to exploit variation across con-
secutive cohorts within a municipality. In this way, we account for any time-invariant
municipality-specific factors that might make commuting more costly (including geo-
graphical factors). Municipality × cohort fixed effects, γi,t, and occupational group ×
municipality fixed effects, δo(j),i, allow to account for unobserved heterogeneity across
cohorts and occupational groups (and, thus, income groups) within a municipality. We
also add occupational group × province × cohort fixed effects, ηo(j),p(i),t, to account
for any local shocks or policies that directly affect an occupational group. Finally, Xj,i,t
controls for sex, age, civil status and years of education of each individual.
Coefficient estimates are reported in Table 1.8. We first consider a specification that
controls only for municipality fixed effects, cohort fixed effects and individual char-
acteristics. In column (2), we introduce municipality-cohort fixed effects. The esti-
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mates are large and highly significant. Column (3) includes occupation-municipality
fixed effects and occupation-cohort fixed effects. The point estimate, although statis-
tically significant, significantly drops when we include these fixed effects, suggesting
that failing to control for local labor market characteristics as well as any (common)
occupation-specific shocks creates an upward bias. Column (4) further controls for
occupation-cohort fixed effects interacted with provincial dummies in order to test for
potential shocks or policies that affect systematically a labor market in a given area.
The coefficient estimate remains similar. Finally, in column (5), we allow the effect of
individual characteristics to vary by provinces. In this way, we can flexibly control for
any policies (or the business cycle) varying across local labor markets not only over
time or across occupations, but also depending on socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the workforce. The results remain qualitatively similar.
Table 1.8: Taxation and probability of living close to workplace
1(Residence = workplace)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(1− τj,i,t) 3.887*** 3.977*** 1.567*** 1.167** 0.962*
(0.334) (0.318) (0.495) (0.580) (0.585)
Observations 1,992,686 1,992,686 1,992,686 1,992,686 1,992,686
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × cohort FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × occupation FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation × cohort FE No No Yes Yes Yes
Occupation × cohort × province FE No No No Yes Yes
Controls × province FE No No No No Yes
Mean outcome (%) 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582 0.582
Note: This table presents the effect of log net-of-tax rate on the probability of living in the municipality
where the workplace is located.
Our most conservative estimate suggests that a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax
rate raises the share of workers living in the same municipality of the workplace by
0.962 percentage points. Given the share of individuals living in a municipality that it
is the same of the workplace is 58.32 percent, this estimate translate in an elasticity of
moving the residence in the same place of workplace with respect to the net-of-tax rate
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of 1.788.
It is important to highlight that migration responses are not necessarily the same
across segments of the labor markets. For instance, workers employed in high-skill
jobs might be more mobile than other workers, because their skills can easily adapt to
new locations, workplace and peers. In Figure 1.9, we depict the β coefficient estimate
and 95 percent confidence intervals obtained by running equation (1.8) separately by
gender, skill level, civil status and occupations.
Figure 1.9: Heterogeneous influence of taxes on location choice
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Note: This figure presents coefficient estimate and 95 percent confidence intervals on the effect of net-of-
tax rate on the probability of living in the municipality where the workplace is located. We run separate
regressions on the following subsamples of individuals: i. men vs women; ii. high vs low educated; iii.
single vs married; iv. occupations.
We find the following heterogeneous effects. First, the mobility response is not sta-
tistically significant for women. This result implies that women face larger commuting
costs, that offset any tax incentives. This is plausible when women are involved in
home duties or childcare that significantly raise the cost of not living close to the work-
place (see, e.g., Manning 2003).
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Second, influence of taxes on location choices is stronger for individuals with the
higher education. This may be consistent with the fact that high-educated individuals
have fewer job constraints and thus have a larger feasible set of locations to choose
from. High-educated individuals might also be more likely to seek the guidance of a
tax consultant for advice on low-tax residential location.
Third, we find that married households’ residential choices are not affected by local
taxes. One interpretation is that married household value public goods and services,
such as schools, relatively more.
Looking on heterogeneity by occupation, we identify a very strong effect for man-
agers. This can be explained by their ability to change (or choose) their tax residence
because their work location might be flexible or not fixed over the year. This strong
responsiveness of chief executive officers to taxation is in line with Goolsbee (2000),
which uses compensation data from corporate executives in the US, and with cross-
country evidence provided by Piketty et al. (2014). Most of the other occupations
presents, instead, smaller or zero effect.
1.6 Implications for tax revenue
Following Saez (2001), we use the tax base elasticity estimate to forecast the revenue
effect of local income tax changes.40 Let us assume that there are N taxpayers in the top
bracket facing a constant marginal tax rate τ for incomes above y∗. If a local govern-
ment increases the top tax rate by a small amount dτ, there are two effects to consider.
First, there is a mechanical increase in revenue by dM = N(y− y∗)dτ, where y is the
average income in the top bracket. Second, the mobility response would reduce the
tax base in the top bracket by dy = −βydτ/(1− τ), where β = [(1− τ)/y]∂y/∂(1− τ)
is the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the net-of-tax rate. Therefore, the loss in
tax revenue coming from mobility responses is dB = −Nβyτ/(1− τ)dτ.
40See also Saez (2004) and Diamond and Saez (2011) for applications.
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The total change in tax revenue is thus:
dR = dM + dB = N · (y− y∗) · dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical effect
· [1− β · α · τ/(1− τ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
mobility effect
, (1.9)
where α = y/(y − y∗) is the Pareto parameter in the top bracket of the income
distribution. Equation (1.9) is equal to the marginal deadweight burden created by
the increase in the tax rate and shows that the fraction of tax revenue lost through
mobility response is an increasing function of the tax rate, the elasticity and the Pareto
parameter. Using the tax base elasticity estimate obtained by running equation (1.3),
we can forecast the fraction of the projected mechanical revenue lost through mobility
responses as β · α · τ/(1− τ).
Figure 1.10 shows how equation (1.9) is derived. The horizontal axis shows pre-
tax income, while the vertical axis shows disposable income. The solid line shows the
original flat tax schedule. As depicted, we assume that implementing a progressive
tax schedule raised the top tax rate τ by ∆τ above the income level y∗. To evaluate
this change, we need to consider the expected effects on revenue. Ignoring behavioral
responses at first, this reform mechanically raises additional revenue by an amount
equal to the change in the tax rate (∆τ) multiplied by the average income that is above
the cutoff income level (y− y∗). Summing up these effects for all the taxpayers N in
the bracket above y∗, we get the mechanical effect of implementing a progressive tax
schedule. This effect is dampened by the mobility response, which is captured by the
elasticity, β, of the tax base with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1 – τ.
As an application, consider the adoption of a progressive tax schedule in Lazio re-
gion and the city of Rome. We have β = 2.602 (see column 4 in Table 1.5), α = 2.014
(based on tax returns data for Rome), and τ = 4.23 (as in 2015). It turns out that only
23.15 percent of the projected tax revenue is lost through mobility response. In general,
when we focus on all the municipalities with a progressive tax schedule, we find that
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Figure 1.10: Efficiency costs of adopting a progressive tax scheme
Note: The figure depicts the derivation of the optimal top tax rate τ = 1/(1 + αβ) by considering a
small reform around the optimum which increases the top marginal tax rate τ by ∆τ above y∗. A
taxpayer with income y mechanically pays ∆τ[y–y∗] extra taxes but, by definition of the elasticity β of
income with respect to the net-of-tax rate 1–τ, also reduces her income by ∆y = βy∆τ/(1–τ), leading
to a loss in tax revenue equal to ∆τβyτ/(1–τ). Summing across all top bracket taxpayers and denoting
by ym the average income above y∗ and α = ym/(ym–y∗), we obtain the revenue maximizing tax rate
τ∗ = 1/(1+ αβ). This is the optimum tax rate when the government sets zero marginal welfare weights
on top income earners.
migration responses dampen projected revenue by 20.13 percent.41 Holding constant
α and τ, for mobility responses to completely offset the mechanical revenue gains, we
would need a tax base elasticity of 12.92.
Ignoring the social value of marginal consumption of top incomes, it follows an
optimal revenue-maximizing local tax rate for the top bracket equal to:
τ∗ =
1
1 + α · β = 12.08%, (1.10)
which is well above any existing local top tax rate (summing both the regional and
municipal tax rate). The implication of this finding is that local governments are on the
41The mean α and τ (as in 2015) in places where a progressive tax is in force are 2.796 and 2.693.
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left-hand side of the Laffer curve: raising the tax rate would increase tax revenue.
The analysis has assumed so far that the local reduction in incomes due to the tax
rate increase is equal to the global effect on tax revenue. This assumption would be
reasonable if the drop in the tax base was due to real (i.e., labor supply) effects or if
the tax base was shifted in the informal sector or out of the country. As we showed
in Section 1.5, our estimates are consistent with within-country cross-location mobility.
Therefore, it is plausible that incomes disappearing from the tax base of location A,
following a tax increase in A, are shifted towards a location B with a lower tax rate,
τB.42 It is then straightforward to show that equation (1.9) becomes:
dR = dM
[
1− τ
A − τB
1− τA · β · α
]
. (1.11)
Going back to our initial example of a taxpayer moving her residence from Rome
(location A) to Costa Smeralda (location B) and assuming that all the mobility response
took place over the A− B pair, we can use the elasticity estimate β, obtained from the
location-pair analysis (see column 2 in Table 1.6), to derive the fraction of revenue lost
due to mobility drops. In this case, we find that the fraction of revenue lost due to mo-
bility response drops from 23.15 to 15.4 percent.43 The resulting revenue-maximizing
optimal local tax rate would increase from 12.08% to:
τA =
1 + τB · α · β
1 + α · β = 16.15%. (1.12)
Therefore, this simple theoretical analysis shows that, in addition to estimating the
elasticity β, it is critical to analyze the nature of the mobility response.
42Chetty (2009) develops a generalized formula that allows to account for the fact that some of the costs
of evasion and avoidance are transfers to other tax bases or economic agents.
43This is computed as (τA − τB)/(1− τA) · β · α = (.0423-.009)/(1-.0423)*2.2*2.014. Overall, the fraction
of revenue lost due to mobility responses would further decrease to 7.9 percent when we use the
average top tax rate of all the potential destination locations.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we address one of the most long-standing questions in public economics:
do individuals move across places in response to tax differences? The answer to this
question has crucial implications for policy-makers, encompassing the resulting changes
in expected tax revenue and the level and location of local economic activity. Despite a
growing literature has focused on tax-induced mobility response of individuals, a re-
cent survey of the literature (Kleven et al., 2020) has emphasized that “direct empirical
evidence on the responsiveness of individual locations to taxes has been remarkably
scant”. In particular, most of the existing literature has focused on specific segments
of the population that might be substantially sensitive to taxes, both because they tend
to be less tied to specific firms and because their skills are less likely to be location-
specific. There are major empirical and data challenges related to both measurement
and identification of how individuals respond to taxes, which limit our knowledge on
this topic.
We combine administrative data with several identification strategies to study the
effect of local income taxation on tax base and individual mobility. Our laboratory
is Italy, which offers both temporal and spatial variation in the local income tax rate.
The tax rate was substantially similar across places in the early 2000s. Following a
series of recent tax decentralization reforms, which have granted more autonomy to
local governments in setting taxes, larger dispersion in the local income tax rate has
emerged both across places for a given income group and across income groups for a
given place. This policy change gives us a unique opportunity to study how taxation
affects location choices in a country where income taxes are purely residence-based and
several local public goods (e.g., education, public healthcare, voting) are exclusively
provided to their residents. In addition, a key advantage of the Italian setting is that
the authorities have been collecting micro-level data on tax residence’s transfers for the
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entire population.
We find that local income tax changes affects the location of the tax base and the
probability of changing tax residence. Our preferred model shows that a 1 percent
increase in the net-of-local tax rate on personal income would raise the tax base by
around 1.2 percent. Relating changes in tax residence’s transfers with changes in the lo-
cal income tax rate differential across places, we provide clear evidence that taxpayers
actively move their tax residence across places to minimize their tax liability. On aver-
age, a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate differential raises tax residence’s transfers
by around 2.2 percent (from a baseline of around 49 individuals moving within a loca-
tion pair). Comparing workplace changes vis-à-vis with the place of tax residence, we
find that this result involved limited, if any, real (i.e., job-related) mobility responses,
but significantly raised the probability of having the tax residence in a municipality
different from where the workplace is located. This mobility response is mostly con-
centrated among chief executive officers, high-skill men, and unmarried individuals.
In the last part of the paper, we study the efficiency costs of local income taxation
and discuss the implications of our results for tax revenue and the revenue-maximizing
local income (top) tax rate. Although migration is an often-cited justification in propos-
als to avoid tax progressivity at local level, we find that the benefit of additional rev-
enue from adopting a local progressive tax scheme greatly exceeds the cost of foregone
revenue due to relocation. Our results, at least over the medium run, are consistent
with Epple and Romer (1991) and Agrawal and Foremny (2019), who show that local
redistribution is feasible with migration, but in contrast with the analysis in Feldstein
and Wrobel (1998), who show that local redistribution involves large efficiency costs.
Building on the elasticity estimate, we find that the optimal income tax-revenue maxi-
mizing rate would be larger than any existing ones set by local governments in Italy. A
possible caveat is that mobility could rise in the long-run given demographic shifts and
technological innovations, which may impose additional constraints on redistributive
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policy.
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2.1 Introduction
Economists and policy makers often advocate tackling tax evasion as a key policy for
the development of fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson 2009; Besley and Persson 2013),
to finance worthy government projects (Myles 2000; Lindert 2004), and to set tax in-
struments more efficiently (Saez et al. 2012; Keen and Slemrod 2017). The interest
in fighting tax evasion ramps up routinely during economic downturns, when gov-
ernments face challenges in raising revenue and financing public spending. Despite
technological development has enhanced the ability of governments to retrieve reli-
able information and monitor tax payments, relatively little is known on the economic
returns from anti-tax evasion policies.
Whether curbing tax evasion is a successful strategy for improving the fiscal budget
and global welfare is not obvious (Slemrod 2007; Slemrod 2019). First, the effective-
ness of anti-tax evasion policies can be limited when tax authorities face constraints in
enforcing tax payments. Enforcement may in fact be difficult and costly, in particular
in weak institutional environments (Carrillo et al. 2017) and when the decision to pun-
ish evaders overlaps with political considerations (Casaburi and Troiano 2016). Sec-
ond, even if stricter tax enforcement would eventually raise revenue, overall welfare
depends on how revenue are spent and whether tax rates complement or substitute
stricter enforcement (Keen and Slemrod 2017). Additional revenue might indeed not
improve welfare if they are diverted in political rents (see, e.g., Brollo et al. 2013; Caselli
and Michaels 2013).
In this paper, we ask the following questions: How successful are anti-tax evasion
policies when tax authorities face enforcement constraints? Is curbing tax evasion an
effective strategy for financing public goods provision? Does the threat of tax evasion
deter the desired degree of tax progressivity? We study these questions in the context
of the “Ghost Buildings” program: an anti-tax evasion policy implemented in Italy
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aimed to identify buildings not registered on the land registry maps and thus missing
from the tax base.
Using an innovative monitoring technique, the program detected more than 2 mil-
lions of unregistered buildings. The central government identified the location of each
unregistered building and transmitted detailed information to municipalities. Munici-
pal administrators were then required to enforce the registration of previously unregis-
tered buildings and to collect taxes. To incentivize compliance, the central government
retained transfers to municipalities based on the projected increase in tax revenue that
municipalities would have experienced by fully enforcing ghost buildings’ registra-
tion.
We first focus on the role of municipal administrators in collecting tax revenue. Our
empirical approach is twofold. First, we relate cross-municipality variation in the share
of detected unregistered buildings and the staggered introduction of the program with
municipality-level panel data on tax revenue. The program gave rise to stark geo-
graphical heterogeneity in the scope for fighting tax evasion. As shown by Figure 2.1,
the share of detected unregistered buildings ranges from 0 to 13 percent of the stock of
total buildings across the almost 8,000 Italian municipalities. By using official estimates
on the projected increase in tax revenue that municipalities would have experienced in
a scenario of perfect compliance, we are able to infer what share of projected revenue
was actually raised by municipal administrators.
Second, we exploit a discontinuity in the possibility for accumulating debt and run
deficit to study whether the program spurred stricter enforcement in municipalities
subject to a balanced budget rule.1 Intuitively, to offset lower government grants,
municipalities eligible for fiscal restraints would have more binding incentives to en-
force tax collections compared to municipalities not subject to fiscal restraints. We im-
plement a difference-in-discontinuity design, which exploits variation in tax revenue
1Over the period of interest, around 5,600 municipalities (that is, around 71 percent of the sample) have
not been subject to a balanced budget rule.
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Figure 2.1: Geographical representation of ghost buildings
Note: This figure presents the share of detected ghost buildings in each municipality. Yellow (red) area
depicts municipalities with a lower (larger) share of ghost buildings. The black line refers to regional
boundaries. Break points are the quintile intervals in the share of ghost buildings. Trentino Alto-Adige
region (the white area in the North-East) was not part of the program. Data from the Italian Internal
Revenue Agency.
across municipalities whose population size is close to the threshold defining eligibil-
ity for a balanced budget rule, before and after the introduction of the Ghost Buildings
program. This strategy allows to absorb any systematic cross-municipality difference
that eligibility for fiscal restraints might have generated, such as the fact that munic-
ipalities with a balanced budget rule adopt more rigid fiscal policies (Grembi et al.
2016).2
2This strategy also allows us to control for any confounding policy changing at the same cutoff, such as
the wage paid to mayors, and any national policy implemented over the period of interest.
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We find that the program increased tax revenue by around three-fourth of the pro-
jected mechanical variation in the tax base generated by ghost buildings’ registra-
tion. This result is depicted in the top left graph of Figure 2.2, where we present a
binned scatter-plot comparing (log of) tax revenue (red dots) or government grants
(blue dots) with the interaction between the share of detected unregistered buildings
and a dummy for the post-program period, net of municipality and province-year fixed
effects. On average, a 1 standard deviation increase in the share of ghost buildings
(corresponding to a 1.7 percentage points increase) raised municipal tax revenue by
around 2.1 percent of the sample mean (i.e., around 42,000 euros), while government
grants fell by around 2.7 percent.
Figure 2.2: Baseline results
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Note: This figure shows the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on (log of) the following municipality-
level outcomes: i) tax revenue vs government grants (top left graph); ii) share of municipal public spend-
ing in administration vs education (top right); iii) top vs bottom statutory marginal tax rate on personal
income (bottom left); iv) tax rate on luxury properties vs second homes (bottom right). We depict the
residuals obtained by regressing each of these outcome variables (vertical axis) and the interaction be-
tween share of ghost buildings and the post-program dummy (horizontal axis) on municipality fixed
effects, province-year fixed effects, election year-year fixed effects and time-varying municipality con-
trols. The figure plots the residuals in 20 equal sized bins and shows the line of best fit. The sample
includes 7,709 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period.
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Missing revenue are consistent with imperfect compliance by municipal adminis-
trators in enforcing ghost buildings’ registration. Our difference-in-discontinuity esti-
mate clearly shows that revenue are anomalously lower in municipalities not eligible
for fiscal restraints. Ceteris paribus, municipalities subject to fiscal restraints collect
around 11.1 percent more revenue, compared to those with similar scope for enforc-
ing tax collection but not eligible for fiscal restraints. These results survive to several
robustness checks. Among those, we also show that, conditional on scope for stricter
enforcement, municipalities were on very similar trend before the introduction of the
Ghost Buildings program.
We then focus on the effect of revenue composition on allocation of public spend-
ing. That is, we ask whether substituting government grants with tax revenue affected
public spending choices. Political agency models of public finance imply that rely-
ing more on tax revenue as a source of public spending decreases moral hazard and
rent-seeking behavior by politicians when there are asymmetries of information across
sources of revenue (see, e.g., Besley 2006; Besley and Smart 2007). This informational
asymmetry arises because taxation is in itself informative about government revenue,
while information on non-tax revenue must be acquired at a cost. As a result, voters
are more likely to keep politicians accountable and demand improvement in public
services when spending is mostly financed through taxes rather than by government
transfers.3
We test this hypothesis by relating the shift in the composition of local revenue en-
gendered by the Ghost Buildings program with rich information on public expendi-
tures from municipal balance sheets since the early 2000s. Italian local governments
are the ideal testing ground for the causal evaluation of revenue composition on public
3The idea that increasing transparency may stimulate the demand for public goods can be traced back
at least to John Stuart Mill’s Principles of Economy in 1848. In more recent times, a series of seminal
papers by James Buchanan and co-authors has argued that citizens systematically underestimate the
tax price of public sector activities (see, e.g., Buchanan 1967 and Buchanan and Wagner 1977). This
“fiscal illusion” might be exploited by governments to reach a size that is larger than an informed
citizen would want.
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spending allocation. Municipalities manage around 10 percent of total current public
expenditure and are in charge of providing a large array of essential public services,
such as public transportation, school facilities, local police, town planning, and man-
age public utilities. This environment - which is common to many other countries
with a certain degree of decentralization - allows us to study whether the way local
governments are financed affects the allocation of revenue.
Top right graph of Figure 2.2 shows that municipalities are more likely to invest in
schools and less on administration in response to the Ghost Buildings program. On av-
erage, a 1 standard deviation increase in the share of ghost buildings raises investments
in schools by around 1.6 percent, while administrative spending declines by nearly 2.6
percent. This reallocation of public spending is in line with the idea that politicians
attempted to pleasure voters by improving public goods provision, while reducing
budget items (including diversified rents) that would undermine their chances to be
re-elected. If voters are treated as rational principals, they would be sensitive to the
welfare implications of this policy and reward the incumbent in the voting booth. Pub-
lic spending improvements can thus be an important channel explaining the success
of the program in increasing mayors’ probability to be re-elected, previously shown by
Casaburi and Troiano (2016).4
Next, we study whether municipalities change local tax rates in response to a broader
and relatively more enforced tax base. The two main local taxes are on personal income
(where the marginal tax rates can differ across income brackets) and on property. Since
the value of a building enters the tax base for both the property and the income tax (as
imputed rent), local policy makers have two basic alternatives: to raise taxes to ben-
efit from the “mechanical gains” of relying on a broader tax base (Keen and Slemrod
2017) or to cut them to compensate non-evaders and perhaps gain political consensus.
Moreover, the possibility of choosing different marginal tax rates across income brack-
4This finding connects with Weigel (2020), showing that voters demand better public infrastructure in
exchange for larger taxes.
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ets give them the opportunity to change the distribution of the tax burden across the
income distribution.
We provide clear evidence that tax evasion deters the progressivity of the local in-
come tax schedule. As shown in panel c of Figure 2.2, we find a significant increase in
the top marginal tax rate and, by contrast, a fall in the bottom marginal tax rate on per-
sonal income. This change in income tax progression was more intense in places with
higher pre-program level of income inequality; lower in places where the tax base is
more likely to flee. For property taxes, we find that the increase in the tax base brought
about by tighter enforcement led to larger tax rates on both owner-occupied luxury
properties reported as main residence and second homes (see panel d of Figure 2.2).5
This increase in property and top income tax rates suggests that tax evasion led to
suboptimal tax rates. One implication is that base broadening reduces the marginal
efficiency cost of taxation, thus making raising taxes less costly (Slemrod and Kopczuk
2002; Kopczuk 2005).
This paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, it relates to the em-
pirical literature studying the public finance effects of anti-tax evasion policy (see Alm
2012 and Slemrod and Weber 2012 for reviews). In particular, our findings contribute to
the literature on tax enforcement (e.g., Andreoni et al. 1998 and Slemrod and Yitzhaki
2002) and the role of digitalization to tackle tax evasion (see Gupta et al. 2017 and
Pomeranz and Vila-Belda 2019 for recent reviews).6 Our results show that incentiviz-
ing tax collectors’ compliance can be effective to harness third-party information in a
context with extensive opportunities for tax evasion. This is an old idea: historically,
states from the Roman empire to the French monarchy granted special autonomy to
“tax farmers”, who were subject to a set of monetary incentives aimed to bolster their
5Properties reported as main residence and different from “luxury” properties have been tax exempted
over the period analyzed.
6A recent literature has focused on the role of other enforcement technologies, such as third-party report-
ing (Slemrod et al. 2001; Saez 2010; Kleven et al. 2011; Chetty et al. 2013; Naritomi 2019), cross-checking
(Carrillo et al. 2017), paper trails (Pomeranz 2015; Kumler et al. 2020) and targeted auditing strategies
(Almunia and Lopez-Rodriguez 2018).
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loyalty. Yet, as pointed out by Slemrod and Gillitzer (2013), the focus on tax collectors
in this literature has been neglected.7 Our results thus offer evidence on the expected
returns of anti-tax evasion policies in countries that have begun to reconsider incen-
tives for tax staff (see, e.g., Kahn et al. 2001 for the case of Brazil and Das-Gupta and
Mookherjee 1998 for several developing countries).
Second, we study the linkage between revenue sources and public spending compo-
sition. To our knowledge, this is the first study to consider the impact of tax revenues
on public spending composition at the local level in the context of a high-tax evasion
and developed country.8 Two recent notable exceptions are the papers by Gadenne
(2017) and Martinez (2019), who reach similar results by investigating the effect of an
exogenous increase in tax revenue on provision of public goods in Brazil and Colom-
bia. By contrast, there is a rich and growing literature reporting null or small effects on
both quantity and quality of public goods when additional resources stem from non-tax
revenue. Windfall gains from non-tax revenue, such as natural resources, international
aid or grants, have been described as a source of “disease” or even as a “curse” that
negatively affect relative prices, corruption and rent seeking, thus dissipating any pos-
sible benefits.9 This article emphasizes the notion that what matters is the source of
fiscal windfall: public spending financed through taxes has a positive effect on school
spending. Since a large fraction of public goods is provided locally, improvements in
tax collections have thus the potential to improve residents’ welfare.
7One notable exception is Khan et al. (2016), which conduct a large-scale field experiment in Pakistan
showing that incentivized tax collectors raise 9.4 log points higher revenue than those not facing any
incentives.
8Italians have been accused by some of making tax evasion a “national sport” (Povoledo 2011). The tax
gap is estimated at 34 percent by the European Commission (see Study to quantify and analyse the VAT
Gap in the EU Member States, 2015) and at 30 percent by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance
(see Annex 2 to the Nota di Aggiornamento del documento di economia e finanza, 2015).
9Vicente (2010) and Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that oil discoveries increase corruption and have
little or no effect on the quality of public good provision. Borge et al. (2015) provide negative evidence
of additional rents from hydro-power production on efficiency of public goods in Norwegian munici-
palities. Brollo et al. (2013) emphasize the link between non-tax revenues and rent-seeking behavior by
politicians focusing on Brazilian municipalities. They show that the electoral punishment of corruption
decreases when transfers are larger, since with a larger budget size the incumbent has more room to
grab political rents without loosing popularity among voters.
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Third, we provide the first empirical evidence on the deterrent effect of tax eva-
sion on tax progressivity. The complementarity between tax progressivity and tax
base broadness induced by stricter enforcement relates to the theoretical predictions
of Slemrod (1994) and Keen and Slemrod (2017). Moreover, our results connect with a
recent empirical finding by Jensen (2019), which studies historical episodes of shifting
from self-employment to wage labor in the US. Consistent with our finding, his results
show that increasing information about individuals’ income for the government sub-
stantially raised state-level income taxes. In the Italian context, Bordignon et al. (2017)
show that information shocks affect tax choices of local governments, while Rubolino
(2020) finds limited mobility responses to higher local income taxes, thus suggesting
that local taxes are an efficient way to finance local public goods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the institutional
framework. Section 2.3 sets out the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis.
Section 2.4 presents the data. Section 2.5 describes the empirical strategies. Section 2.6
presents the results. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Local public finance in Italy
The Italian constitution devolves substantial autonomy to the 20 regions and 7,910
municipalities. Municipalities manage around 10 percent of total public expenditure
and are responsible for providing a large array of public goods and services to citi-
zens. To finance these services, they set taxes on properties and a surtax on personal
income, which raise nearly 15 percent of total revenue. Moreover, both the central and
regional governments transfer resources to municipalities to cover ordinary running
costs. Transfers are determined by law on the basis of a municipality’s population,
density, surface, age composition and previous expenses (see Decreto Legislativo n.
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504/1992).10
The national government keeps municipalities accountable through a set of subna-
tional fiscal rules. Since 1998, the Domestic Stability Pact (Patto di Stabilità Interno) has
constrained municipalities in terms of fiscal discipline by limiting their possibility to
accumulate fiscal deficit (see Legge Finanziaria 23 December 1998, no. 448, Article 28).
To enforce these rules, the national government reduces interest payments for munici-
palities that complied and cut transfers for those who did not.11 The operational target
of the rule and the population cutoff defining eligibility have frequently changed from
year to year (see Grembi et al. 2016). Importantly for our analysis, over the 2005-2012
period only municipalities with less than 5,000 residents were exempted from the Do-
mestic Stability Pact.12 This implies that around 5,600 municipalities (i.e., around 71
percent of the sample) have not been eligible for fiscal rules during this period. Start-
ing from 2013, the rule has been also extend to municipalities with population above
1,000 inhabitants, and eventually extended to every municipality.
The municipal government is composed of a mayor and an executive committee.
Any change in fiscal policy, such as local tax rates and public goods provision, is pro-
posed by the mayor and the executive committee. An elected municipal council en-
dorses the annual budget proposed by the mayor.
2.2.2 The “Ghost Buildings” program
Italian law requires new buildings to be reported to the land registry within thirty days
after their completion (Regio Decreto Legge 13 Aprile 1939, N. 652). All buildings require
10Horizontal (non earmarked) equalization grants were allocated with a system based on historical ex-
penditure until 2014. Starting from 2015, a reform has gradually introduced an equalization system
based on the difference between standard expenditure needs and fiscal capacity (see Marattin et al.
2020 for the fiscal policy reaction of Italian cities to transfer cuts).
11Noncompliers are subject to the following penalties: i. a 5 percent cut in the government transfers; ii.
a ban on hires; iii. a 30 percent cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism bonuses for employees
of the municipal administration. By contrast, municipalities complying with fiscal rules benefit from
interest rate cuts for loans from the central government. Patrizii et al. (2006) provide evidence of a
very large compliance rate in meeting the Domestic Stability Pact requirements.
12The rationale for this exemption cutoff lies on the presence of economies of scale in managing munic-
ipal governments.
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a building permit before starting the construction to make them part of the City Plan.13
Yet, granting a permit does not automatically imply the registration of the building in
the land registry, since the two processes are independently administered and data are
not cross-checked. This anomaly gave rise to the phenomenon of “ghost buildings”:
buildings physically existing, but missing from land registry and thus invisible for the
tax authorities.14
Failing to register a building is tax evasion: buildings enter the tax base for prop-
erty tax, income tax (as imputed rent), waste disposal tax and require the payment
of registration fees. To detect unregistered buildings, the Agenzia del Territorio - the
government agency managing the land registry - carried out the “Ghost Buildings”
program. The program started in 2006 and consisted of two steps. First, land and reg-
istry maps were juxtaposed to obtain the Official Building Map. Then, Official Building
Maps were overlapped with high resolution (50 cm) aerial photographs of the entire
country. A building is identified as “ghost” when it appears in the aerial photographs
but not in the Official Building Map (see Appendix B for details). Using this technique,
the Agenzia del Territorio detected 2.238 million ghost buildings, including commercial,
industrial, and residential stand-alone buildings, as well as any unreported extension
of previously registered buildings.
The Agenzia del Territorio published information on the unregistered properties in
the Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana (the official journal of record of the Ital-
ian government). The publication process lasted three years (from August 2007 to
September 2010): this difference in timing of publication rested on the availability of
digitized land registry maps. At the time the program started, only 60 percent of the
land registry maps of the Italian territory was available. Then, the Agenzia del Territorio
13If a building is not part of the City Plan, then the law requires its demolition.
14Property tax evasion in Italy dates back centuries. For instance, the creation of dry stone buildings
called trulli, located in some South-East villages and still inhabited, was a response to the 1466 Pram-
matica de Baronibus edict, which forced tax payments of lime houses. Conversano’s count resorted
to cunning: building dry stone houses to avoid taxes and made them easy to disassemble before tax
inspectors approached.
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digitized the remaining land registry maps proceeding by province (i.e., by simultane-
ously coding different municipalities in the same province). Therefore, the publication
year mostly varies by province: only one-tenth of municipalities has a program start
year that differs from the provincial modal publication date (see Figure B2).
Buildings’ registration was not automatic and involved the active participation of
local administrators. In particular, they were required to: i. disseminate information
about the ghost buildings; ii. proceed, with the support of municipal police, to follow-
up inspections and imputation of the tax base of properties not voluntarily registered;
iii. collect overdue taxes; iv. check whether the building was conform with the City
Plan and local zoning restrictions. To incentivize local administrators’ compliance in
the enforcement process, the national government cut transfers to municipalities based
on the projected increase in tax revenue that municipalities would experience by fully
enforcing ghost buildings’ registration.
As shown by Table B1, the total cadastral rent of the ghost buildings was 825.6 mil-
lion euros. The Italian Internal Revenue Agency (Agenzia delle Entrate) calculates that
registering the buildings would increase the tax base by approximately 600 million of
euros, summing up nearly 444 million of euros for the property tax, about 137 millions
of euros for the income tax (including both central and local taxes), and around 7.5 mil-
lion of euros from registration fees (Agenzia delle Entrate 2012). Agenzia delle Entrate
(2012) and Casaburi and Troiano (2016) calculate that the owner of a ghost building
will face, on average, an additional tax burden of nearly 528 euros per year, and that
65 percent of the burden is paid in local taxes. If confirmed, this projected increase
in the tax base would raise municipal tax revenues by 5 percent of the pre-program
sample mean.15 In other terms, the mechanical variation in the tax base implies that
a 1 standard deviation increase in ghost buildings would raise local tax revenue by 3
15Mean (unweighted) municipal tax revenue was of around 2 million euros per year. The average (un-
weighted) number of detected ghost buildings in a municipality is 287. The predicted average increase
in municipal tax revenue is 287(0.65*528) = 98,498 euros per year.
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percent of the sample mean. For instance, the program would increase tax revenues in
the city of Rome - where 3,990 ghost buildings were detected - by around 1.4 million
of euros. The town with the largest share of detected ghost-buildings - Isola di Capo
Rizzuto (Calabria) - would experience an increase in tax revenues of two-thirds of its
average pre-program level of tax revenues (around 1 million euros).16
2.3 Empirical hypotheses
This section formalizes the hypotheses tested in the empirical analysis. Our goal is to
the study the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on three municipality-level out-
comes: i. tax revenue; ii. public spending; iii. tax rates.
The program crucially leaned on the active participation of local administrators to
enforce registration of ghost buildings. Anti-tax evasion policies are canonical exam-
ples of policies that are asymmetric in their concentration of costs and benefits (Tullock
1959; Olson 1965). If politicians are not willing to curb tax evasion, then registration
rates and tax revenue would be lower than in the case all the buildings were regis-
tered. Yet, since failing to enforce ghost buildings’ registration would reduce govern-
ment grants and eventually increase budget deficit, eligibility for fiscal rules creates a
discontinuity in the cost of not enforcing ghost buildings’ registration. Therefore, we
can estimate the compliance gap (i.e., the difference between the amount of projected
and collected revenue) by comparing municipalities eligible for fiscal rules with those
not eligible.
Hypothesis 1: The program increases tax revenue. Conditional on scope for stricter en-
forcement, tax collections are relatively larger in municipalities eligible for fiscal
restraints.
16Some discrepancy between projected and actual revenue might be due to measurement errors in es-
timating the mechanical variation in the tax base. These errors might arise, e.g., when policy makers
imputed the rental value of buildings not voluntarily registered. Yet, ghost buildings’ owners had the
right to appeal for a re-evaluation if not convinced by the imputed rental value of the building.
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Second, the change in the composition of local revenue generated by the Ghost
Buildings program allows us to explore whether how (local) governments are financed
affects the allocation of revenue. The concept that the source of revenue might affect
public spending’s decision is developed in political agency models of public finance
(Besley 2006; Besley and Smart 2007). In these models, the incumbent faces a trade-
off between spending on public goods, which please voters, versus grabbing “rents”,
which are personal perks that are unobservable to voters. Incumbents that displease
voters by extracting excessive rents will not be re-elected. In principle, voters should
be able to observe the size of government and make inference about the incumbent
based on observed policy outcomes. Yet, if there are informational asymmetries across
sources of revenue, voters would have distorted information on the actual resources
available to the incumbent.
Switching from a less to a more transparent source of revenue has thus the potential
to reduce incumbent’s moral hazard. Intuitively, citizens paying more taxes would be
more likely to monitor the incumbent in order to check how their money are spent.
By contrast, any increase in non-tax revenue does not have any (direct) cost on citi-
zens and, thus, would not stimulate accountability. In our context, the program would
enhance accountability by substituting government grants with tax revenue.17
Hypothesis 2: An increase (decrease) in tax revenue (government transfers) leads to
more provision of public infrastructure and lower political rents.
Third, we study the effect of relying on a broader and relatively more enforced tax
base on local statutory tax rates on property and income. How tax rates should vary
when tax evasion is curbed is not a-priori obvious.18 On the one hand, the increase
17The concept that taxation improves governance can be already found in the literature focusing on the
development of modern Europe (North and Weingast 1989). In public economics, it is related to the
idea of “fiscal illusion” (Puviani 1903) and at the core of the “second generation” approach to fiscal
federalism (Oates 2005; Weingast 2009).
18For instance, Sandmo (2012) argued that “the joint analysis of tax design and compliance policy is too
complex to result in a simple and intuitive characterization.”
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in the tax base brought about by tighter enforcement increases the mechanical bene-
fit (i.e., revenue gain) of increasing the tax rate. Using a simple framework to analyze
efficient level of tax administration, Keen and Slemrod (2017) show that the relation be-
tween tax base and tax rate is towards strategic complementarity. On the other hand,
a potential ambiguity is introduced by the impact that tighter enforcement might have
on the responsiveness of other forms of tax evasion to the tax increase (or if politicians
want to cut taxes to compensate non-evaders and gain political consensus). For in-
stance, taxpayers may respond to stricter enforcement for property income by making
offsetting adjustments on less enforced tax bases, thereby reducing the total effect on
tax revenue (Saez et al. 2012; Slemrod and Gillitzer 2013; Carrillo et al. 2017). In this
case, the relation between tax base and tax rate would be of strategic substitutability.
The theory of optimal taxation defines optimal taxes by means of the Ramsey’s in-
verse elasticity rule (see Cremer and Gahvari (1993) for an analysis on the validity of
these rules in the presence of tax evasion). In our context, local administrators would
choose property and income statutory tax rates taking as given the (time-varying)
probability of detection, which affects the “expected” tax rates, that are crucial for
evaluating the welfare effects of a tax rate change.19 In the special case of independent
demands, Cremer and Gahvari (1993) show that tax evasion leads to a modification
of the Ramsey rule: optimal expected tax rates are lower in markets where evasion is
more spread. This suggests that anti-tax evasion policies and optimal taxation should
be consider in conjunction with each other. It is thus plausible to assume that the pro-
gram would raise the statutory tax rates, given that stricter tax enforcement (and the
possibility to rely on a broader tax base) reduces the marginal efficiency cost of taxa-
tion, thus making raising taxes less costly (Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002; Kopczuk 2005).
Hypothesis 3: Statutory tax rates and enforcement are strategic complements.
19The “expected” tax rate is a weighted average of the regular (statutory) tax rate and the penalty rate,
where weights are defined by the probability of detection and non-detection.
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2.4 Data
This section presents the data used in this paper. Table 2.1 shows the summary statis-
tics of the main variables employed.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ghost buildings (%) 115,635 0.018 0.017 0 0.131
Post (0/1) 115,635 0.544 0.498 0 1
Ghost buildings × Post 115,635 0.010 0.015 0 0.131
Tax revenue (€1,000) 115,635 1,972 18,375 0 1,751,331
Government grants (€1,000) 115,635 1,535 15,659 0 1,838,914
Administrative spending per-capita 115,635 358.58 893.04 0 42,923
School spending per-capita 115,635 11.998 51.189 0 3,845
Income tax - top rate (%) 115,635 0.352 0.264 0 0.900
Income tax - bottom rate (%) 115,635 0.278 0.254 0 0.800
Tax rate on luxury properties (%) 115,635 0.495 0.090 0 0.860
Tax rate on second homes (%) 115,635 0.677 0.152 0.300 1.110
Tax base (1,000€) 115,635 94,210 71,851 269 4.94e+07
Note: The sample covers 7,709 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. Variables are expressed in 2015
euros.
2.4.1 Ghost Buildings program
The Italian Internal Revenue Agency provides data on the Ghost Buildings program.
We access to municipality-level information on the total number of parcels, the number
of parcels containing ghost buildings, and the program start date.20 This information
allows us to define ghost buildings intensity as the ratio between the number of parcels
containing ghost buildings and the total number of parcels, net of buildings that did
not required to be reported on land registry. We construct this indicator for the popu-
lation of 7,709 out of the 7,910 municipalities, since the program did not cover Trentino
Alto-Adige region, where land registry maps are autonomously administered.
Figure 2.3 displays the density of ghost buildings intensity. The indicator varies
from 0 to 13 percent and it has a mean (median) value of 1.8 (1.4). Geographically,
20Parcels are defined at the municipality-level. According to the law (Reggio Decreto no. 1952, 1931),
they can vary in size, but they capture portions of lands (or buildings) that belong to the same owner,
and their cadastral definition and quality is the same.
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tax evasion is significantly higher in the South and, although to a lower extent, in the
Center (see previous Figure 2.1). Figure B3 shows that ghost buildings intensity is
highly correlated with other regional level proxies for tax evasion derived from tax
data. Casaburi and Troiano (2016) find that several geographical and socioeconomic
characteristics are strongly associated with the share of detected ghost buildings in
a municipality. Moreover, they find that initial registration rates are correlated with
mayor characteristics, such as gender, age, birthplace, and education.
Figure 2.3: Distribution of ghost buildings intensity
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Note: The histograms shows the distribution of ghost buildings intensity, defined as the ratio between
the number of land registry parcels containing ghost buildings and the total number of parcels in each
municipality.
Differently from Casaburi and Troiano (2016), which use data on registered ghost
buildings up to April 30, 2011, our dataset is based on the final update of the program.
Following Casaburi and Troiano (2016), our empirical analysis focuses on the ex ante
program scope to measure the impact of enforcement rather than on the final registra-
tion rates. The rationale is that the program scope predicts the exogenous increase in
enforcement induced by the program, while the actual registration rate could depend
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on imperfect compliance of local administrators in ensuring buildings’ registration.
Moreover, registration rates are sensitive to measurement issues, given that we miss
information on the number of detected unregistered buildings that were not conform
with local zoning or environmental restrictions and were actually demolished.21
2.4.2 Municipal balance sheets
We collect panel data on tax revenue and public expenditures from the balance sheets
of Italian municipalities. Municipal balance sheets have been introduced with the aim
to better monitor local public spending in the frame of the Domestic Stability Pact.
They are approved by the town council by the 30th of April of the following year. The
current accounting models are authorized by the Italian Ministry of Interior and are
harmonized both across municipalities and over time.
The dataset covers the 2001-2015 period and includes detailed yearly information on
the composition of revenue and its allocation across several budget items. As shown
by Figure B4, revenue are mostly composed of own taxes (39 percent) and government
grants (34 percent), while a relatively lower part arises from assets disposal, capital
transfers, loans and mortgages and transfers from the European Union. On average,
municipalities raise around 2 million of 2015 euros from local taxes and receive grants
for around 1.5 million. In the rest of the paper, we refer to tax revenue as the sum of rev-
enue collected from municipal taxes, while revenue from government grants include
transfers from both the central and regional governments.
The balance sheets provide detailed information on how municipalities invest their
21Anecdotal evidence confirms the absence of a hard-line stance by local administrators in demolishing
abusive unregistered buildings (see, e.g., Il Sole 24 Ore, 5 November 2018). Several detected ghost
buildings are located in environmentally constrained area (e.g., when the distance to seaside or a river
is lower than 150 meters). In these situations, municipal administrators had to initiate a urban in-
fringement procedure, which is a legal requirement to obtain a demolition permit. In practice, most
demolitions were postponed and eventually condoned. For instance, an unregistered villa in Castel-
daccia (Sicily) was overwhelmed by a flood of the Milizia river, which killed 8 people in 2018. Local
administrators had already obtained the permit to demolish the villa, but the order had remained on
paper since 2008.
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revenue among several budget items. The right-hand side of Figure B4 depicts the
composition of capital spending: almost half of total spending is allocated to admin-
istration (e.g., financial administration, economic planning, performance audit), waste
disposal and environment protection. Public transports, urban roads maintenance and
social services account for around one-third, while around 8 percent of spending is
assigned to finance school facilities.22
Education is the main measure of public expenditure outcome that we consider. Mu-
nicipalities are in charge of financing nursery, primary, and early secondary schools. In
particular, they finance school facilities, lunches, transportation and staff. Municipali-
ties receive government grants earmarked for current expenditures on most basic bud-
get items. By contrast, physical school infrastructures have been particularly under-
funded until a recent large-scale reform (see law 107/2015), which is after the period
covered in our empirical analysis. Therefore, we focus on physical school infrastruc-
tures as the type of input that is the most likely to be affected by changes in non-
earmarked revenues, but we also discuss and present the effect on other budget items.
There is ample anecdotal evidence that the supply of municipal education infrastruc-
ture has not kept up with the increase in the demand over the last decade in Italy.23
Furthermore, there is causal evidence that increases in municipal school spending raise
standardized test scores in Italian primary schools (Pavese and Rubolino 2020).
One potential way through which municipalities could improve public goods pro-
vision is by reallocation of expenditures. Municipalities have room for adjustment be-
cause about one-third of expenditures are not rigid. Furthermore, Bandiera et al. (2009)
show how similar municipalities can pay very differently for similar goods, which the
authors interpret as evidence of passive waste. Moreover, a better management of ex-
isting resources might also be associated with lower political rents (see, e.g., Persson
22To gain precision, we impute missing data with provincial average values. Missing values account for
7 percent of total observations. All the results presented in the empirical strategy are not sensitive to
these interpolations.
23See, e.g., OECD, “Education at a Glance 2016”.
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and Tabellini 2000). We attempt to capture these possibilities by studying the effect of
the program on spending per-capita in administration, which is our proxy for ineffi-
cient spending (including political rents).
2.4.3 Local tax rates
To finance spending, municipalities set two main taxes. First, they charge a surtax on
personal income on top of tax rates set by the national and regional governments. The
income tax rates can differ across income brackets and vary between 0 and 0.9 percent.
Moreover, since 2007 municipalities can set an exemption cutoff for the income tax.
In our analysis, we focus on two measures: i. the bottom statutory marginal tax rate;
ii. the top statutory marginal tax rate, which is faced by around the top 5 percent of
the income distribution. These series have been collected by Rubolino (2020) from ad-
ministrative sources since 2001. Importantly, the definition of the tax base is constant
across municipalities, given that it is defined by the central government and any na-
tional reform would be absorbed as a common effect. Likewise, the definition of the
income intervals to which the tax rates applied has been constant both over time and
across municipalities.
Second, municipalities raise revenue from a local property tax. This tax was intro-
duced in 1993 (formerly called Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili) in an attempt to raise
municipalities’ administrative power and accountability. Municipalities can choose
two distinct property tax rates: i. the tax rate on “luxury” homes (e.g., stately homes,
villas, maisonettes, cottages) reported as main residence24; ii. the tax rate for second
homes and commercial buildings. The tax base for the property tax depends on a
function of the cadastral value of the residence (net of deductions), determined by the
24The 2008 reform abolished the property tax on owner-occupied residence, with the exception of cadas-
tral units A1, A8 and A9 (referred as luxury homes in the text), that were taxed even if reported as main
residence. These luxury homes are real estate units belonging to buildings located in prestigious area
presenting constructive, technological and fittings features than are of higher level than that of residen-
tial buildings. In 2012, the property tax was substantially reformed and renamed “Imposta Municipale
Propria” (see Messina and Savegnano 2014 for a review on local property taxation in Italy).
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national government. We collect information on property tax rates from the Italian In-
stitute of Finance and Local Economy (Fondazione IFEL). Over the period of interest,
the tax rate on luxury properties ranges from 0 to 0.86 percent, while the tax rate on
second homes between 0.3 and 1.11 percent.
2.4.4 Other data
In addition to the core data, we collect municipality-level time-varying information on
demographical and socio-economic data (i.e., population, share of 65+, share of 15-,
share of foreign, unemployment rate) from the Italian National Statistical Office, de-
tailed demographic and socio-economic information on local politicians from the Ital-
ian Department of the Interior (Ministero degli Interni), taxable income from the Min-
istry of Economy and Finance, elections and turnout data from Ministero degli Interni
and survey information on tolerance toward tax cheaters from European Values Survey.
2.5 Empirical strategy
The aim of the paper is to study the effects of the Ghost Buildings program on local
public finance outcomes. To this end, we build on two distinct empirical strategies.
First, we exploit cross-municipality variation in ghost buildings intensity and the stag-
gered introduction of the program to implement a difference-in-differences approach.
Second, we exploit the discontinuous change in eligibility for fiscal restraints and the
introduction of the program to implement a difference-in-discontinuity approach.
2.5.1 Difference-in-differences approach
We examine how ghost buildings intensity is associated with municipality-level public
finance outcomes by implementing a difference-in-differences event study. Specifically,
we run specifications as the following:
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yi,t = ∑
j 6=0
β j · GBi · 1(t = tj) + γi + δt + ui,t, (2.1)
where the dependent variable, yi,t, is log of tax revenue, public spending or tax
rate in municipality i at year t. GBi denotes ghost buildings intensity. The interac-
tion term, GBi · 1(t = tj), omits the program inception year (denoted by j = 0), so
that the difference-in-differences coefficient β j can be interpreted as the effect in year
t relative to the program inception year. The inclusion of municipality fixed effects,
γi, and year fixed effects, δt, allows to control for municipality-specific time-invariant
unobserved characteristics and common shocks. In some specifications, we also in-
clude time-varying municipality characteristics, province-year fixed effects and elec-
tion year-year fixed effects. These fixed effects allow to capture any change in regional
or provincial policy, local business cycle, and the fact that electoral incentives for pur-
suing policies aiming to capture voters, such as lower taxes or higher public goods
provision, are stronger when legislative elections approach (and voters’ attention in-
creases). Throughout the analysis, we cluster the standard errors at the municipality
level.25
The identifying assumption requires that the timing of program inception and its
interaction with ghost buildings intensity are quasi-random. The quasi-randomness
is equivalent to the “parallel trends assumption” of standard difference-in-differences
specifications. Therefore, we will validate this assumption by showing that β j = 0
∀j < 0.
Since the program starting year is staggered in time, municipalities might have in-
fluence over when the program would start. We then might be worried that the orig-
inal date of the program could be a response to local economic shocks. If this is the
25To account for the possibility of spatial correlation in the error term, we follow the suggestions by
Angrist and Pischke (2009) to “pass the buck up one level” and cluster standard errors on a higher
level of aggregation, which in our case is the province or the region. As we will show in Section 2.6,
our baseline results remain valid.
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case, then β would capture a selection effect. However, as discussed earlier, the tim-
ing of the program rested on the availability of digital land registry and was highly
clustered at the provincial level. Indeed, nearly one-tenth of the post-program dum-
mies has value different from the one it would have had based on the modal date of
publication in the province (see Figure B2). To deal with this discrepancy, we follow
Casaburi and Troiano (2016) to implement an instrumental variable approach. We first
compute the modal program starting year for each province, then we instrument the
actual municipality-specific program inception year dummy with this binary variable
defined at the provincial level.
To assess the magnitude of the effect and relate actual with projected revenue, we
run the following empirical specification:
yi,t = αPosti,t + β(GBi · Posti,t) + γi + δt + ui,t, (2.2)
where Posti,t is a dummy for the post-program period. This reduced form specifica-
tion is equivalent to a difference-in-differences strategy where we compare the change
in the outcome variable with ghost buildings intensity, before and after the staggered
introduction of the program.
2.5.2 Difference-in-discontinuity approach
To study whether budget constraints stimulate local administrators to enforce ghost
buildings’ registration, we exploit the discontinuous change in eligibility for the Do-
mestic Stability Pact, which limits the possibility of accumulating debt and run deficits.
We focus on the period 2005-2012, when only municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants
were subject to fiscal rules. Since we expect fiscal rules to have an independent effect
on local public finance outcomes (Grembi et al. 2016), we implement a “difference-in-
discontinuity” design, which allows to difference out any systematic difference across
eligible and not eligible municipalities by exploiting the staggered introduction of the
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program.
Defining pi as the population size in municipality i (as computed in national Cen-
sus), pc as the population cutoff above which fiscal rules applied, Ti as a dummy equal
to 1 if pi > pc, and Posti,t as a dummy equal to 1 for each year t after the inception of
the Ghost Buildings program, the difference-in-discontinuity estimator can be imple-
mented by estimating the boundary points of four regressions functions of yi,t on pc:
on both sides of pc and for both Posti,t = 0 and = 1.
We follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Gelman and Imbens (2019) to run local
linear regressions: this method consists in fitting linear regression functions to the ob-
servations distributed within a distance h on either side of pc. We restrict the sample
to municipalities in the interval pi ∈ [pc − h, pc + h]26 to run the following regression:
log(yi,t) = αP∗i + Ti(β0 + β1P
∗
it) + Posti,t[γ0 + γ1P
∗
i
+ Ti(δ0 + δ1P∗i )] + ui,t,
(2.3)
where P∗i = pi − pc is the normalized population size. The coefficient of interest is
δ0, which identifies the local average effect of eligibility for fiscal restraints on tax col-
lections, as the treatment is given by the interaction between the post-program dummy
variable and eligibility for the Domestic Stability Pact, Posti,t× Ti. A positive δ0 would
suggest that local administrators in municipalities subject to fiscal rules collect larger
revenue as a result of the Ghost Buildings program, compared to municipalities not
eligible for fiscal rules but with similar scope for raising revenue.
This empirical approach yields the causal effect of eligibility for fiscal restraints on
local administrators’ compliance under plausible assumptions. First, any difference in
tax revenue would have not systematically changed at pc in the absence of the Ghost
26We first restrict the sample to the interval ± 2,000 since other policies change discontinuously at the
3,000 population threshold. The optimal bandwidth, h, is then computed using the algorithm devel-
oped by Calonico et al. (2014).
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Buildings program. In other terms, we assume (local) parallel trends across munic-
ipalities just below and above pc. To validate this assumption, we will estimate the
δ0 coefficient year-by-year. We will show that municipalities were on similar trends
before the introduction of the Ghost Buildings program, thus strongly supporting the
validity of this design.
Second, we assume the absence of any manipulation of the running variable. We test
for the continuity of the density at pc (McCrary 2008). Figure B5 shows no evidence of
systematic manipulation; the discontinuity estimate is -.061 (.120).
Third, δ0 provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of ghost buildings’ registration
on the outcome of interest under the assumption that there is no interaction between
the Ghost Buildings program and other policies or factors that changed discontinu-
ously at the 5,000 cutoff. This assumption might be violated if local administrators just
below and just above pc, who are paid differently, are systematically different in their
ability to enforce registration of ghost buildings. We directly test this assumption by
performing two exercises. First, in Figure B6, we show that the distribution of mayor
and components of town council’s ability (measured by a dummy for having a col-
lege degree) does not significantly change at pc (discontinuity estimates are .017 (.057)
and .019 (.019), respectively). Second, we exploit the discontinuous change in mayors’
salary at other population cutoffs (i.e., at 10,000 and 15,000) to analyze whether there
is any change in collected revenue, holding constant the eligibility for fiscal rules. Fig-
ure B7 shows that tax collections do not present any significant jump in these cases,
thus indirectly suggesting that the contemporaneous change in mayor’s salary would
not confound the effect that we assign to eligibility for fiscal restraints.
Similarly, we require municipalities around pc to face the same scope in raising
tax revenue. This assumption might be violated if either scope for registering ghost
buildings changes discontinuously at the population cutoff or, conditional on scope
for stricter enforcement, if buildings’ characteristics and tax rates differ as well. If this
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is the case, then any difference in tax collections would reflect a systematic difference
in revenue gains from any mechanical increase in the tax base. We test this possibility
by comparing the distribution of ghost buildings intensity (Figure B8), pre-program
tax rates (Figure B9), rental value and buildings’ characteristics (Figure B10). In each of
these cases, we do not find any significant difference as one crosses the cutoff defining
eligibility for fiscal restraints, thus suggesting that expected revenue gains from enforc-
ing ghost buildings’ registration would be similar for the two groups of municipalities.
2.6 Results
This section presents the results on the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on
municipality-level tax revenue (Hypothesis 1), public spending (Hypothesis 2) and tax
rates (Hypothesis 3). For the sake of space, we report additional results and robustness
checks in Appendix B.
2.6.1 Tax revenue
Baseline results. We start by presenting the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on
tax collections. Figure 2.4 presents the estimated β j coefficients from equation (2.1):
each point shows the effect of having implemented the Ghost Buildings program for j
years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy j years before (if j < 0) relative to the actual in-
ception year. Three main findings emerge. First, there are no pre-existing differences in
the tax revenue trend across municipalities: the β j are not significantly different from
zero for at least five pre-program years.27 The parallel trend assumption is thus satis-
fied. Second, tax revenue have started to increase exactly from the time the program
was put in force. Third, the revenue increase is sharp, stable and persistent up to five
27Hereafter, we only plot estimates up to 5 years before and 5 years after the program inception year
because the vast majority of municipalities is observed during this time window. However, the re-
gressions include the full set of dummies as specified in equation (2.1). Results are not sensitive to
excluding municipalities that are not observed over this time window.
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years after the implementation of the program.
Figure 2.4: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on tax collections
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Note: This graph presents the impact of the Ghost Buildings program on log of tax revenue. The figure
plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation (2.1) and the 95 percent confidence intervals: each point
shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy j years
before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at municipality-
level.
To assess the magnitude of these effects and compare the estimated coefficient with
the projected increase based on a scenario of full compliance, Table 2.2 presents coeffi-
cient estimates and standard errors obtained by running equation (2.2) . We start from
a basic model including municipality fixed effects (column 1), and then we cumula-
tively include year fixed effects, time-varying municipalities controls,28 province-year
fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects. Column 5 (our preferred specifica-
tion) presents the coefficient estimated from a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model
where the dummy for the actual program inception year is instrumented by the the
28We control for demographic characteristics (population, share of population 65+, share of population
15-, share of foreign), unemployment rate, and individual-level characteristics of the mayor and other
members of the town council (i.e., gender, age and years of education of the mayor and average value
of the same variables within the town council). We also include the interaction between each of these
variables and a dummy for the post-program period.
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provincial modal year. In the last column, we exploit the fact that the program was
not implemented in Trentino Alto-Adige region to run a triple difference analysis. The
coefficient remains substantially similar. Overall, this table shows that the impact of
the program on tax revenue is consistently positive in each specification.
Table 2.2: Baseline effects on tax revenue
Outcome: log of tax revenue
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
& DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Posti,t × GBi 2.477*** 2.359*** 1.686*** 1.342*** 1.283*** 1.229***
(0.206) (0.205) (0.202) (0.278) (0.295) (0.295)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 119,670
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Election year × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Mean dependent (€1,000) 1,972 1,972 1,972 1,972 1,972 1,937
Note: This table shows the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on log of municipal tax revenue.
Posti,t × GBi is the interaction between a dummy for the (municipality-specific) post-program period
and the share of ghost buildings detected in a municipality. Column (5) reports estimates from an in-
strumental variable approach where the post-program dummy is instrumented by the provincial modal
year of the program inception year. Column (6) combines the 2SLS approach with a triple difference
approach that exploits the fact that one region did not participate into the program. The sample covers
7,709 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. First-stage coefficient is 0.958 (0.007). Standard errors
clustered at municipality-level.
The baseline effect implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in municipality-level
program intensity (corresponding to a 1.662 percentage points increase in the share of
unregistered buildings) raises tax revenue by 2.1 percent of the sample mean, which
amounts to nearly 42,043 euros of additional revenue per year. This effect accounts for
70 percent (that is, 2.1 percent of the predicted 3 percent) of the projected tax revenue
increase that the program would have generated in a scenario with perfect compliance.
To put this number in perspective, if we move from Trento (where ghost buildings
intensity was 0) to Crotone (where one-tenth of the stock of buildings was unregis-
tered), we would observe an increase in tax revenue by around 14 percent in Crotone
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compared to Trento, which corresponds to nearly 1,140 thousand euros of additional
revenue per-year.29
The estimated impact can be ascribed to the Ghost Buildings program if we ob-
served a contemporaneous offsetting change in government grants. In line with the
graphical evidence presented above, Figure B11 shows a clear fall in government grants.
Table B2 presents the same specifications as above, but using the log of government
grants as outcome. Our preferred specification (column 5) implies that a 1 standard
deviation increase in ghost buildings intensity decreases government grants by 2.7 per-
cent, which is fairly close to the projected reduction based on the back-of-the-envelope
calculations presented in section 2.2. Moreover, we also show that the timing of the ef-
fect is consistent with an increase in the tax base (see Figure B12 and the bottom panel
in Table B2), while we do not find any significant change in other potential revenue
sources, such as loans or mortgages (see Figure B13). Overall, these tests provide evi-
dence that it is the additional tax base generated by ghost buildings’ registration that
drives the variation in tax revenue. In line with Hypothesis 1, these results suggest that
the Ghost Buildings program raises tax revenue.
Finally, we account for the possibility that the error term was spatially correlated
across municipalities located in the same local labor market. Following the suggestions
by Angrist and Pischke (2009) to “pass the buck up one level”, we cluster the standard
errors on a higher level of aggregation. Figure B14 shows that our estimates remain
statistically significant at usual confidence intervals when we employ standard errors
clustered at province- or region-level.
Local administrators’ compliance. The results presented in the previous paragraphs
showed that actual tax revenue were lower than projected tax revenue. From a policy
perspective, it is important to understand whether missing revenue can be attributed
to local administrators’ imperfect compliance.
29Moving from Trento to Crotone implies a 6.667 standard deviation increase in ghost buildings inten-
sity. Tax revenue in Crotone over the pre-program period were 8,137,109 euros.
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We study the role of local administrators by exploiting a discontinuity in the pos-
sibility of accumulating debt and run deficit. Since failing to enforce ghost buildings’
registration would reduce government grants and eventually increase budget deficit,
we expect larger revenue in municipalities eligible for fiscal rules. Therefore, we aim to
identify the role of local administrators by comparing tax revenue before and after the
Ghost Buildings program (to cancel out any systematic cross-municipality heterogene-
ity, including any (time-invariant) policy changing at the same cutoff) and just below
and above the cutoff defining eligibility for fiscal rules.
Figure 2.5 presents the difference in log of tax revenue in 20 equal size bins and
a linear fit for observations at both sides of the cutoff. The sample is composed of
549 municipalities, having a population size between 4,283 and 5,717, as defined by
employing the data driven choice of the optimal bandwidth proposed by Calonico et al.
(2014) (we will present results for different range of bandwidths below). We also report
the δo coefficient estimate and municipality-level clustered standard errors obtained by
running regression (2.3). The figure shows that eligibility for fiscal restraints creates a
revenue gap: local administrators in municipalities with a balanced budget rule collect,
on average, 11.1 percent more revenue. This finding confirms Hypothesis 1: ceteris
paribus, tax revenue are higher in municipalities subject to fiscal restraints.
We then allow for treatment intensity by multiplying the interaction between the
dummy for post-reform period and the dummy for fiscal rules ’ eligibility, Posti,t · Di,
with ghost buildings intensity, GBi. Table 2.3 shows the results. Our baseline esti-
mate (column 1) shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in ghost buildings inten-
sity (corresponding to an increase of 1.577 ghost buildings share in this sample) leads
to a tax revenue increase that is 6.764 percent larger in municipalities eligible for fiscal
restraints, compared to municipalities not eligible for fiscal restraints. In the rest of the
table, we test the sensitivity of this result to polynomial order’s choice and the inclu-
sion of municipality-specific time-varying control variables. The coefficient estimate
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Figure 2.5: Imperfect compliance in ensuring enforcement
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Note: This graph shows the impact of eligibility for a balanced budget rules on local administrators’
compliance in ensuring enforcement. The vertical axis is the difference in log of tax revenue before
and after the Ghost Buildings program. The horizontal axis is the actual population size minus 5,000.
Scatter points are sample average over intervals of 100 population size bins. The optimal bandwidth is
computed following the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014).
remains substantially similar across specifications.
We conduct three additional robustness checks to corroborate this finding. First,
we validate the (local) parallel trend assumption in Figure B15, where we depict year-
by-year coefficient estimates and confidence intervals. We do not find any significant
difference in tax revenue across municipalities below and above the cutoff for up to
5 years before the introduction of the Ghost Buildings program, thus suggesting that
municipalities were on similar trends. By contrast, a clear and persistent discontinuity
arises immediately after the introduction of the program. This result unambiguously
shows that the increase in tax revenue was driven by the Ghost Building program and
not by pre-existing trends across municipalities.
Second, the difference-in-discontinuity estimate rests on the assumption that other
demographic and political economy factors are not varying systematically across mu-
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Table 2.3: Local administrators’ imperfect compliance
Outcome: log of tax revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Posti,t × Di × GBi 4.292*** 3.427*** 3.975*** 3.196*** 4.210*** 3.366***
(0.786) (0.819) (0.817) (0.873) (0.824) (0.901)
Observations 549 549 549 549 549 549
Polynomial order 1 1 2 2 3 3
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Note: This table reports difference-in-discontinuity estimates of the impact of the Ghost Buildings pro-
gram on the difference in log of tax revenue across municipalities below and above the cutoff defining
eligibility for fiscal rules. In Columns (1) and (2), we run local linear regressions. Columns (3) and (4) use
a second-order polynomial, while we use a third-order polynomial in columns (5) and (6). Column (2),
(4) and (6) include municipality-specific control variables. Optimal bandwidth is computed following
the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
nicipalities above and below the cutoff in response to the Ghost Buildings program.
If, for instance, the introduction of the Ghost Buildings program led high skill local
administrators to be appointed, we would capture a selection effect. We explore this
possibility by running equation (2.3) on several mayor and town council-specific char-
acteristics, including their ability, age and sex. Table B3 reports the results. We do not
find any significant effect of the program on each of these variables.
Finally, we test whether our results are sensitive to bandwidth choice. Figure B16
displays coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals obtained by estimat-
ing equation (2.3) using different bandwidths around the threshold. The figure shows
that our coefficient estimate is unaffected by bandwidth choice for a reasonable range
of bandwidths.
Heterogeneity analysis. We now study whether, conditional on scope for ghost
buildings’ registration, collected revenue significantly differ across municipalities ac-
cording to specific characteristics of local administrators, citizens, and housing sector.
First, we study whether local administrators’ ability matters. Ability might reflect,
e.g., the capacity to persuade evaders to register the buildings. We create the dummies
LowAbilityi and HighAbilityi, equal to 1 for municipalities where the share of gradu-
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ated local administrators lies in the bottom or top decile, respectively, of the national
distribution. Column (1) in Table 2.4 shows that, conditional on scope for stricter en-
forcement, low ability local administrators were relatively less successful in enforcing
ghost buildings’ registration.
Table 2.4: Heterogeneous effects on tax revenue
Outcome: log of tax revenue
(1) (2) (3)
Posti,t × GBi 1.293*** 0.804** 1.318***
(0.433) (0.336) (0.411)
Posti,t × GBi × LowAbilityi -1,796***
(0.711)
Posti,t × GBi × HighAbilityi 0.175
(0.404)
Posti,t × GBi × LowTaxCheati 3.514***
(0.920)
Posti,t × GBi × HighTaxCheati -2.734**
(1.212)
Posti,t × GBi × LowOwnerOcci 0.291
(0.364)
Posti,t × GBi × HighOwnerOcci -1.468**
(0.705)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table presents heterogeneous responses of the Ghost Buildings program on tax revenue. Each
specification includes municipality fixed effects, province-year fixed effects, election year-year fixed ef-
fects and municipality controls. The interaction between the dummy for the post-program period and
the share of ghost buildings in a municipality, Posti,t × GBi, is interacted with dummy variables for
politicians with low or high ability as measured by the town council’s average years of education (col-
umn 1), low or high tolerance toward tax cheating behaviors (column 2), and municipalities with a low
or high share of owner-occupied homes (column 3). A municipality is classified as a high (low) level of a
specific indicator if it has a value in the top (bottom) decile of the national distribution of that indicator.
Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
Second, we study whether the program was more successful in places where the
underlying preferences for curbing tax evasion are more spread. As emphasized by
political scientists, social and civic capital are key values for the successful operation
of government policies (see, e.g., Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993).
We use information on tolerance toward tax cheating behavior from survey data to
construct the dummies LowTaxCheati and HighTaxCheati, that are equal to 1 in places
where the average score is in the bottom or top decile, respectively, of the national
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distribution. Column (2) in Table 2.4 shows that the program was relatively more suc-
cessful in municipalities with a lower level of tolerance for tax cheaters. By contrast,
places where residents are less likely to blame tax evaders have significantly lower tax
intakes as a result of the Ghost Buildings program. A simple interpretation for this
result is that local administrators’ compliance rate is larger in places where voters are
more likely to blame evaders.
Finally, we explore whether local administrators are less likely to raise tax collections
in places where the buildings’ stock is mostly composed of owner-occupied homes.
Since enforcing ghost buildings’ registration raises the tax burden and might possi-
bly harm re-electoral chances, compliance rate can be lower in place with a larger
share of owner-occupied homes. To explore this possibility, we create the dummies
HighOwnerOcci and LowOwnerOcci, which take value 1 in a municipality when the
share of owner-occupied homes lies in the top or bottom decile, respectively, of the
national distribution. Column (3) consistently shows that tax collections are signifi-
cantly lower in places where the stock of owner-occupied homes is relatively larger.
One explanation is that local administrators are less willing to enforce ghost buildings’
registration in places where a large number of residents (i.e., voters) would be affected
by the program.
2.6.2 Public spending
Baseline results. This section presents the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on
municipality-level public spending. Namely, we study whether shifting from govern-
ment grants to tax revenue as a source of funding for municipalities had any impact
on public spending allocation.
Figure 2.6 depicts the β j coefficients and standard errors estimated by running equa-
tion (2.1) on two outcomes: administrative spending per-capita (top panel) and educa-
tion spending per-capita (bottom panel). As in the previous figure, the event time is set
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relative to the program inception year, and dynamic treatment effects are rescaled by
the baseline spending at t = 0. The evidence provided in this figure is consistent with
the concept that switching from a less to a more transparent source of revenue raises
politicians’ accountability and public goods provision. In accordance with Hypothesis
2, we observe a substantial and gradual decline in administration expenditure and an
increase in school spending.30
Figure 2.6: Event study for public spending allocation
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A. Administrative spending
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B. Education spending
Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost Buildings program on log of administrative spending
per-capita (top figure) and education spending per-capita (bottom figure). The figure plots the estimated
β j coefficients from equation (2.1) and the 95 percent confidence intervals: each point shows the effect
of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy j years before (if j < 0)
relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at municipality level.
Table 2.5 quantifies the average effect of the Ghost Buildings program on log of ad-
ministrative spending per-capita (top panel) and education spending per-capita (bot-
tom panel). The table reports coefficients estimates and standard errors obtained by
running equation (2.2).31 The coefficient estimates for administrative spending are
30Differently from tax revenue, the effect appears to start from t = +2. This temporal lag might reflect
the fact that public spending decisions are approved by the town council by the 30th of April of the
following year.
31 Figure B17 presents alternative results using standard errors clustered at province- or region-level.
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consistently negative, although the magnitude of the effect varies somewhat across
specifications. In particular, the effect becomes larger once we include province-year
fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects, which account for any local economic
shocks or the fact that electoral incentives for pursuing policies aiming to capture vot-
ers are stronger when legislative elections approach (and voters’ attention increases).
On average, our preferred specification (column 5) suggests that a 1 standard deviation
increase in ghost buildings intensity decreases administrative spending by 2.6 percent,
which corresponds to a reduction of around 9.3 euros per-capita (baseline administra-
tive spending per-capita is 359 euros).
By contrast, we estimate that the program has a positive effect on school spending
per-capita. Although the estimated coefficient does not vary substantially across speci-
fications, we obtain less precise estimates in specifications with province-year and elec-
tion year-year fixed effects. The baseline specification suggests that a 1 standard devia-
tion increase in scope for enforcement raises school spending per-capita by 1.6 percent
(from a baseline of around 6 euros per-capita). In aggregate terms, our estimates sug-
gest that a 1 standard deviation increase in ghost buildings intensity would increase,
on average, education spending by around 484 euros per-municipality. According to
the estimate provided by Pavese and Rubolino (2020), a 1 standard deviation increase
in ghost buildings intensity would raise standardized test scores by around 0.06 of a
standard deviation.32
The intuition behind this observed change in public spending allocation is that
any revenue increase obtained through higher taxes is obviously visible by taxpayers,
while an increase in revenue financed by government transfers might not be observed
at all by citizens. As a result, any increase in tax revenue would make politicians more
accountable and ultimately leads to a more efficient allocation of public spending. This
32Pavese and Rubolino (2020) estimate that a 100 euros increase in school spending per-pupil raises
standardized math test scores by 0.119 of a standard deviation. A back-of-the-envelope calculation
implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in ghost buildings intensity would raise school spending
by around 46.15 euros per-pupil.
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Table 2.5: Baseline effects on public spending
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
& DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: log of administrative spending per-capita
Posti,t × GBi -0.282** -0.224* -0.594*** -1.445*** -1.541*** -1.542***
(0.118) (0.118) (0.119) (0.158) (0.163) (0.163)
Mean dependent 358.71 358.71 358.71 358.71 358.71 374.92
B. Outcome: log of education spending per-capita
Posti,t × GBi 1.023** 1.045** 1.369*** 1.090* 0.958 0.920
(0.440) (0.440) (0.458) (0.659) (0.693) (0.693)
Mean dependent 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 5.98 6.84
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 119,670
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Elec. year × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table shows the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on log of administrative spending
per-capita (top panel) and education spending per-capita (bottom panel). Posti,t ×GBi is the interaction
between a dummy for the (municipality-specific) post-program period and the share of ghost buildings
detected in a municipality. The sample covers 7,709 municipalities (7,978 in last column) over the 2001-
2015 period. First-stage coefficient is 0.958 (0.007). Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
finding is closely related to the evidence presented by Gadenne (2017), showing that
improvements in tax collections raise school investments in Brazilian municipalities.
Similarly, Martinez (2019) exploits the timing of cadastral updates and fluctuations in
oil prices to show that larger property tax revenue raises local public goods provision
in Colombian municipalities.
In Table B4, we replicate the same analysis on other budget items. We do not find
any significant effect on all the other public expenditure categories, with the only ex-
ception of spending to finance municipal police.33 This spending increase might be
motivated by the fact that municipal policies played a key role, along with munici-
pal administrators, in the enforcement process. In fact, municipal police was required
33Crowding out of national or regional spending in education is unlikely to drive this effect: the “divi-
sion of labor” between different levels of government in Italy is well defined by the Constitutional law.
We can therefore rule out the concern that national and regional bodies withdraw funding in areas in
which they are aware of increased spending by municipalities.
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to proceed to inspections and imputation of the tax base of properties not voluntar-
ily registered. Yet, although statistically significant, the effect appears rather small in
economic terms: on average, we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in ghost
buildings intensity raises municipal police spending by around 1.8 euros per-capita
(see Figure B18 for the event study graph).
Heterogeneity analysis. Table 2.6 casts light on the mechanisms behind the ob-
served effects by studying heterogeneous responses regarding i) voters’ likelihood to
be informed; ii) politicians’ ability; iii) mayor’s gender.
Table 2.6: Heterogeneous effects on public spending
log of administrative log of education
spending per-capita spending per-capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Posti,t × GBi -1.736*** -1.451*** -1.419*** 0.718 1.128* 0.879
(0.210) (0.160) (0.161) (0.923) (0.666) (0.665)
... ×LowTurnouti 0.470** 0.584
(0.217) (0.906)
... ×LowSkilli 0.792* -0.489
(0.423) (1.960)
... ×Womani -0.239 2.129**
(0.286) (1.075)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table studies heterogeneous responses of the Ghost Buildings program on municipal pub-
lic spending per-capita in administration and education. All specifications include municipality fixed
effects, province-year fixed effects, election year-year fixed effects and municipality controls. The post-
program ghost buildings intensity indicator is interacted with a dummy variable for municipalities
where political participation is lower than the median (columns 1-4), a dummy for those where the
average number of years of education of town council’s members is lower than the median (columns
2-5), and a dummy for municipalities with female mayors (columns 3-6). Standard errors clustered at
municipality-level.
We first study heterogeneity effects with respect to voters’ likelihood to be informed
about how public spending is allocated, as proxied by the electoral turnout for the
national election in 2013. Intuitively, places where citizens are less informed and less
active in the political debate might be less willing to monitor local politicians and, thus,
to limit rent-seeking behaviors (Ferraz and Finan 2008; Gadenne 2017). Consistent with
this view, we find that the administrative spending cut is significantly dampened in
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municipalities where political participation is lower than the median value (column 1).
This result underlines the role of having a more informed electorate to exert pressure
on politicians for providing a more efficient allocation of public budget.
The increase in the tax burden faced by ghost buildings’ owners could make them
more willing to demand more from politicians. Politicians ability to translate extra rev-
enue in worth government spending might be crucial to accommodate the electorate.
In column 2, we show that municipalities where town council’s members are less able
(proxied by the share of members with a college degree) were less likely to reduce
administrative spending.
Finally, we study whether the gender of the mayor matters for public spending de-
cision. Previous literature has provided suggestive evidence that women politicians
are more likely to promote redistributive public policies both because they are less cor-
rupt (Brollo and Troiano 2016) and more effective than men to spur economic growth
through public spending (Edlund and Pande 2002; Edlund et al. 2005). Consistent with
this literature, we find that the increase in education spending is significantly larger in
places where mayors are women.
2.6.3 Tax rates
Baseline results. This section studies whether the Ghost Buildings program has any
impact on local tax rates. Specifically, the program offers the opportunity to study the
tax rate response to a broaden and relatively more enforced tax base. We focus on
four (statutory) tax rates set by municipalities: i) the top marginal tax rate on personal
income; ii) the bottom marginal tax rate on personal income; iii) the tax rate applied
to luxury properties reported as main residence; iv) the tax rate applied to buildings
different from the main residence.
We start by plotting the event study estimates from equation (2.1) in Figure 2.7. This
figure provides two main findings. First, there is a clear change in the distribution of
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the income tax burden as a response to the program. Top graph depicts a significant
gradual increase in the top tax rate and, by contrast, a reduction in the income tax
rate faced by poorer taxpayers (although the pre-program coefficients are significantly
different from zero in some years). This result points to a positive increase in structural
progressivity of the municipal income tax schedule.
Figure 2.7: Event study for local tax rates
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A. Top income tax rate
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B. Bottom income tax rate
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C. Tax rate on luxury properties
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D. Tax rate on second homes
Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost Buildings program on local statutory tax rates. The
figure plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation (2.1) and the 95 percent confidence intervals:
each point shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the
policy j years before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at
municipality-level.
Second, we find that the program led to larger tax rates on both luxury properties
and second homes. These results are consistent with our Hypothesis 3: a broader and
more enforced tax base leads local administrators to exploit the “mechanical gains” of
raising taxes. In all cases, we find significant effects up to 5 years after the program
inception year.
Table 2.7 presents coefficient estimates and standard errors on the effect of the pro-
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gram on local tax rates, obtained by running equation (2.2).34 The table shows that esti-
mates are hardly affected when controlling for municipality-specific controls, province-
year fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects or by using different econometric
models. Our preferred specification (column 5) shows that a 1 standard deviation in-
crease in ghost buildings intensity raises the top marginal tax rate on income by 0.6
percent, while the bottom marginal tax rate falls by 0.7 percent.
Table 2.7: Baseline effects on local marginal tax rates
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
& DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Outcome: log of top income tax rate
Posti,t × GBi 0.557*** 0.569*** 0.471*** 0.339*** 0.341** 0.347***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.127) (0.134) (0.133)
Mean dependent (%) 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.340
B. Outcome: log of bottom income tax rate
Posti,t × GBi -0.389*** -0.410*** -0.335*** -0.422*** -0.427*** -0.431***
(0.109) (0.109) (0.110) (0.155) (0.164) (0.164)
Mean dependent (%) 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.269
C. Outcome: log of property tax on luxury buildings
Posti,t × GBi 0.089*** 0.111*** 0.070*** 0.157*** 0.166*** 0.170***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
Mean dependent (%) 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.492
D. Outcome: log of property tax on second homes
Posti,t × GBi 0.146*** 0.107*** 0.090*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 0.162***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
Mean dependent (%) 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.676 0.671
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 119,670
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Election × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table displays the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on the (log of) tax rates set by
municipalities. The sample covers 7,709 municipalities (7,978 in the last column) over the 2001-2015
period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
We find that the program leads to higher property taxes. Point estimate in column
(5) implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in the Ghost Buildings program leads to
an increase by around 0.3 percent in property tax rates. This clear change in property
34Figure B19 displays alternative results using standard errors clustered at province- or region-level.
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taxes suggests that the absence of a monitoring technique and the possibility of not
registering a property led to suboptimal tax rates.
Heterogeneity analysis. This section explores heterogeneity responses to the tax
rate increase. First, we ask whether policy makers raise taxes for redistributive pur-
poses. If growing inequality was the main concern, the tax rate increase should be
relatively larger in places where the pre-program distribution of income was more un-
equal. We shed light on this mechanisms by using data on the municipality-specific
pre-tax Gini index.35 We split municipalities according to their pre-program level of
local income inequality to create the dummy HighIneqi, equal to 1 for municipalities
with a Gini index above the median. Top panel in Table 2.8 shows that the impact
of the program on the top income tax rate was significantly larger in more unequal
municipalities.
Second, if optimal tax rules are defined by means of the Ramsey’s inverse elasticity
rule, local administrators might take into account the responsiveness of the reported
tax base to larger statutory tax rates. If, for instance, taxpayers in certain places had ac-
cess to better evasion or avoidance technologies or their labor supply is more sensitive
to tax rate changes, then local policy makers would be less willing to raise taxes. To
summarize how much taxpayers are likely to respond to a tax rate change, we estimate
the (pre-program) tax base elasticity of a municipality with respect to its net-of-tax
rate. This elasticity incorporates all the behavioral responses of taxpayers to any tax
rate change set by municipalities (Saez et al. 2012) and it measures the efficiency cost
of raising taxes in terms of missing revenue.36 Using the estimated elasticity, we cre-
35The Gini index is computed from municipality-specific tabulated data on taxable income from 7
income intervals, following the procedure proposed by Milanovic (1994) and Abounoori and Mc-
Cloughan (2003).
36Empirically, the tax base elasticity is estimated as the β parameter from regressions of the following
form: log(yi,t) = βlog(1− τi,t) + γXi,t + δi + εp(i),t + ηe(i),t + ui,t, where the outcomes is the tax base of
municipality i at year t; τ is the tax rate (the top marginal tax rate, the bottom marginal tax rate or the
property tax rate depending on the specification). Xi,t are municipality-level time-varying controls; δi,
εp(i),t, and ηe(i),t are municipality fixed effects, province-year fixed effects, and election year-year fixed
effects, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Heterogeneous effects on local tax rates
log(Inc tax) log(Inc tax) log(Prop tax) log(Prop tax)
Top rate (%) Bottom rate (%) Luxury pr. (%) Second pr. (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
by pre-program income inequality level
Posti,t × GBi 0.399** -0.315* 0.172*** 0.186***
(0.157) (0.176) (0.033) (0.041)
Posti,t × GBi × HighIneqi 0.189** -0.148 -0.030 -0.010
(0.096) (0.117) (0.031) (0.028)
by cost of raising taxes
Posti,t × GBi 1.615*** 0.460** 0.241*** 0.318***
(0.170) (0.226) (0.055) (0.051)
Posti,t × GBi × HighCosti -1.350*** -1.326*** 0.001 -0.102**
(0.154) (0.209) (0.050) (0.048)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635
Baseline controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table studies heterogeneous responses of the Ghost Buildings program on local marginal tax
rates. All specifications include municipality fixed effects, province-year fixed effects, election year-year
fixed effects and municipality controls. The interaction between the dummy for the post-program period
and the share of ghost buildings in a municipality, Posti,t × GBi, is interacted with dummy variables for
municipalities with a pre-program Gini index higher than the median value (panel a) and for those
where the cost of raising taxes (captured by the net-of-tax tax base elasticity) is larger than the median
value (panel b). The sample covers 7,709 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. Standard errors
clustered at municipality-level.
ate the dummy HighCosti, equal to 1 if the cost of raising taxes in a municipality (i.e.,
its tax base elasticity) is larger than the median value. The bottom panel in Table 2.8
shows that policy makers do discount for the expected behavioral response of taxpay-
ers when deciding on tax policy. The increase in the top marginal tax rate and property
tax on second homes was substantially dampened in places with larger tax base elastic-
ity, suggesting that the threat of tax base flee prevents policy makers by changing taxes.
Accordingly, the tax rate reduction is significantly larger in places where taxpayers are
more sensitive to the tax rate. This might suggest that policy makers attempt to spur
economic growth by lowering the tax burden faced by the poor.
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2.7 Conclusion
How successful are anti-tax evasion policies in raising revenues? Do politicians react to
exogenous increase in revenue by seeking rents or spending it on public goods? Does
tax evasion hinder tax progressivity by raising the cost of setting higher taxes on the
rich? This paper aims to answer these questions by focusing on the Ghost Buildings
program: an anti-tax evasion program implemented in Italy that detected more than 2
millions of buildings hidden to tax authorities.
Exploiting cross-municipality variation in the share of detected unregistered build-
ings and the staggered introduction of the program, we uncover a stable and persistent
increase in tax revenue, corresponding to nearly three-fourth of the projected mechan-
ical increase in the tax base. This discrepancy is mostly due to imperfect compliance
by local administrators in financially unconstrained municipalities. We also show that
decisions regarding how to finance local governments are a key feature for ensuring a
more efficient allocation of public spending. Finally, we provide evidence that stricter
tax enforcement leads to larger property tax rates and to an increase in the progressiv-
ity of the local income tax schedule.
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3.1 Introduction
The literature on intergenerational mobility documents that socioeconomic status per-
sists over generations in all countries studied so far, although to varying degrees (Black
and Devereux 2011; Corak 2013). A growing number of papers also document persis-
tence within specific occupations, such as doctors (Lentz and Laband 1989), lawyers
(Laband and Lentz 1992), academic professors (Durante et al. 2011), pharmacists (Mo-
cetti 2016) and liberal professions (Aina and Nicoletti 2018). The literature on the
causes of intergenerational persistence has been largely dominated by the debate on
the relative importance of an individual’s innate qualities (nature) versus environmen-
tal factors (nurture),1 while the role of the functioning of the labor market remains
substantially under-investigated.
Another strand of literature is aimed at understanding the economic effects of reg-
ulation of occupations (Kleiner 2000). One of the main justifications for regulation in
certain professions is the existence of asymmetric information between suppliers and
clients that, in turn, may lead to a market failure. However, excessive regulation may
hinder competition and generate monopoly rents, especially when regulation is mainly
shaped by the interests of the incumbents. Empirical studies usually find higher earn-
ings for individuals in regulated occupations (Kleiner and Krueger 2013), while the
evidence regarding the effects on the selection of practitioners is scant and based on
peculiar case studies.
The present paper stands at the junction between these two strands of literature.
Our aim is to provide a first thorough analysis of how regulation affects intergen-
erational persistence in occupations and therefore entry opportunities and allocative
mechanisms of these labor markets.
Distinguishing a career following that is motivated by an intergenerational trans-
1See, among others, Bowles et al. (2005), Björklund et al. (2006) and Sacerdote (2011).
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fer of occupation-specific human capital (through either nature or nurture) from that
caused by regulation and positional rents is empirically challenging. To address this
issue, we exploit two reforms relating to the regulation of professional services that
have been implemented in Italy since the 2000s: the “Bersani decree” in 2006 and the
“Monti reform” in 2011. Although the liberalization of Italian professional services
was remarkable in some respects, initial conditions differed substantially across occu-
pations, while the pace and extent of regulatory reform also varied substantially. To
measure the strictness of regulation, we build an OECD-style index for 14 occupations
and for three different cohorts (i.e., before and after each reform). The propensity of
children to follow their parents’ career is measured using data from the Labor Force
Survey (LFS), matching the (2-digits) degree program on which they are enrolled with
the (4-digits) occupation of their parents. Namely, we proxy occupational persistence
with an indicator that is equal to 1 if children pursue a course of study that naturally
leads to the same occupation as their parents.2 Then, we exploit the differential effect
of regulation on career following for professionals (treated group) and employees in
similar occupations (control group), before and after each reform.
We find significant heterogeneity in intergenerational persistence across occupa-
tions: career following is remarkably high among lawyers and pharmacists, whereas
it is relatively lower among natural scientists. We also find that regulation does affect
the extent of occupational persistence. According to our estimate, the combined ef-
fect of the two regulatory reforms (that corresponds to a 1.7 decrease in our index of
the strictness of regulation on a 0-6 scale) reduced the propensity of career following
by about 4 percentage points (more than one-third of the sample mean). The impact
is stronger for occupations in the social sciences (e.g., lawyers, accountants, etc.) and
in areas where the local economy is more dependent upon professional services (i.e.,
2It is worth noting that our main outcome variable captures the likelihood of career following and not oc-
cupational persistence, as we observe the degree program and not the final occupation of the children.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we also refer to it as (risk of) occupation persistence.
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where economic rents are higher). Interestingly, at the individual level, the impact of
regulation on occupational persistence is stronger for less able children, thus further
confirming the existence of allocative inefficiencies in the distribution of talents across
occupations. As far as the domains of regulation are concerned, the effect of regula-
tion is entirely driven by restriction on market conduct (e.g., restrictions on prices and
advertising); by contrast stricter entry requirements are associated with fairer entry
opportunities in certain occupations.
Our paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, the overwhelming
majority of existing empirical studies that examine the factors responsible for the ob-
served intergenerational persistence has focused on nature versus nurture and on the
mediating role of the education system (Black and Devereux 2011).3 Surprisingly, the
role of regulation, which may heavily influence economic returns and barriers to entry
in certain occupations, is largely neglected. However, a simple cross-country evidence
shows that the strictness of regulation in professional services is positively associated
to intergenerational persistence in related occupations (see Figure 3.1).4 Moreover, reg-
ulation is not a second-order issue as a large proportion of workers is employed in reg-
ulated sectors (Kleiner 2000; Koumenta and Pagliero 2019); as far as Italy is concerned,
individuals employed in occupations whose activity requires membership of a profes-
sional body (professioni ordinistiche) represent about 10 percent of the total employment
and 31 percent of those with a college degree (Mocetti et al. 2019).
Second, our empirical strategy allows the identification of a causal nexus (from anti-
competitive regulation to career following), thus overcoming the descriptive approach
3As far as occupational persistence is concerned, Lindquist et al. (2015) find, using Swedish administra-
tive data on adoptees and on their biological and adoptive parents, that post-birth factors matter twice
as much as pre-birth factors in explaining intergenerational transmission of occupations. However,
they are not able to identify the underlying mechanisms behind such a large post-birth effect.
4In countries with a lower index of regulation (i.e., with more market-friendly regulatory environments)
the probability of being employed in a certain occupation if one’s parent is employed in the same
occupation is considerably lower. However, this cross-section association needs to be interpreted with
caution as regulation and intergenerational mobility might likely have common correlates that cannot
all be credibly controlled for.
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Figure 3.1: Occupational persistence and regulation across countries
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Note: Intergenerational persistence is measured with the odds ratio, i.e., the probability of becoming
member of a profession if one’s parent is a member of the same profession relative to the corresponding
probability for the overall population. Data are drawn from EU-SILC survey conducted in 2005 con-
taining a specific section concerning intergenerational mobility with information on occupation (at the
2-digit level) for both children and parents (recorded in a retrospective fashion). Regulation is measured
with the OECD product market indicator for professional services (i.e., accountants, lawyers, engineers
and architects).
that has prevailed in previous studies on occupational persistence.5 In contrast, our
empirical strategy allows us to control for occupation-specific transmission channels
while exploiting occupation-specific variation in the regulatory environment. Finally,
we contribute to the literature on the impact that regulation has on the selection of
practitioners. We show that, beyond a natural degree of persistence (due, for exam-
ple, to intergenerational transmission of occupation-specific skills), regulation gener-
ates rents that bias the allocation of individuals across occupations depending on their
family background. This effect is larger for less able children, thus reinforcing the idea
5Indeed, other papers have examined the role of non-market factors, such as nepotism, on occupational
persistence but they do not provide causal evidence. One exception is Mocetti (2016), which focuses on
the Italian pharmacists’ labor market and exploits (cross-sectional) discontinuity produced by regula-
tion in the ratio between the number of pharmacies allowed and the population.
Chapter 3. Regulation and Intergenerational Mobility 112
of a potential negative impact in terms of selection of practitioners.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a
deeper discussion on the economics of regulation (Section 3.2.1) and on the channels
through which it might favor the intergenerational transmission of occupations (3.2.2).
In Section 3.3, we describe the data and the main variables. In Section 3.4, we discuss
the empirical strategy. Section 3.5 shows and analyzes the main results. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Institutional framework
In each country, a complex set of laws and institutions regulates the functioning of
the product and labor markets. As far as professional services are concerned, regu-
lation might affect entry into a given market, the supply of services and the prices
applied to consumers. Entry requirements generally include: having a university de-
gree in a field of studies relevant for the specific occupation (e.g., a degree in law for
becoming a lawyer); the acquisition of professional experience (e.g., through a practice
period spent under the supervision of a professional and/or attendance on special-
ized courses); passing a state examination to obtain a license; becoming a member of a
relevant formal professional body (albo professionale); and for some economic activities
there are also restrictions on the number of firms that are allowed to operate in a given
market (e.g., pharmacies and notaries). As far as the code of conduct is concerned, the
professional body generally imposes rules and restrictions on pricing, advertising and
business structure and is endowed with a disciplinary power to guarantee enforcement
of these rules.
6Raitano and Vona (2018) find a positive impact of regulation on law background returns for (incum-
bent) lawyers, thus highlighting one potential channel through which regulation impacts on (self-)
selection across occupations.
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The economic rationale for regulation lies in reducing problems associated with
asymmetric information. If suppliers are heterogeneous in markets with asymmet-
ric information, consumers might not have the ability to discern or even collect the
information needed to evaluate the quality of the services they consume. As a remedy
for this market failure, the regulator may decide to introduce entry barriers and other
forms of regulation to guarantee a better selection of practitioners and a higher level of
average quality of services and, therefore, welfare gains for consumers (Akerlof 1970;
Leland 1979; Law and Kim 2005). However, regulation might also lead to negative out-
comes. In particular, it might limit competition by impeding free entry into the market
and reduces consumer welfare by inducing higher prices and lower supply than in a
perfectly competitive equilibrium. Moreover, it might bias the allocation of resources
across occupations. This is even more the case when regulation is shaped by the pro-
fessional body and is designed primarily for its benefit (Stigler 1971; Pagliero 2011).7
Empirical evidence shows that regulation has a significant effect on the labor mar-
ket outcomes of the regulated occupations. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) for the U.S.
and Koumenta and Pagliero (2019) for European countries both find that licensing is
associated with a significant wage premium. Reliable evidence on the impact of reg-
ulation on measures of practitioner quality is scant, partly due to identification issues
and the difficulty of finding accurate measures of the service quality. The case studies
examined so far do not find that regulation increase the quality of service.8
In Italy, professional services are historically subject to strict regulation (Pellizzari
7The debate between proponents and opponents of licensing dates back over centuries. Smith (1776)
described the ability of the crafts to lengthen apprenticeship programs and limit the number of ap-
prentices per master, thus ensuring higher prices and, therefore, higher earnings in these occupations.
Friedman and Kuznets (1945) described occupational licensing as an institution that allows practition-
ers to capture monopoly rents, with some professions characterized by similarities with the medieval
guilds.
8Kleiner (2000) exploit cross-sectional variation in licensing stringency for dentists in the U.S. and find
that tougher licensing does not improve dental health (although it raises the earnings of practitioners).
Using data on physicians in Israel, Kugler and Sauer (2005) investigate variation induced by a policy
rule, and find that stricter licensing requirements lead to higher practitioner rents but also to a lower
quality of the service. Angrist and Guryan (2008) find that state-mandated teacher testing is associated
with increases in teacher wages without a corresponding increase in teaching quality (as measured by
their educational background).
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et al. 2011). However, since the 2000s, various reforms have been carried out in or-
der to open professional services to competition. Two main legislative actions were
taken in 2006 (so-called Bersani decree) and 2011 (so-called Monti reform). The two
reforms can be regarded as a sudden and unexpected change in the Italian legislation.
They were approved by two different governments, shortly after they took office, via
emergency decrees. The Monti reform was notably adopted as a response to the fi-
nancial and sovereign debt crisis, which urged taking swift and vigorous action. Both
reforms dealt with practitioners’ conduct and, to a lesser extent, with entry require-
ments. First, minimum prices and restrictions on advertising and inter-professional
cooperation were withdrawn by the Bersani decree, which also took action on the re-
serves of the activities of notaries and the sale of medicinal products by pharmacies. In
the second wave of reforms, regulated tariffs were completely abolished and continu-
ing education and other conduct obligations were introduced. A cap on the duration
of initial training was also fixed at up to 18 months. The number of notaries has since
been increased and the demographic criteria for the establishment of pharmacies loos-
ened.
Every five years, the OECD releases the Indicators of Product Market Regulation
(the “PMR Indicators”), which measure the degree of openness to competition allowed
by the regulatory environment for each country and for different economic sectors (net-
work industries, retail trade, professional services). With respect to professional ser-
vices, until 2013 regulations on architecture, engineering, legal and accounting services
were taken into account.9 By using such indicator, the OECD countries can be ranked
on the basis of the restrictiveness of their legal framework with respect to competition.
This indicator certifies the progressive liberalization of Italian professional services:
between 2003 and 2013, Italy moved from 2nd (out of 27 OECD countries) to 19th (out
of 34) position with respect to the restrictiveness of regulation in this field. Figure 3.2
9In the 2018 wave, the indicator was expanded and revised and, therefore, is not comparable with the
previous one.
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provides a clear visual evidence of these figures: Italy was one of the more regulated
countries in professional services before the reforms, but it has also experienced the
largest variation in the strictness of regulation during the next decade.
Figure 3.2: OECD indicator of regulation in professional services
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Note: Data from OECD product market regulation website.
3.2.2 Regulation and occupational persistence
Intergenerational persistence has been documented in several occupations studied so
far, although to a varying extent. This stylized fact might be attributed to a number
of reasons that are difficult to isolate from each other. Parents may influence their
children through the genetic transmission of characteristics, such as innate abilities and
personality traits that are more valued in certain labor markets (e.g. memory, locus of
control, risk aversion, confidence, etc.). Moreover, parents may subtly influence the
lifetime prospects of their children through family culture and other monetary and
non-monetary investments that shape skills, aptitudes, beliefs and behaviors.10
10See Mogstad (2017) for a review on the human capital approach to intergenerational mobility.
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However, intergenerational occupational persistence might also be shaped by reg-
ulation. First, children of parents who are professionals might have privileged access
ex lege. For example, in Italy entry into the pharmacies market is highly regulated (the
law establishes the number of pharmacies that should operate in a city as a function of
the existing population) and inheriting the family business is one of the most common
ways of owning a pharmacy.
Second, compulsory practice might be easier to complete for a child whose parent
will hire him/her, as he/she does not have to spend time in looking for it and can
receive a financial support which is more limited for the other children. Working with a
parent can also make easier to comply with the requirements that can be set during the
compulsory practice, regarding the number and kind of activities that shall be carried
out.
Third, having a parent already in the business might help the young practitioner
to create a portfolio of clients, and this is clearly even more important when other
instruments to attract potential clients (such as advertising or competitive tariffs) are
constrained by regulation. In addition to this, in a context in which the form of business
is restricted (i.e., only specific kinds of companies or sole practitioner are admitted), it
is harder for a child of a non-professional to run its business - while he or she could be
hired as professional by a company in a more liberalized context.
Fourth, parents might exploit their positional advantage (and their connections) to
obtain privileged information that, in turn, might facilitate their children gaining ad-
mission to a college or passing the state exam.
Finally, and importantly, the interest in exploiting these positional rents is clearly
greater when also the economic returns of the occupation (which in turn depends on
the extent of regulation) are larger. Stated differently, consider two individuals who
have to decide whether to run the business of their parents or opt for a different oc-
cupational choice. The only difference is that in the first case the business activity is
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regulated and, therefore, it has higher returns. The consequence is that, while both
individuals have an equal positional advantage in inheriting the family business, the
incentive to exploit this advantage is larger in the former case.
Nevertheless, stricter regulation does not necessarily imply a higher propensity of
career following. For example, strict but fair entry requirements (e.g., in terms of edu-
cational requirements or characteristics of the state exam) might also increase the role
of individual merit and decrease that of less fair mechanisms, such as nepotism, family
networks, etc.
The relevance of each channel could clearly vary to a large extent across occupations
and the characteristics of the corresponding labor market. Aina and Nicoletti (2018)
show that having a liberal professional father affects the different steps required for the
child to become a liberal professional to a varying extent. They show that the impact is
stronger on the probability of completing a compulsory period of practice and entering
a liberal profession, whereas there are no effects (after controlling for children’s and
parents’ formal human capital) on passing the licensing examination. Raitano and
Vona (2018) find that the liberalization measures in the lawyers labor market squeezed
the law background returns (and interpret this as evidence of nepotism).
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Labor Force Survey
Data for the Italian labor market of occupations are drawn from the Labor Force Survey
(LFS). This survey is conducted by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) during
every week of a year. The annual sample is composed of over 250,000 households
(about 600,000 individuals). The survey represents the leading source of statistical in-
formation for estimating the main aggregates of the Italian labor market at the national
and local levels.
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We retrieved data since 2004 on people aged 19-25 who are recorded as children
in the survey and have at least one parent whose occupation is one of the following:
accountants, agronomists, architects, biologists, chemists, doctors, engineers, geolo-
gists, lawyers, notaries, pharmacists, psychologists, social assistants and veterinari-
ans.11 These occupations are identified on the basis of the 4-digit ISCO occupational
classification. Having co-residing children and parents allows us to match each child
to their parents and therefore to observe two generations.
This strategy has two main drawbacks. First, focusing on children still living with
their parents might lead to a sample selection bias. However, the proportion of people
aged 19-25 still living with their parents is approximately 92 percent.12 Therefore, we
argue that this issue is negligible. Second, the vast majority of children are not in the
labor market yet and, therefore, we do not observe their occupation. However, we
observe whether they are enrolled at a university and, if so, their degree program.
To construct our measure of intergenerational persistence, we match children’s ed-
ucational choice with their parents’ occupation. Hence, we measure the individual
propensity of children to follow their parents’ occupation with an indicator that is
equal to 1 if children pursue a course of study that naturally leads to the parents’ oc-
cupation. We illustrate the matching between each occupation and the corresponding
degree program in Table 3.1 (top panel).13
As we will discuss in the following section, the empirical strategy requires us to
11We select this subset of occupations following two main criteria. First, we select occupations that
require a specific degree program, thus allowing us to build our measure of propensity of career fol-
lowing. This is why, for example, we exclude journalists. Second, we select only occupations above
a minimum population threshold. This is why we exclude the profession of actuary, which is very
rarely surveyed in the LFS.
12In the LFS, the sample units are “de facto” households, composed of people living together even if
with no formal arrangement. Members who are temporarily absent (e.g., for job or training reasons)
are still considered members of the family. The family background of youngsters who do not co-reside
with their parents is not known by construction. In the majority of cases, these youngsters are already
active in the labor market; conversely, the proportion of students is rather low (13 percent, which is
about one-third of the corresponding figure for co-residing children).
13Less than 1 percent of the children in our sample already has a college degree and is employed in one
of the occupations considered in our study. In this case, occupational persistence is directly measured
by comparing the occupation of the parent with that of the children.
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create a proper control group, i.e., children whose parents are employed in occupa-
tions similar to those of the treated ones but not exposed to entry requirements and
conduct rules established by a professional body (or, at most, exposed to milder and
time-invariant occupational licensing). These control units have been chosen using the
following criteria. First, we restrict the analysis to cognitive non-routine occupations
that are comparable to those in the treated group in terms of skill content. Namely, we
consider the ISCO major groups 1, 2 and 3, corresponding to managers, professionals
and technicians and associate professionals. Second, within these ISCO groups, we
select the occupations that have a similar education careers with respect to that of the
treated group. The choice of which specific occupation to consider has been dictated
by the educational content of each job description (using a semantic criterion) and/or
the employment opportunities associated with each degree course as described in the
university guides. For example, legal experts and magistrates represent the control
group for lawyers and notaries; finance technicians are the counterparts of accoun-
tants; building technicians, computer scientists or mathematicians are the control units
for engineers; etc. See Table 3.1 (bottom panel) for a complete list of the control occu-
pations and their corresponding degree program.
Table 3.2 displays the summary statistics of our main variables, i.e., the indicator of
occupational persistence and the main socio-demographic variables at both individual
and household level. The sample of the children in the treated group includes 28,796
children-parents pairs. The average occupational persistence is 0.18, which means
nearly one-fifth of the children is enrolled in a degree program that represents a pre-
requisite for entry into the occupation of their parents. This figure is higher among
children whose parents are self-employed professionals (0.25), while it is remarkably
lower among children of parents employed in similarly skilled occupations (0.06). It is
also noteworthy that 71 percent of this sample of children is enrolled at a university, a
percentage much higher than that for the overall population in the same age bracket.
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3.3.2 Regulation index
Since the 1990s, the OECD has been constructing a system of indicators to measure
stringency and ongoing development in product market regulation across the OECD
countries (Nicoletti et al. 1999; Conway and Nicoletti 2006; Koske et al. 2015).14 The
basic idea is to turn qualitative data on laws and regulation that may affect compe-
tition into quantitative indicators. The indicator covers different sectors (network in-
dustries, professional services, retail trade) and has a pyramidal structure. The index
is then computed as a simple average among the various occupations covered among
the professional services (i.e., legal, accounting, engineering and architecture services).
For each occupation, different aspects are taken into account and noted on a 0-6 scale
(from the less restrictive to the most restrictive one).15 The answers (from 0 to 6) to
the different questions are then averaged and aggregated into sub-indicators. The sim-
ple average of the sub-indicators then leads to the measure of regulation for a spe-
cific sector or occupation. As far as professional services are concerned, the indicator
includes questions regarding entry (exclusive rights, educational requirements, com-
pulsory chamber membership and quotas) and conduct regulation (prices and fees,
marketing and advertising, form of business, inter-professional cooperation).
We follow this simple methodology to develop a novel measure of the stringency of
regulation for a selected sample of occupations in Italy. We consider different aspects
of the relevant legal framework of each occupation for the years 2003, 2008 and 2013.
This allows us to cover the effects of the Bersani decree in 2006 and of the Monti reform
in 2011 on the stringency of regulation of each occupation
Our indicator differs from the OECD index regarding the number of occupations
covered and the content of the relevant regulation taken into account. Our contribu-
14These indicators have been widely used in the literature to examine, for example, the impact on growth
and productivity in downstream sectors (Barone and Cingano 2011; Bourlès et al. 2013).
15For example, the indicators consider whether it is compulsory to be member of a professional organi-
zation in order to legally practice: if so, the question is noted ”6”; if not, it is noted ”0”.
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tion is twofold. First, we enlarge the set of occupations to the following: accountants,
agronomists, architects, biologists, chemists, doctors, engineers, geologists, lawyers,
notaries, pharmacists, psychologists, social assistants, and veterinarians.
Second, we include a wider range of information in the construction of the indica-
tors. Specifically, for entry regulation we consider the following five sub-topics: ex-
clusive rights (i.e., reserves of activities), education requirements, professional exam,
compulsory chamber membership and quantitative restrictions. For conduct regula-
tion, we consider the following five sub-topics: prices and fees, advertising, form of
business, inter-professional cooperation and disciplinary power. Moreover, with re-
gard to entry, we refine the extent of exclusive rights by considering both the number
and the value of reserves of activities of each occupation. We have also extended the
set of information related to educational requirements, with reference to the character-
istics of the university courses that grant access to the professional exams, and to the
professional exams themselves (e.g., we consider whether there is limited enrollment
at university and the composition of the examining board). With regard to conduct,
we add more details regarding the effect of regulation on: i. quantitative restriction
concerning the business activities allowed to operate in a market; ii. the possibility of
advertising the business; iii. the legal form of the companies allowed to operate in a
market; iv. the disciplinary powers of chambers; v. the costs related to chamber mem-
bership. Detailed information about the construction of the indicator are provided in
the Appendix.16
Table 3.3 shows the extent of regulation for the 14 occupations and how this has
varied over time. The occupations subject to more stringent regulation are those of
notaries and pharmacists, while those of engineers and geologists are relatively less
regulated. Moreover, the indicator has decreased over time, reflecting the liberalization
effects of the Bersani decree and the Monti reform, although to a differing extent across
16See Figure B1 in the Appendix for a graphical illustration of the pyramidal structure of the index, and
Table C1 for a complete description of the items included in the construction of the indicator.
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occupations.
3.3.3 Descriptive evidence
During the recent years, Italy has experienced a significant increase in the number of
workers employed in regulated occupations; moreover, wages in these occupations
have also markedly decreased (Figure 3.3).17 The increase in the supply and the de-
crease in rents are consistent with the liberalization process that occurred in the same
temporal window.18
Figure 3.3: Employment and income patterns
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Note: Dashed vertical lines represent the years of the Bersani decree and the Monti reform, respectively.
Data from LFS and tax returns from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance.
These occupations are characterized by a significant intergenerational occupational
persistence. We find that, on average, the probability of being enrolled in a degree pro-
gram that naturally leads to the same occupation as the child’s parents is nearly 8 times
higher among the children of professionals compared to the rest of the population. We
also find substantial heterogeneity across occupations. In particular, the odds ratios
17See Mocetti et al. (2019) for a more detailed descriptive analysis of the labor market of regulated occu-
pations in Italy and the economic effects of the reforms.
18Similar findings are obtained looking at the cross-country evidence (Figure C2). In more regulated
countries the share of workers employed in professional services is significantly lower and the wage
premium is significantly higher, consistent with the idea that anti-competitive regulation hampers
entry in the occupations and increases economic rents.
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are higher among the children of lawyers and, especially, among those of pharmacists.
In contrast, career following is much lower among geologists and biologists.
In order to validate the goodness of our indicator of intergenerational persistence,
we examine whether and to what extent it is correlated with other available measures.
At the geographical level, occupation persistence is significantly higher in the South
and, although to a lesser extent, in the Center. Similar patterns are observed by Güell
et al. (2018). At the occupation level, Basso and Labartino (2011) exploit the informative
content of surnames to capture the strength of family connections across professionals
in Italy. Figure 3.4 shows that the two indicators are positively associated with a coef-
ficient of correlation equal to 0.54.
Figure 3.4: Occupational persistence across professions
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Note: Intergenerational persistence is measured with the odds ratios, i.e., the probability of becoming a
member of a profession if one’s parent is a member of the same profession relative to the correspond-
ing probability for the overall population. The pseudo-ICS measures the strength of intergenerational
links within professions exploiting the informational contents of surnames, as computed by Basso and
Labartino (2011). The intuition behind the latter measure is that if socioeconomic status is strongly trans-
mitted then surnames should also explain a large share of its variance, i.e. the R-squared in a regression
of socioeconomic status on surname dummies is increasing in the strength of the intergenerational pro-
cess.
Figure 3.5 shows that there is also a strong and positive association between the
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extent of regulation and incomes (as declared in tax records), with a coefficient of cor-
relation equal to 0.87. Economic returns, in particular, are significantly higher among
pharmacists and notaries which are also the two most regulated occupations accord-
ing to our indicator. This is somewhat reassuring since we know from previous studies
that regulation does affect economic rents (Kleiner 2000; Kleiner and Krueger 2013).
Figure 3.5: Wage premium and regulation in Italy
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Note: Stringency of regulation is measured with a 0-6 OECD-style index, with higher values indicating
stricter regulation; see the Appendix for more details. Income data from tax returns provided by the
Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance.
Figure 3.6 provides prima facie positive evidence on the strong relationship between
the extent of career following and the stringency of regulation across occupations (left-
hand side graph) and over time (right-hand side graph). The coefficient of correlation
is equal to 0.72. It is worth noting that this positive correlation is not entirely driven
by pharmacists and notaries that visually appear as two outliers in the scatter plot;
indeed, if we exclude these two occupations the correlation continues to be sizable
(0.46). Consistent with the progressive process of liberalization of professional ser-
vices, we show that intergenerational transmission of occupation has decreased over
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time in occupations subject to regulation, while it has remained fairly stable in control
occupations. An obvious interpretation of these findings is that economic regulations
provide market power to incumbents, constitute barriers to entry and ultimately gen-
erate rents. Thus, the children might benefit from their parents’ positional rents and
are more likely to follow in their parents’ footsteps.
Figure 3.6: Occupational persistence and regulation
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Note: Intergenerational persistence is measured with the odds ratio, i.e., the probability of becoming
member of a profession if one’s parent is member of the same profession relative to the corresponding
probability for the overall population. Stringency of regulation is measured with 0-6 OECD-style index,
with higher values indicating stricter regulation (see the Appendix for details on the construction of this
indicator).
However, these correlations, although suggestive, may be affected by the omission
of relevant variables (e.g., sector-specific factors that might affect both the degree of
competition and the extent of career following) and therefore cannot be interpreted as
constituting a causal nexus. In the following section, we describe how we deal with
this identification challenge.
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Table 3.1: Occupations and corresponding university degree
Occupation: Degree:
a. Treated group
Accountant Economics
Agronomist Agriculture and veterinary
Architect Architecture
Biologist Biology
Chemist Chemistry
Doctor Medicine
Engineer Engineering
Geologist Geology
Lawyer Law
Notary Law
Pharmacist Pharmacy
Psychologist Psychology
Social assistant Social services
Veterinary Agriculture and veterinary
b. Control group
Financial associate professional Economics
Manager or entrepreneur in agriculture Agriculture and veterinary
Designer or art teacher Architecture
Biochemical technician Biology
Chemical technician Chemistry
Paramedical professional Medicine
Civil engineering technician or ICT professional Engineering
Physic and geologic technician Geology
Legal expert Law
Magistrate Law
Pharmacologist or pharmaceutical technician Pharmacy
Personnel and staff development professional Psychology
Primary, pre-primary and special needs teacher Social services
Other life science technician Agriculture and veterinary
Note: For each occupation - identified on the basis of the 4-digit ISCO classification of occupations - the
table reports the corresponding university degree.
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Table 3.2: LFS: descriptive statistics
Children of:
Professionals Self-employed Control
professionals professions
Occupational persistence 0.184 (0.388) 0.248 (0.432) 0.060 (0.237)
Female 0.490 (0.500) 0.488 (0.500) 0.484 (0.500)
Age 21.72 (1.977) 21.73 (1.980) 21.76 (1.981)
Number of siblings 2.027 (0.808) 2.026 (0.796) 2.009 (0.793)
Enrolled at university 0.713 (0.452) 0.720 (0.449) 0.550 (0.498)
Parents’ age 54.96 (4.754) 55.50 (4.981) 52.04 (4.903)
# parent-child pairs 28,796 14,324 69,682
Note: The table shows mean values and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of the main variables. The
sample refers to individuals aged 19-25 who are recorded as children in the survey (and therefore they
still co-reside with their parents) and have at least one parent who is a professional or employed in a
control profession (see Table 1 for the list of occupations). Data are drawn from the Italian LFS (years
2004 to 2018).
Table 3.3: Regulation index in selected occupations in Italy
Year:
2003 2008 2013
Accountant 3.563 2.775 1.638
Agronomist 3.413 2.613 1.537
Architect 3.325 2.525 1.438
Biologist 3.278 2.490 1.415
Chemist 3.235 2.473 1.422
Doctor 3.473 2.573 1.766
Engineer 2.827 2.027 1.153
Geologist 3.185 2.398 1.310
Lawyer 3.735 3.048 2.335
Notary 5.013 4.026 3.613
Pharmacist 4.010 3.412 2.565
Psychologist 3.315 2.528 1.753
Social assistant 3.245 2.458 1.370
Veterinary 3.318 2.505 1.405
Note: The table shows the measures of regulation (with a 0-6 OECD-style index, with higher values
indicating stricter regulation) across occupations and over time; see the Appendix for more details.
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3.4 Empirical strategy
The goal of our study is to identify the effect of regulation on occupational persistence.
To address this issue, we adopt a strategy that exploits the differential effect of the
treatment (the changes in regulation) on occupational persistence for the treated group
and a proper control group. We consider as control units the children of parents em-
ployed in highly-skilled occupations that are characterized by a similar educational
career with respect to that of the treated occupations but which are not subject to the
entry requirements and conduct rules established by a professional body.
We define our dependent variable as an indicator that is equal to 1 if children are
enrolled at a university on a degree program that could lead them to follow their par-
ents’ career; for example, children of doctors have a high propensity to become doc-
tors themselves if they are enrolled in a medical degree course. According to the di-
verse regulatory environment that may affect children’s educational and occupational
choices, we divide our sample of children into three cohorts depending on the year, t,
in which they enrolled at the university: i. t < 2007 (pre-Bersani decree); ii. 2007 ≤ t <
2012 (post-Bersani decree and pre-Monti reform); iii. t ≥ 2012 (post-Monti reform).
Then, we measure the effect of regulation on the the propensity to follow the par-
ents’ career by running regressions as the following:
Yi,p,t = α + βRp,t + γXi,t + φp + δt + ρe(p),t × δt + ei,p,t, (3.1)
where Yi,t is the propensity of the child i (whose parent is employed in occupation p)
in the cohort t to follow the parents’ career; this variable is equal to 1 if there is career
following and 0 otherwise. The main explanatory variable is Rp,t, which measures the
strictness of regulation in occupation p at time t (obviously, Rp,t = 0 for the control
units). The specification also includes the main socio-demographic variables, Xi,t, as
controls. Crucially, we add a wide array of fixed effects in order to address the omitted
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variable bias. Namely, we control for occupation-fixed effects, φp, to capture any unob-
servable that may systematically affect intergenerational persistence in an occupation,
such as the fact that in certain jobs the heritability of occupation-specific skills (in the
pre-birth stage or in the family environment) might be larger19 or that the ability of our
proxy to capture career following might vary across occupations. Time fixed effects, δt
captures common shock. Importantly, we also include degree program × time fixed
effects, ρe(p) × δt, with the degree-program e that we use as predictor of occupation p.
This last set of fixed effects is aimed at capturing the fact that enrollment on a certain
degree program might vary across time due to supply factors or demand factors (e.g.,
an increase in the employment opportunities for the graduates in a certain degree pro-
gram). Finally, ei,p,t is the error term. Throughout the analysis, we cluster the standard
errors at the employment status-occupation group level. By allowing for an arbitrary
covariance structure within groups over time, we account for the presence of common
unobserved random shocks at the group level that would lead to correlation between
all observations within each group.20
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main results
This section sets out our main findings on the effects of regulation on intergenerational
persistence among occupations.
We start with Table 3.4, which shows our baseline results. In the first column, we
control for time-, profession- and region-fixed effects, thus accounting for the common
19Indeed, one may plausibly argue that the cost of acquiring occupation-specific human capital is lower
for children who follow their father’s occupation. Where the direct and indirect transmission of job-
specific knowledge and abilities is more relevant, there would presumably be a higher percentage of
children following their father’s occupation.
20The choice to cluster the standard errors at the employment status-occupation group level is motivated
by the fact that the effect of regulation varies both with the employment status (e.g., between self-
employed and employee) and the occupation level (as regulation is occupation-specific).
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trends to which children belonging to the same cohort are exposed, for occupation-
specific (time-invariant) factors affecting occupation persistence and for unobserved
local variables that might affect both regulation and employment opportunities. Ac-
cording to these estimates, a 1 point decrease in the regulation index leads to a decrease
of 2.3 percentage points in the propensity of children to follow their parent’s profes-
sional career (relative to the control group). In the second column, we add the main
socio-demographic characteristics, both at the individual and household level. The es-
timated parameter is unchanged: this is not surprising as the two groups are well bal-
anced across these characteristics. In the third column, we add degree program fixed
effects to account for the fact that certain degree-programs structurally attract more
students. Finally, in the fourth column (our preferred specification), we include degree
program-time fixed effects to capture asymmetric shocks such as time-varying demand
for certain educational profiles. The coefficient is unaffected and it remains highly sig-
nificant. According to this estimate, the combined effect of the two regulatory reforms
(corresponding to a 1.7 decrease in our index of the strictness of regulation) reduced
the propensity of career following by about 4 percentage points, more than one-third
of the sample average.21
Although we strictly follow the OECD methodology, turning qualitative informa-
tion into quantitative evidence is still subject to a number of arbitrary choices. One
important choice is the weights structure: the overall indicator is obtained as a simple
average of the indicators of each sub-domain, thus implicitly assuming that, say, exclu-
sive rights are as important as educational requirements or that limitations on prices
are as important as those on the form of business. One might guess that these sub-
domains are not all equally important but any different weights structure can appear
21 Table 3.4 also contains standard errors clustered at the province level (second row) as some regulatory
domains are shaped by local (provincial) professional bodies and the demand for professional services
is highly heterogeneous over the territory. In this case, standard errors are slightly lower. Hereafter,
standard errors clustered at the province-level are omitted as we prefer to have more conservative
estimates.
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Table 3.4: Impact of regulation: main results
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
A. Measure of regulation: simple average
Regulation index 0.023** 0.023** 0.020** 0.023**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
B. Measure of regulation: principal component
Regulation index 0.023** 0.023** 0.021** 0.024**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s profession FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Child’s degree program FEs No No Yes Yes
Child’s degree program × Time FEs No No No Yes
Observations 98,478 98,478 98,478 98,478
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation on the likelihood of career following,
i.e., an indicator equal to 1 when the children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same
occupation of their parents. The measure of regulation is obtained as a simple average across all regula-
tion items in the top panel and with the principal component analysis in the bottom panel. The sample
includes all children having at least one parent who is a professional (treated group) or employed in a
similar profession (control group). Socio-demographic controls include: gender, children’s age, number
of siblings, birth order, gender of the parent, parents’ age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the employment status and occupation-level (first row) and at the province-level (second row).
arbitrary. Therefore, in the bottom panel of Table 3.4, we use the principal component
analysis as an alternative strategy to extract information from each sub-domain. The
first principal component, which we use as a synthetic measure, explains more than 50
percent of the total variance of the underlying variables. This synthetic measure has
the advantage of using a different weights structure that, however, is chosen by the
statistical algorithm in a transparent way.22 The results are largely confirmed.
Our identifying variation comes from two different sources. On the one hand, we
exploit variation comparing treated and control groups before and after the two re-
22Specifically, more weights are assigned to extent and value of exclusive rights and strictness and fair-
ness of the professional exam among the entry requirements, and to restriction on prices and adver-
tising among the conduct requirements.
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forms. On the other hand, we have a continuous measure of the strictness of the reg-
ulation that varies over time and across (treated) occupations. In Table 3.5, we exploit
separately the two sources of variation. In the first two columns, we examine the vari-
ation of the likelihood of occupation persistence between treated and control group in
a standard difference-in-differences setting, with a different set of controls. According
to these results, the first reform slightly decreased the likelihood of career following for
the children having at least one parent who is a professional, although the effect is not
significant from a statistical point of view; the second reform, in contrast, decreased the
likelihood of occupation persistence by about 4 percentage points. The more signifi-
cant effect of the second reform can be attributed to different factors. First, this reform
shortened the period of compulsory practice, thus reducing the positional advantage
of the children of professionals in a crucial step to start a liberal profession (Aina and
Nicoletti 2018). Second, the same reform significantly reduced the wage premium of
regulated professions (Mocetti et al. 2019), thus decreasing the incentives of the chil-
dren of professionals to exploit their positional advantage. In the last two columns of
Table 3.5, we exploit variation of regulation with the subset of regulated (treated) oc-
cupations. We find again that the strictness of regulation is positively associated with
the extent of career following.
The credibility of a difference-in-differences strategy crucially relies on the assump-
tion that, in the absence of the treatment, the occupational persistence for the treated
and the control group would have followed parallel paths over time. In our setting,
we expect that the treated and the control groups have a different level of occupational
persistence (as they were exposed to different regulatory environments) and follow a
similar trend over the pre-reform period. A parallel trend between treated and con-
trol groups would suggest the absence of an anticipatory effect and/or of divergent
patterns between the two groups before the policy reforms were implemented. These
assumptions are visually examined in Figure 3.7, which plots the difference in occu-
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Table 3.5: Impact of regulation: exploiting different sources of variation
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
Between groups Within group
Treated × post-2006 -0.010 -0.012
(0.009) (0.010)
Treated × post-2011 -0.041*** -0.045**
(0.015) (0.019)
Regulation index 0.101** 0.123*
(0.049) (0.065)
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s profession FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full set of controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 98,478 98,478 28,796 28,796
Note: The table shows the effect of regulation on the likelihood of occupational persistence exploiting
two different sources of variation: i. variation across treated and control occupations over time due
to the liberalization reforms; ii. variation in the intensity of the reforms (captured by the regulation
index) across treated occupations over time. In the first case, we report the results of a difference-
in-differences empirical strategy where the parameter of interest is obtained from an interaction term
between a dummy for treatment group and dummies for the period after the 2006 and 2011 reforms, re-
spectively. The coefficient is negative, suggesting that the reforms negatively affected intergenerational
occupational persistence in treated occupations over the post-reform period compared to control group
occupations. In the last two columns, instead, we expected and find a positive effect of the regulation
index on the outcome, given that our regulation index takes higher values as regulation is stricter. The
sample includes all children having at least one parent who is a professional (treated group) or em-
ployed in a similar profession (control group) in the first two columns and only children having at least
one parent who is a professional (treated group) in the last two columns. Full set of controls include
socio-demographic controls (gender, children’s age, number of siblings, birth order, gender of the par-
ent, parents’ age) and child-s degree program-time fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
clustered at the employment status and occupation level.
pational persistence between the treated and the control groups for different cohorts
of children. In the left panel, we consider the entire sample, while in the right panel
we focus on the subset of children of self-employed individuals. In both figures, the
coefficients are fairly stable over time and slightly decrease later, in particular after the
second reform (consistently with the results shown in Table 3.5). Hence, the parallel
trend assumption is empirically satisfied.
3.5.2 Robustness
This section tests the validity of our main findings. First, we control whether our re-
sults are robust to the inclusion of further controls (Table 3.6). If treated and control
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Figure 3.7: Parallel trend assumption
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Note: Each point represents the estimated difference in occupation persistence between the treated and
the control group. Vertical bands represent + / - 1.96 time the standard error for each point estimate.
Dashed vertical lines refer to the Bersani reform and Monti decree.
units operate in different markets, they might be exposed to distinct macro shocks. To
address this issue, we enrich the specification with a set of geographical area-, sector-
and firm size-time fixed effects (included separately and jointly) to account for differ-
ent economic cycles and enrollment patterns along these dimensions. The results are
qualitatively similar to those estimated by the baseline model, although the magni-
tude is somewhat lessened when we control for different trends across (parents’) firms
of different size.
Second, we examine whether our results hold for different specific subsamples of
the population. Namely, in Table 3.7, we replicate the analysis using only children of
self-employed parents (top panel), only children of parents employed in micro-firms,
i.e., with less than 5 employees (middle panel) or only children enrolled at a university
(bottom panel). The restriction on the children of self-employed parents is motivated
by the fact that occupational persistence might differ markedly between employees
and self-employed professionals. Indeed, they are differently exposed to regulation
depending on their occupational status; e.g., lawyers who own their legal firm are sub-
ject to the regulation for professional services, while lawyers who are employed as, say,
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Table 3.6: Impact of regulation: robustness to the inclusion of further controls
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
Regulation index 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.019** 0.018**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s profession FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s degree program FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Child’s degree program × Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical area × Time FEs Yes No No Yes
Sector of activity × Time FEs No Yes No Yes
Firm’s size × Time FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 98,478 98,478 98,478 98,478
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation on the likelihood of career following,
i.e., an indicator equal to 1 when the children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same
occupation of their parents. The sample includes all children having at least one parent who is a profes-
sional (treated group) or employed in a similar profession (control group). Socio-demographic controls
include: gender, children’s age, number of siblings, birth order, gender of the parent, parents’ age. Stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the employment status and occupation level.
a legal adviser for a commercial bank are less subject to the regulation, as they work
in a sector not (or, at least, less) affected by restrictions on market conduct. Therefore,
we might expect that the impact of regulation on occupational persistence is stronger
among the self-employed. The results confirm this expectation, while they remain
highly significant from a statistical point of view. The restriction on the subsample of
children of parents working in micro-firms exploits the fact that smaller firms are more
likely family-managed firms where recruitment or succession decisions are taken more
often within the family.23 Larger firms, in contrast, are more likely to resort to more
formal selection mechanisms. Our results show that the impact of regulation on occu-
pation persistence is larger for smaller firms. Finally, the restriction on the subsample
of children enrolled at a university might help to discriminate whether enrollment on
a degree program naturally leading to the parents’ occupation is mostly driven by
higher enrollment per se or to a preference for that specific degree program among
23See Bennedsen et al. (2007) for an empirical analysis on the role of families in succession decisions and
firm performance.
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those enrolled. One could argue that parents’ economic rents might have a direct ef-
fect on the probability that their children enroll at university, independently from the
specific degree chosen. Indeed, our summary statistics show that enrollment is signif-
icantly higher among professionals’ children. However, our results are substantially
confirmed when we replicate the analysis for the subsample of enrolled children.
Table 3.7: Impact of regulation: robustness to sample selection
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
A. Subsample of self-employed parents
Regulation index 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.043***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 26,213 26,213 26,213 26,213
B. Subsample of parents working in micro-firms
Regulation index 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.041***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 26,955 26,955 26,955 26,955
C. Subsample of enrolled children
Regulation index 0.023** 0.022** 0.024** 0.024**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 58,281 58,281 58,281 58,281
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parent’s profession FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Socio-demographic controls No Yes Yes Yes
Child’s degree program FEs No No Yes Yes
Child’s degree program × Time FEs No No No Yes
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation on the likelihood of career following,
i.e., an indicator equal to 1 when the children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same
occupation of their parents. The samples include: in the top, panel all children having at least one
parent who is a self-employed professional (treated group) of self-employed in a similar profession (control
group); in the middle panel, all children having at least one parent who is a professional (treated group)
in a micro-firm (with at most 5 employees) or employed in a similar profession (control group) in a
micro-firm; in the bottom panel, all children enrolled at a university having at least one parent who is a
professional (treated group) or employed in a similar profession (control group). Socio-demographic
controls include: gender, children’s age, number of siblings, birth order, gender of the parent, parents’
age. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the employment status and occupation level.
Finally, we replicate the regressions excluding one treated occupation (and its cor-
responding control occupation) at a time (Table 3.8) to examine whether the estimates
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are sensitive to the particular performance of a single occupation. Again, the results
are qualitatively confirmed.
Table 3.8: Impact of regulation: robustness to exclusion of professions
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
Profession excluded: β SE Full set of controls # observations
Accountant 0.022** (0.009) Yes 89,803
Agronomist 0.023*** (0.009) Yes 94,395
Architect 0.023** (0.010) Yes 93,550
Biologist 0.024*** (0.009) Yes 97,105
Chemist 0.024*** (0.009) Yes 96,717
Doctor 0.033*** (0.009) Yes 66,678
Engineer 0.023** (0.009) Yes 87,398
Geologist 0.024*** (0.009) Yes 98,101
Lawyer 0.020** (0.008) Yes 95,925
Notary 0.024*** (0.009) Yes 98,000
Pharmacist 0.019** (0.009) Yes 96,548
Psychologist 0.024*** (0.009) Yes 96,714
Social assistant 0.025*** (0.009) Yes 71,620
Veterinary 0.026*** (0.009) Yes 97,660
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation on the likelihood of career following, i.e.,
an indicator equal to 1 when the children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same occu-
pation of their parents. The sample includes all children having at least one parent who is a professional
(treated group) or employed in a similar profession (control group), with the exclusion in each row of
the listed treated profession (and its corresponding control profession). Full set of controls includes
time-, parent’s profession- and region-fixed effects, socio-demographic controls (gender, children’s age,
number of siblings, birth order, gender of the parent, parents’ age) and child’s degree program-time
fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the employment status and occupation
level.
3.5.3 Heterogeneous effects
In this section, we explore the heterogeneous effects of regulation, distinguishing be-
tween individual characteristics and domains of regulation.
In Table 3.9, we examine whether the impact of regulation varies on the basis of
children (top panel) or occupational (bottom panel) characteristics. As far as children
characteristics are concerned, we examine whether the impact varies depending on the
gender of the children, the birth order and a measure of individual ability. We find that
the impact is somewhat stronger for males and first born children and significantly
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stronger for less able children, with the latter identified as those who obtain their high-
est school qualification with (at least) a year’s delay. Although partial and rough, this
is an objective and comparable measure of the practitioner’s quality across occupa-
tions. This suggests that the less able individuals are those who benefit most from
positional rents induced by regulation of entry into the occupation. More generally,
this result suggests that anti-competitive regulations bias the allocation of individuals
across occupations, favoring family background over individual merit.
Table 3.9: Impact of regulation: heterogeneous effects
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
A. by children’s characteristics
Regulation index 0.028** 0.023*** 0.026** 0.019** 0.047*** 0.022**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009)
Subsample: Male Female First Later Less More
born born able able
Observations 50,663 47,815 65,679 32,799 13,729 84,749
B. by occupation’s characteristics
Regulation index 0.028** 0.014* 0.038*** -0.001 0.020* 0.028***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Subsample: Soft Hard Private Public Low local High local
sciences sciences services services demand demand
Observations 50,157 48,321 34,771 63,707 49,104 49,374
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation on the likelihood of career following,
i.e., an indicator equal to 1 when the children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same
occupation of their parents, for different subsamples of the population as indicated in each column.
The sample includes all children having at least one parent who is a professional (treated group) or
employed in a similar profession (control group). Full set of controls includes time-, parent’s profession-
and region-fixed effects, socio-demographic controls (gender, children’s age, number of siblings, birth
order, gender of the parent, parents’ age) and child-s degree program-time fixed effects. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the employment status and occupation level.
As occupational characteristics, we first distinguish two groups depending on whether
they refer to social sciences (e.g., economics, law, etc.) or hard sciences (e.g., engineer-
ing, medicine, natural sciences, etc.). We find that the impact of regulation on inter-
generational occupational persistence is higher for social sciences. This finding might
be due to the fact that entry into these occupations is based on more subjective evalu-
ation and/or to the fact that the output of these services is more difficult to evaluate
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in a comparative manner. Both factors might increase the positional rents generated
by regulation. The distinction between social and hard sciences also reflects the dis-
tinction between occupations which require a training period prior to the professional
exam (e.g. lawyer, accountant, etc.) and those that do not (e.g. engineer, doctor, etc.).
Consistent with Aina and Nicoletti (2018) - who find that having a liberal professional
father has a significant effect on the probability to complete a compulsory period of
practice - such a requirement may explain the differing impact of regulation on these
two groups.
Second, we examine whether the results vary between private services and public
services (i.e., public administration, health, education) as they might be exposed to
different entry and demand conditions. We find that the impact is largely concentrated
in the private services where restrictions on market conduct might be more effective.
The differing effect might also be explained by the higher proportion of self-employed
professionals (that, in turn, are more exposed to regulation) working in private services
compared to public services.
Finally, we examine whether the impact of regulation is different across areas char-
acterized by a differing demand for professional services. The underlying idea is that,
although regulation of professional services is homogeneous over the territory - and
geographical mobility is historically low (Faini et al. 1997) and professionals are largely
local (Michelacci and Silva 2007) -, heterogeneity in the demand for these services might
increase rents at the local level. In other words, supply constraints are more binding
(and rents higher) where the demand is higher. We build a measure at the province
level capturing dependence of the economy on professional services. This measure is
computed in two steps. First, using the input-output matrix, we compute the depen-
dence on professional services for each sector of economic activity. Second, we trans-
late these figures at the province level using the sector composition of the local econ-
omy (i.e., the distribution of employees across sectors at the province level as recorded
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by the 2001 Census).24 Interestingly, we find that the impact of regulation on occu-
pational persistence is stronger in the provinces where the demand for professional
services is higher (i.e., where the measure of dependence is above the median).
In Table 3.10, we distinguish the effect by domains of regulation (and occupational
characteristics). Namely, we replicate the results of Table 3.9 (bottom panel) using
the index of regulation for entry and conduct rules separately. According to these
findings, the impact is mostly driven by conduct regulation, although this result should
be interpreted with caution due to the small variability in entry regulation observed
in the reference period. Moreover, as expected, restrictions on market conduct are
more effective in the private services and in areas with higher demand for professional
services. Interestingly, strictness of entry regulation seems to favor intergenerational
mobility in hard sciences.
Table 3.10: Impact of different types of regulation
Dependent variable:
Likelihood of occupational persistence
Entry requirements 0.330 -0.890*** 0.053 -0.460* 0.083 -0.080
(0.138) (0.326) (0.167) (0.239) (0.198) (0.339)
Conduct rules 0.016** 0.006 0.021** -0.002 0.004 0.014**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Subsample: Soft Hard Private Public Low local High local
sciences sciences services services demand demand
Observations 50,157 48,321 34,771 63,707 49,104 49,374
Full set of controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: The table shows the effect of the strictness of regulation (distinguishing between entry require-
ments and conduct rules) on the likelihood of career following, i.e., an indicator equal to 1 when the
children attend a degree program that naturally leads to the same occupation of their parents, for dif-
ferent subsamples of the population as indicated in each column. The sample includes all children
having at least one parent who is a professional (treated group) or employed in a similar profession
(control group). Full set of controls includes time-, parent’s profession- and region-fixed effects, socio-
demographic controls (gender, children’s age, number of siblings, birth order, gender of the parent, par-
ents’ age) and child’s degree program-time fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the employment status and occupation level.
24According to our analysis, the financial sectors and manufacturing activities with a higher technology
content are more dependent on professional services; in contrast, agriculture and services to house-
holds essentially do not involve demand for professional services. Therefore, we expect that the de-
mand for these services is heterogeneous across provinces depending on the sector composition of the
local economy.
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3.6 Conclusion
Does regulation affect the allocation of individuals across occupations? Does regu-
lation affect intergenerational persistence in certain (high-income) occupations? An-
swering these questions could contribute to two strands of literature. The first ex-
amines the factors behind intergenerational persistence of earnings and occupations,
where the role of regulation has been substantially under-investigated. The second
examines the effects of regulation, where evidence on the characteristics of the practi-
tioners who enter the profession (and, more generally, on allocative efficiency) is scant.
To answer these research questions, we exploited two main reforms in the regulation
of professional services that were introduced in Italy since the 2000s. Italy was one of
the more regulated economies in these sectors until the first half of the 2000s, while the
combined effect of the two reforms led to a significant liberalization in the next decade.
We find that the progress toward a more market-friendly regulatory environment
leads to a substantial decrease in the propensity for career following. These results sug-
gest that intergenerational persistence in certain occupations depends to a large extent
on the existence of positional rents generated by lack of competition. In other words,
our findings suggest that regulation significantly biases the allocation of individuals
across occupations based on the parental occupation. The impact is stronger for pro-
fessions in social sciences and in areas where the demand for professional services is
higher. Moreover, the impact of regulation on occupational persistence is stronger for
less able children, thus confirming allocative inefficiencies in the distribution of talents
across occupations.
Conclusion
This dissertation focuses on three main public policy reforms that took place in Italy
around the turn of this century. First, I study the mobility response to larger geograph-
ical dispersion in tax rates on personal income. Using data from the universe of tax
residence’s transfers, I implement several empirical approaches, resting on tax vari-
ation both across locations over time and across income bracket within a location. I
provide evidence that local income taxes distort the location of the tax base. This result
has important implications for policy-makers, encompassing the resulting changes in
expected tax revenue and the level and location of local economic activity.
The second chapter focuses on the local public finance effects of curbing tax eva-
sion. Focusing on an anti-tax evasion program implemented in Italy that detected
more than 2 millions of buildings hidden to tax authorities, I provide evidence of a
stable and persistent increase in municipalities’ tax revenue. Moreover, I show that
decisions regarding how to finance local governments are a key feature for ensuring a
more efficient allocation of public spending. Finally, I provide evidence that stricter tax
enforcement leads to larger property tax rates and to an increase in the progressivity
of the local income tax schedule.
The third chapter studies whether regulation of professional services affects inter-
generational persistence of occupations. To answer this question, we exploit two re-
forms that were introduced in Italy since the 2000s and differently affected occupa-
tional groups. Italy was one of the more regulated economies in these sectors until the
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first half of the 2000s, while the combined effect of the two reforms led to a significant
liberalization in the next decade. We find that the progress toward a more market-
friendly regulatory environment leads to a substantial decrease in the propensity for
career following. These results suggest that intergenerational persistence in certain oc-
cupations depends to a large extent on the existence of positional rents generated by
lack of competition. In other words, our findings suggest that regulation significantly
biases the allocation of individuals across occupations based on the parental occupa-
tion.
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A Appendix for Tax-Induced Transfer of Residence: Evi-
dence from Tax Decentralization in Italy
A1 Local income taxation in Italy
This Appendix provides detailed information on the set of rules regulating the income
tax set by municipalities and regions in Italy.
Municipal tax on personal income. Municipalities can establish, according to Ar-
ticle 1 of Legislative Decree 360/1998, an income tax on top of the tax rate set by the
central and regional government. Such tax rate cannot exceed the 0.8 percent, except
for cases expressly provided by the law, such as the case of the city of Rome, which,
starting from 2011, can establish a rate of up to 0.9 percent.
Starting from 2007, municipalities have been granted the right to introduce an ex-
emption threshold from the tax in the presence of specific income requirements. In this
case, the municipal income tax is not due if the income is lower or equal to the limit
established by the municipality. From 2011, municipalities can establish a single rate or
a plurality of different rates. If a municipality implements a graduated tax scheme, tax
rates must be articulated according to the same income brackets established for the na-
tional income tax, Imposta sul Reddito delle Persone Fisiche (IRPEF), as well as diversified
and increasing with income.
The municipal income tax (as well as the income tax set by the regional and national
government) depends on the municipality in which the taxpayer has her tax residence
on 1st of January of the year to which the payment of the tax refers. The tax is calculated
by applying the rate set by the municipality to the total income determined for IRPEF
purposes, net of deductible costs and tax credits for income generated abroad. The
payment of the municipal income tax is made on account and balance, together with
the payment of the income tax for the regional and national government.
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For the year 2016 and 2017, municipalities cannot change the income tax rate(s). The
same law states that the local tax freeze does not apply to the municipal waste disposal
tax (TARI). Furthermore, the tax freeze does not apply for local authorities that are on
predissesto or a situation of financial instability, as referred by Article 243-bis and Article
246 of Legislative Decree no. 267/2000.
Municipalities retain revenue from the municipal income tax. Tax intakes are mostly
used to deliver public goods provisions, such as public transportation, waste manage-
ment and to finance school facilities.
In the following, we list the laws concerning the income tax set by municipalities:
• Law 15 December 1997, n. 446, Article 52. Istituzione dell’imposta regionale sulle
attività produttive, revisione degli scaglioni, delle aliquote e delle detrazioni dell’Irpef e
istituzione di una addizionale regionale a tale imposta, nonché riordino della disciplina
dei tributi locali
• Law 28 September 1998, n. 360. Istituzione di una addizionale comunale all’IRPEF.
• Law 27 December 2006, n. 296. Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e
pluriennale dello Stato.
– Article 1, comma 161. Modalità e termini per l’accertamento, da parte degli enti
locali, dei tributi di propria competenza.
– Article 1, comma 162. Requisiti minimi che devono possedere gli atti di accer-
tamento di tributi locali.
– Article 1, comma 163. Termine per la notifica degli atti esecutivi relativi a tributi
locali.
– Article 1, comma 164. Termine per la richiesta di rimborso, da parte del con-
tribuente, di tributi locali non dovuti.
– Article 1, comma 165. Misura degli interessi sui rimborsi di imposta.
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– Article 1, comma 166. Arrotondamento del versamento di tributi locali.
– Article 1, comma 167. Modalità di compensazione di tributi locali.
– Article 1, comma 168. Soglie minime per l’esigibilità di tributi locali.
– Article 1, comma 169. Proroga automatica delle aliquote vigenti in mancanza di
nuova delibera.
• Law 31 May 2010. Misure urgenti in materia di stabilizzazione finanziaria e di compet-
itività economica.
• Law 14 March 2011, n. 23. Disposizioni in materia di federalismo fiscale municipale.
– Article 14. Ambito di applicazione del decreto legislativo, regolazioni finanziarie e
norme transitorie.
• Law 13 August 2011, n. 138. Ulteriori misure urgenti per la stabilizzazione finanziaria
e per lo sviluppo.
– Article 1. Disposizioni per la riduzione della spesa pubblica.
• Law 21 November 2014, n. 175, Article 8. Semplificazione fiscale e dichiarazione dei
redditi precompilata.
• Law 28 December 2015, n. 208. Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio annuale e
pluriennale dello Stato.
Revenue from the regional and municipal income tax accounts for 28,302 millions
of euros, that is nearly 16 percent of total revenue in 2015. Figure A1 shows
the trend in total revenue raised from the municipal income tax over the 2001-
2015 period. The figure clearly underlines the process of tax decentralization
described above. Tax revenue were around 25 millions of euros in 2001, then
they substantially rose after the first wave of decentralization in 2007 (to around
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1,500 millions) and continue to gradually increase after the 2011 reform. In 2015,
municipalities raised around 2,500 millions of euros from the municipal income
tax. This accounts for around 1.5 percent of total personal income tax revenue
raised by the Italy in 2015 (that amount to nearly 173,007 millions of euros).
Figure A1: Tax revenue from the municipal income tax
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Note: This figure depicts the trend in total revenue (millions of 2015 euros) raised from the municipal
income tax. The sample includes 7,960 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period.
Regional tax on personal income. The law 446/1998 introduced the regional sur-
charge to the income tax. The tax rate applied to total taxable income, net of deductible
costs, deductions, the tax credit for profits distributed by companies and entities, and
for income produced abroad. The basic rate of the tax was 0.9 percent initially, then
raised to 1.23 percent from 2012. Each region (and autonomous province) can increase
the basic rate within the limits set by the national law by modifying its own law, which
is published in the Official Gazette no later than 31 December of the year preceding the
one in which the tax refers.
The discipline of the regional additional income tax was substantially reformed by
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the Article 6 of Legislative Decree 68/2011, which established that any tax increase
cannot be larger than 2.1 percentage points. Similarly to the municipal income tax, this
reform established that regions can adopt a graduated tax scheme, where the tax rates
must be articulated exclusively in relation to the same income brackets established for
the national income tax, as well as diversified and increasing with income. The regions
can arrange tax deductions in favor of the family and also adopt measures of direct
economic support. The regions can also set deductions from the regional income tax
itself in the place where subsidies, vouchers, service vouchers and other social support
measures provided for by regional legislation are provided.25
The regional surcharge is paid in a single solution to the region in which the tax-
payer has his tax domicile on 1st of January of the year in which the tax rate applied.
Revenue from the regional income tax are held by the regions and mostly contribute to
financing the National Health Service (administered by the regions).
In the following, we list the laws concerning the income tax set by regions:
• Law 15 December 1997, n. 446, Article 50. Istituzione dell’imposta regionale sulle
attività produttive, revisione degli scaglioni, delle aliquote e delle detrazioni dell’Irpef e
istituzione di una addizionale regionale a tale imposta, nonché riordino della disciplina
dei tributi locali.
• Law 4 December 1997, n. 460, Article 21. Riordino della disciplina tributaria degli
enti non commerciali e delle organizzazioni non lucrative di utilità sociale
• Law 4 May 2001, n. 207, Article 4. Riordino del sistema delle istituzioni pubbliche di
assistenza e beneficenza, a norma dell’articolo 10 della L. 8 novembre 2000, n. 328.
• Law 30 December 2004, n. 311, Article 1. Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio
an- nuale e pluriennale dello Stato.
25These tax exemption measures cannot be adopted by the regions involved in the recovery plans from
the health deficit.
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• Law 27 December 2006, n. 296, Article 1. Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio
an- nuale e pluriennale dello Stato
• Law 1 October 2007 n. 159, Article 4.
• Law 5 May 2009, n. 42, Article 7. Delega al Governo in materia di federalismo fiscale,
in attuazione dell’articolo 119 della Costituzione.
• Law 23 December 2009, n. 191, Article 2. Disposizioni per la formazione del bilancio
annuale e pluriennale dello Stato.
• Law 31 May 2010, n.78, Article 11. Misure urgenti in materia di stabilizzazione fi-
nanziaria e di competitività economica.
• Law 6 May 2011, n. 68, Articles 2 and 6. Disposizioni in materia di autonomia di
entrata delle regioni a statuto ordinario e delle province, nonché di determinazione dei
costi e dei fabbisogni standard nel settore sanitario.
• Law 6 December 2011 n. 201, Article 28. Disposizioni urgenti per la crescita, l’equità
e il consolidamento dei conti pubblici.
• Law 29 December 2011, n. 216, Article 29. Proroga di termini previsti da disposizioni
legislative.
• Law 22 June 2012, n. 83, Article 19 comma 9. Possibilità per la regione Campania di
destinare l’ aumento dell’aliquota dell’addizionale regionale all’IRPEF previsto dall’art.
2, comma 86, della legge n. 191 del 2009 o anche il raddoppio dell’aumento stesso, alla
copertura del Piano di rientro dal disavanzo nel settore del trasporto.
• Law 6 July 2012, n. 95, Article 15. Disposizioni urgenti per la revisione della spesa pub-
blica con invarianza dei servizi ai cittadini nonché misure di rafforzamento patrimoniale
delle imprese del settore bancario.
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• Law 8 April 2013, n. 35, Article 3-ter. Disposizioni urgenti per il pagamento dei
debiti scaduti della pubblica amministrazione, per il riequilibrio finanziario degli enti
territoriali, nonché in materia di versamento di tributi degli enti locali
• Law 28 June 2013, n. 76, Article 11 comma 15. Primi interventi urgenti per la
promozione dell’occupazione, in particolare giovanile, della coesione sociale, nonché in
materia di Imposta sul valore aggiunto (IVA) e altre misure finanziarie urgenti.
• Law 21 November 2014, n. 175, Article 8 comma 1 and 4. Semplificazione fiscale e
dichiarazione dei redditi precompilata.
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Figure A2: Share of taxpayers in each income group
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Note: The figure displays the evolution in the share of taxpayers in each income group in Northern Italy
(left-hand side graph) and Southern Italy (right-hand side graph). Series are normalized to 1 in 2001.
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Figure A3: Changes in the local tax rate
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Note: The figure displays the evolution in the share of income bracket-municipality-year observations
containing a tax rate change. Red vertical lines refer to the year before local governments were granted
the possibility to implement a tax exemption cutoff (2006) and to set different tax rates across brackets
(2011).
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Figure A4: How many tax rate variations?
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Note: The figure displays the share of income-bracket municipality cells (vertical axis) with a given
number of tax rate change (horizontal axis) observed over the 2001-2015 period.
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Figure A5: Local average tax rate by bracket
Note: This graph depicts the local average tax rate on personal income (%) for taxpayers in bottom, median and top income bracket. The black line indicates
regional boundaries.
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Figure A6: Municipality tax scheme
Note: The figure displays the evolution in the municipality tax scheme, by showing whether a munici-
pality has set a tax rate on personal income and, if it did, whether it is a single flat rate or a progressive
tax scheme (including both those with a tax exemption cutoff or graduated tax rates). The black line
indicates regional boundaries.
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Figure A7: Trend in municipal income taxation
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Note: The figure displays the evolution in the share of municipalities with a nonzero income tax rate (left-
hand side vertical axis) and in the share of municipalities with a graduated tax scheme (right-hand side
vertical axis) over the 2001-2015 period. Red vertical lines refer to the year before local governments
were granted the possibility to implement a tax exemption cutoff (2006) and to set different tax rates
across brackets (2011).
Appendices 177
Figure A8: Within-municipality cross-bracket tax rate variation
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Note: The figure displays the evolution in the municipal marginal tax rate across income bracket over
the 2001-2015 period for municipalities with a graduated tax rate. Red vertical lines refer to the year
before local governments were granted the possibility to implement a tax exemption cutoff (2006) and
to set different tax rates across brackets (2011). Data from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance.
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A2 Transfer of residence
Table A1: Average annual outflow of individuals, selected province pairs
Origin Destination province:
province: RM MI NA TO PA BS BA CT BG SA FI BO PD CE VR VA TV VI VE GE
RM 49,047 1,629 1,040 605 326 242 325 247 182 419 471 416 240 403 261 218 252 161 236 239
MI 1,283 51,998 652 684 379 726 334 277 2,134 249 301 327 235 156 309 3,846 194 166 213 615
NA 2,949 1,919 45,726 560 151 375 174 96 272 2,504 654 838 191 5,582 282 330 233 177 275 251
TO 582 888 258 50,234 240 136 137 168 125 149 129 156 89 116 123 176 84 69 95 268
PA 638 806 144 362 16,629 140 53 251 158 46 190 275 92 58 143 176 93 110 110 138
BS 243 677 225 146 98 25,472 89 68 1,174 68 66 93 94 66 410 90 57 88 82 68
BA 704 878 135 238 53 136 10,791 34 95 53 121 264 97 53 120 110 92 84 109 50
CT 446 589 70 260 209 103 38 19,267 109 30 95 164 84 26 110 135 79 60 63 63
BG 163 1,578 144 114 100 1,269 55 70 22,971 62 46 63 49 49 89 132 41 46 44 66
SA 1,013 653 1,757 238 51 131 48 31 93 12,718 177 299 76 148 84 131 74 53 63 80
FI 426 329 240 107 150 50 54 59 43 74 15,465 233 59 66 56 51 39 34 54 67
BO 379 405 322 129 175 70 119 83 54 133 194 18,987 106 126 97 54 63 55 86 60
PD 215 294 96 86 47 81 43 40 48 32 63 122 16,983 34 319 42 726 1,146 1,697 35
CE 938 487 3,237 204 53 120 60 24 86 146 196 281 68 12,779 101 135 97 56 86 69
VR 212 340 160 104 95 387 63 68 85 35 55 106 313 56 18,379 48 112 560 129 42
VA 191 2,857 154 130 104 103 61 85 128 66 46 55 48 57 51 17,764 36 36 37 77
TV 224 229 120 77 65 71 48 44 43 40 60 89 832 58 134 42 17,345 625 1,674 31
VI 174 221 112 66 85 94 48 39 51 31 43 80 1,196 33 628 36 581 17,297 256 29
VE 205 252 137 82 69 62 52 37 40 25 58 104 1,756 46 150 43 1,832 258 10,225 34
GE 232 645 114 256 105 63 34 43 58 33 76 62 37 28 45 76 24 22 41 9,433
Note: This table shows the average annual outflow of individuals moving from an origin province (first column) to a destination province (columns 2-20) over the 2007-2015 period within the following
20 most populated provinces: Rome (RM), Milan (MI), Naples (NA), Turin (TO), Palermo (PA), Brescia (BS), Bari (BA), Catania (CT), Bergamo (BG), Salerno (SA), Florence (FI), Bologna (BO), Padua (PD),
Caserta (CE), Verona (VE), Varese (VA), Treviso (TV), Vicenza (VI), Venice (VE), and Genua (GE). The full dataset covers 11,932,720 transfers of residence moving within 107 × 107 = 11,449 province pairs
over the 2007-2015 period.
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Figure A9: Google search for “difference domicile and residence”
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Note: This figure depicts the trend in google search for “difference domicile and residence” (differenza
domicilio e residenza). Searches are normalized to 100 in the peak period.
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A3 Results appendix
Robustness analysis for the progressive tax analysis. This section provides alterna-
tive specifications and robustness checks to test the sensitivity of our baseline results
on the impact of implementing a progressive local tax schedule. First, we account for
different intensities in the implementation of a progressive local tax schedule. While
our baseline estimates consider the decision of switching to a progressive tax as a sim-
ple discrete change in the local tax scheme, the intensity of the reform is likely to differ
across municipalities depending on the progression of the marginal tax rates across
brackets. We account for this possibility in two ways. First, we implement a triple
difference strategy by further comparing municipalities introducing only a tax exemp-
tion for low incomes (which we expect to be relatively less affected) with municipalities
with graduated tax rates. Column (2) in Table A2 shows that the impact is not not sta-
tistically significant in municipalities that implemented a tax exemption. Second, we
compute the average rate progression (i.e., the derivative of the tax rate with respect to
income levels), which we calculate at income level equal to four times the median tax
base in a given year. This measure is an index of the structural progressivity of a tax
schedule (Musgrave and Thin 1948; Rubolino and Waldenström 2020). In column (3)
of Table A2, we show that the impact on the tax base is significantly larger when the
tax schedule is more progressive, that is, when the slope of the tax rate progression is
steeper.
Second, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the staggered implementation
of the progressive tax schedule. One difference between equation (1.2) and the clas-
sical DiD approach is that our model accounts for the fact that there are many local
tax scheme switches staggered over time. The staggered implementation of a progres-
sive tax also means that our control group is not restricted to municipalities that never
implement a progressive tax. In fact, equation (1.2) can be estimated even if all munic-
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Table A2: Implementing a progressive tax schedule, alternative specifications
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3)
1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.012***
(0.003)
1(i ∈ Exemption) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.002
(0.007)
1(i ∈ Exemption) · 1(i ∈ Gra) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.014***
(0.004)
log(AverageRateProgression) -0.040***
(0.011)
Observations 118,770 118,770 118,770
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Tax base (€1,000) 93,659 93,659 93,659
Note: Column (1) shows the baseline effect of switching from a flat to a progressive income tax sched-
ule. Column (2) reports the coefficient estimate separately for municipalities implementing only a tax
exemption cutoff (and then a flat rate for incomes above the cutoff), 1(i ∈ Exemption), and those intro-
ducing also graduated tax rates in addition to a tax exemption cutoff, 1(i ∈ Exemption) · 1(i ∈ Gra).
In column (3), we use the average rate progression as a measure of the structural progressivity of the
local income tax schedule. The sample is composed of 7,918 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period.
Standard errors clustered at municipality-level in parentheses.
ipalities eventually switch to a progressive tax scheme by exploiting differences in the
timing of the reform. We report this exercise in Figure A10 and we show coefficient es-
timate and confidence intervals in Table A3. The results are qualitatively similar when
we rely only on variation in the timing of the local tax scheme switch.
Third, we explore whether the effect differs across municipalities that switched from
a zero local tax rate to a progressive tax versus those switching from a flat to a progres-
sive income tax schedule. In our sample, the share of municipalities taxing their resi-
dents (either through a flat or a progressive tax schedule) has steadily increased over
time (see Figure A7), raising from around 55 percent to 85 percent over the 2001-2015
period. One may argue that the first-time introduction of an income tax might have a
larger effect that a change in an existing tax rate, since the initial inception of a local
tax might be more salient than any subsequent change. To investigate this possibility,
we analyze the effect on the tax base stemming from a triple interaction: i. a dummy
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Figure A10: Staggered impact of implementing a progressive local tax schedule
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Note: The figure depicts the effects of switching from a flat to a progressive local income tax schedule by
exploiting the staggered timing in the local tax scheme switch. The figure plots estimated coefficients
and the 95 percent confidence intervals: each point shows the effect of having implemented a progres-
sive tax schedule for j years (if j >-1) or of starting the policy in j years (if j < -1) relative to the year before
the tax scheme switch was implemented. Regressions include municipality fixed effects and province×
year fixed effects. The sample includes 2,828 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. Standard errors
clustered at municipality-level.
for municipalities that did not set an income tax originally (“later” municipalities); ii.
a dummy for the period after introducing an income tax; iii. a dummy equal to 1 when
a later municipality introduces a progressive tax. We report the result of this exercise
in Table A4. We find that, conditional on introducing a local income tax, the effect is
significantly larger when a later municipality chooses a progressive tax scheme.
Fourth, we test the sensitivity of our estimate to the differential trend in cost of living
across municipalities. For this end, we deflate the tax base by the average housing
price in a municipality, that allows to absorb, at least in part, any municipality-specific
change in cost of living. Table A5 shows that the effect of introducing a progressive tax
remains remarkably similar.
Finally, we allow for spatial correlation in the error term among municipalities by
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Table A3: Staggered change in the tax scheme and tax base
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.011*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 42,421 42,421 42,421 42,421
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No Yes Yes
LLM × province × year FE No No No Yes
Tax base (€1,000) 180,906 180,906 180,906 180,906
Note: This table shows the effect of switching from a flat to a progressive income tax. The sample
is composed of 2,828 municipalities over the 2001-2015 period. The average tax base in progressive
tax municipalities over the period before the tax scheme switch was around 169 million of 2015 euros.
Standard errors clustered at municipality-level in parentheses.
clustering the standard errors on a higher level of aggregation (Angrist and Pischke
2009). Figure A11 shows that our estimates remain statistically significant at usual
confidence intervals when we employ standard errors clustered at local labor market,
provincial or regional level.
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Table A4: Introduction of a local income tax
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(i ∈ Later) · 1(t ∈ Post) 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
... ·1(i ∈ Prog) -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.012** -0.017**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Observations 118,770 118,770 118,770 49,227 49,227 49,227
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LLM × province × year FE No No Yes No No Yes
Sample Full Full Full Later Later Later
Note: This table shows the tax base effect of introducing a local income tax in municipalities that did not
set any income tax initially (“later” municipalities). In columns (2) and (3), we interact the dummy equal
to 1 for each year after the introduction of the local income tax in a later municipality 1(i ∈ Later) · 1(t ∈
Post), with a dummy equal to 1 when the tax scheme is progressive. In columns (4)-(6), we restrict
the sample to only later municipalities to exploit the timing in the introduction of the local income tax.
Standard errors clustered at municipality-level in parentheses.
Cross-bracket analysis with fixed effects. Although suggestive, the graphical ev-
idence presented in Figure 1.5 might be biased if there are municipality-specific eco-
nomic changes affecting differently taxpayers in the very top bracket relative to the
bracket just below, and which are happening simultaneously with the local tax change.
We attempt to account for this issue by adding a wide set of fixed effects. Specifically,
we run regressions of the following form:
log(yb,i,t) = β · 1(b ∈ TopBracket) · 1(t ∈ Post)+
γb,i + δi,t + ηb,p(i),t + ub,i,t, ∀i ∈ Prog,
(1)
where yb,i,t is the tax base or population stock in the income bracket b in municipality
i at time t. 1(b ∈ TopBracket) and 1(t ∈ Post) are dummies for the top income bracket
and the post-tax scheme switch period, respectively. β is the coefficient of interest,
which measures the impact of implementing a progressive tax on the tax base or popu-
lation stock in the top bracket. We include income bracket×municipality fixed effects,
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Table A5: Accounting for differences in cost of living
log(taxable income)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1(i ∈ Prog) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 86,874 86,874 86,874 86,874 86,874
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No Yes Yes Yes
LLM × province × year FE No No No Yes Yes
Controls No No No No Yes
Tax base (€1,000) 94,375 94,375 94,375 94,375 94,375
Note: This table shows the effect of switching from a flat to a progressive income tax, where the tax base
is deflated by the municipality-specific housing price. The sample is composed of 7,918 municipalities
over the 2005-2015 period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level in parentheses.
γb,i, to filter out permanent heterogeneity across taxpayers located in different munici-
pality and/or different income brackets. Municipality× year fixed effects, δi,t, account
for municipality-specific time-varying amenities or economic shocks. If a municipality
becomes more attractive after tax rate changes because of policy changes correlated
with the change in taxes (e.g., improvement in public amenities or increase in public
spending), then these fixed effects would absorb such difference. Income bracket ×
province × year fixed effects, ηb,p(i),t, control for any different reason for why individ-
uals at different points in the income distribution and/or located in different places
might experience different income growth rates, aside from tax changes.
Coefficient estimates are presented in Table A6. We start from a basic model with
municipality, income bracket and year fixed effects. Consistent with the trend detected
in the raw data, we find that the introduction of a progressive tax has a negative impact
on both the tax base and the population stock in the top bracket. Point estimates remain
qualitatively similar when we include municipality× income bracket fixed effects and
municipality × year fixed effects. On average, our estimates imply that implementing
a progressive tax would induce at most 3.904 top taxpayers to outmigrate: this would
reduce the aggregate municipal tax base by around 854 thousand of euros. A rough
comparison with the cross-municipality DiD estimate suggests that nearly fourth-fifth
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Figure A11: Robustness to clustering choice
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-.025 -.02 -.015 -.01 -.005 0 .005
Coefficient estimate
Note: The figure depicts coefficient estimates and confidence intervals for three models: i. municipality
FE + year FE: ii. municipality FE + province × year FE; iii. municipality FE + local labor market × year
FE. For each model, we compute standard errors at four different cluster levels: i. municipality (# =
7,910); ii. local labor market (# = 686); iii. province (# = 107); iv. region (# = 20).
of the erosion in the tax base is driven by the migration response in the top bracket.
One further challenge is represented by local shocks or policies affecting specifically
the rich in a given local area. In column (3) and (6), we account for this possibility
by including income bracket × year × province fixed effects. Our estimates hold up
well across specifications, although the exact magnitude of the effect differs somewhat
across models. Our most conservative estimate implies that implementing a progres-
sive income tax reduces the tax base (stock of taxpayers) in the top bracket by 2.8 (0.8)
percent.
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Table A6: The impact of implementing a progressive tax on top brackets
log(taxable income) log(population stock)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1(b ∈ Top) · 1(t ∈ Post) -0.045*** -0.052*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.008
(0.014) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 67,997 67,997 67,997 67,997 67,997 67,997
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Income bracket FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality × bracket FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Municipality × year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Bracket × year × province FE No No Yes No No Yes
Mean dependent (1,000€ or #) 16,429 16,429 16,429 122 122 122
Note: This table presents the impact of introducing a progressive local tax scheme on taxable income and
population stock of taxpayers in the top income bracket, compared to the bracket just below. Standard
errors in parenthesis, with three-way clustering by municipality × income bracket, income bracket ×
year and municipality × year.
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Figure A12: Heterogeneous effect by population size
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Note: The figure depicts point estimate (central line) and 95 confidence intervals (lateral lines) of the
effect of switching from a flat to a progressive local income tax schedule on the tax base in each quintile
of the population size of a municipality. The sample includes 7,918 municipalities over the 2001-2015
period.
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Figure A13: Tax base and population response in bottom brackets
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Note: The figure compares the evolution in taxable income (top panel) and number of taxpayers (bottom
panel) in the very bottom bracket and in the bracket just above. The dashed vertical line refers to the
year before a municipality switched from a flat to a progressive local income tax.
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Figure A14: Relocation of the tax base at regional border, bracket below the top
Note: The figure shows the relationship between the differential in the regional (top) tax rate on personal
income and mobility. We implement a border discontinuity approach on the sample of municipalities
located close to the regional border for two periods: i. the pre-reform (left-hand side graphs), where the
tax rate differential was zero or negligible; ii. the post-reform period (right-hand side graphs), where
spatial differences began to emerge. The vertical axis in top graphs is the total tax base reported in the
bracket just below the top (in 2015 euros); bottom graphs show the number of taxpayers. The horizontal
axis is the algebraic distance (in driving time) of a municipality from the regional border. Scatter points
are sample average over intervals of 2-driving time minutes bins. Optimal bandwidth is computed fol-
lowing the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014). We report discontinuity estimate and standard
errors with two-way clustering by municipality and regional border pairs standard errors.
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Figure A15: Tax rate differential at regional border
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Note: The figure shows the difference in the regional (top) tax rate on personal income (%) at regional
border. The horizontal axis is the algebraic distance (in driving time) of a municipality from the re-
gional border. Scatter points are sample average over intervals of 2-driving time minutes bins. Optimal
bandwidth is computed following the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014). We report discon-
tinuity estimate and standard errors with two-way clustering by municipality and regional border pairs
standard errors.
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Figure A16: Municipal tax rate differential at regional border
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Note: The figure shows the difference in the municipal (top) tax rate on personal income (%) at regional
border. The horizontal axis is the algebraic distance (in driving time) of a municipality from the re-
gional border. Scatter points are sample average over intervals of 2-driving time minutes bins. Optimal
bandwidth is computed following the algorithm developed by Calonico et al. (2014). We report discon-
tinuity estimate and standard errors with two-way clustering by municipality and regional border pairs
standard errors.
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Figure A17: Marche 2005 ex lege tax cut
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Note: The figure compares the evolution in tax base in the region of Marche (solid line) and a synthetic
control group (dashed line), aiming to resemble the evolution of the tax base in Marche over the pre-
reform period. The red vertical line refers to the year before Marche was forced to cut its tax rate from 4
to 1.4 percent. The two series are normalized to match the Marche series in the years before the tax cut.
The elasticity is computed as the ratio between the log of the mean tax base change and the log of the
net-of-tax rate change = log(102.620/100)/log((100-1.4)/(100-4)). Root Mean Squared Prediction Error =
.460. The synthetic control is mostly composed of Piedmont, Basilicata, and Molise regions.
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Table A7: Border discontinuity approach
log(tax base) log(population stock)
BD BD-FE BD BD-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(LowTaxSidei) 0.155* 0.097*** 0.137* 0.094***
(0.089) (0.024) (0.079) (0.018)
Observations 3,548 8,870 3,548 8,870
Municipality FE No Yes No Yes
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Mean dependent (1,000€ or #) 4,768 4,768 23 23
Elasticity 9.406 1.402 10.403 2.635
(3.820) (1.421) (3.378) (0.832)
Note: This table reports the discontinuous change in log of tax base (columns 1 and 2) and log of pop-
ulation stock (columns 3 and 4) in the top bracket as one crosses from high-tax to low-tax side of the
regional border. Each specification controls for the distance from the regional border at both sides. The
optimal bandwidth (driving time from the border) is computed using the selection criterion proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014). Column (1) and (3) report estimates only relative to the post-decentralization
period, while columns (2) and (4) are based on the full sample period and allow to control for municipal-
ity and year fixed effects to absorb any pre-existing difference in the outcome over the period before tax
rate differentials began to emerge. We weight observations by the difference in the regional tax rate dif-
ferential, so to weight more heavily observations where the net-of-tax income gains would be larger as
one crosses the regional border. Standard errors with two-way clustering by municipality and regional
border pairs in parenthesis.
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Table A8: Local income taxation and transfers of tax residence, 2SLS model
Outcome: log of outmigration odds-ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Tax rate: 99th percentile average tax rate
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] 9.159*** 2.650** 3.996** 5.349*** 6.882*** 3.223 6.242***
(1.056) (1.125) (1.559) (1.749) (1.898) (3.646) (1.886)
B. Tax rate: top marginal tax rate
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] 7.061*** 2.049** 2.858** 3.716*** 4.745*** 2.273 4.260***
(0.824) (0.871) (1.116) (1.216) (1.311) (2.567) (1.284)
Orig-dest pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group trend No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sp and pr tax controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin pr x year FE No No No No Yes No No
Destination pr x year FE No No No No No Yes No
Region pair x year FE No No No No No No Yes
Note: This table presents the effect of net-of-average tax rate differential on the probability of trans-
ferring the tax residence by instrumenting tax rate changes by a dummy for the post-2011 period. Our
outcome is the outmigration odds-ratio: the probability of an individual moving from an origin province
to a given destination province relative to the probability of not moving at all. Our tax rate measure is
the average tax rate computed at 99th percentile in the top panel, and the top marginal tax rate in the
bottom panel. The sample includes 4,549,111 transfers of residence moving within 11,449 province pairs
over the 2007-2015 period. Standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by origin-province
× year, destination-province × year and province-pair.
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Table A9: Migration elasticity using the top marginal tax rate
log of outmigration odds-ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log[(1− τd,t)/(1− τo,t)] 4.508*** 1.589* 2.231*** 2.676*** 2.624*** 3.149***
(0.758) (0.830) (0.843) (0.878) (0.834) (0.874)
Origin-Destination pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Spending and pr tax controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin province x year FE No No No Yes No No
Destination province x year FE No No No No Yes No
Region pair x year FE No No No No No Yes
Note: This table presents the effect of net-of-top marginal tax rate differential on the probability of trans-
ferring the tax residence. Our outcome is the outmigration odds-ratio: the probability of an individual
moving from an origin province to a given destination province relative to the probability of not moving
at all. The sample includes 4,549,111 transfers of residence moving within 11,449 province pairs over
the 2007-2015 period. Standard errors in parentheses, with three-way clustering by origin-province ×
year, destination-province × year and province-pair.
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B Appendix for Tax Enforcement, Public Spending and
Tax Rates: Evidence from the Ghost Buildings Program
B1 The Ghost Buildings program
Identification procedure. In the following, we describe the procedure implemented by
Agenzia del Territorio to detect buildings not registered on the land registry maps and
thus missed from the tax base. We graphically show this procedure in Figure B1 and
summarize this process in detail below:
• Step 1: Take high-resolution satellite images of the country;
• Step 2: Point out any area covered by physical objects by using of ground and
surface’s altimetric models;
• Step 3: Distinguish vegetation (in green) from objects (in red) by exploiting light
frequency data within the short-wave infra-red spectral range;
• Step 4: Remove (untaxed) vegetation;
• Step 5: Compare red objects (i.e., buildings emerging from satellite data) with the
cadastral maps’ vectorial cartography.
• Step 6: Any object existing in satellite data but not in cadastral maps will be
reported as a red ball;
• Step 7: The exact location (address) of each red ball (i.e., ghost building) will be
communicated to local administrators;
• Step 8: Local administrators will be in charge to:
1. disseminate information about the ghost buildings;
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2. proceed, with the support of municipal police, to follow-up inspections and
imputation of the tax base of properties not voluntarily registered;
3. collect overdue taxes;
4. check whether the building was conform with the City Plan and local zoning
restrictions.
Using this technique, the Agenzia del Territorio detected 2.238 million ghost buildings,
including commercial, industrial, and residential stand-alone buildings, as well as any
unreported extension of previously registered buildings. Among these, over 1.260 mil-
lions of buildings required to be reported to the registry and thus were missed from
the tax base. The following buildings do not enter the tax base and are not required
to be registered: i) buildings that are incomplete; ii) buildings that are particularly de-
graded; iii) solar collectors; iv) greenhouses; v) henhouses or other buildings reserved
for animals (Decreto Ministero delle Finanze, 2 Gennaio 1998, n. 28, Art. 3).
Comparison with other measures of tax evasion. To validate this indicator as a
proxy for tax evasion, Figure B3 compares ghost buildings intensity (y-axis) with two
regional-level estimates of the tax gap (x-axis).26 The left-hand side graph compares
ghost buildings intensity with Galbiati and Zanella (2012)’s estimate of the tax gap,
which uses tax audits data on self-employed individuals (small individual businesses,
including farmers and professionals) in the late 1980s. The right-hand side graph re-
lates ghost buildings intensity with a measure of evasion developed by Carfora et al.
(2018) by using data from the Italian Internal Revenue Agency over the 2001-2011 pe-
riod and calculating the tax gap as the ratio between potential and actual tax revenue.
The figure shows that both these two proxies for tax evasion are positively associated
with the ghost buildings indicator (coefficients of correlation equal to 0.57 and 0.62).
26In this figure, the ghost building intensity indicator is computed as the municipal population-
weighted regional average.
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Figure B1: Identification process for ghost buildings
Note: See the text for details.
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Figure B2: Timing of program inception
Note: This figure depicts the Ghost Buildings program inception year. Missing values are imputed with
the provincial average. Trentino Alto-Adige region (the white area in North-East) did not participate into
the program. The exact dates are the following: August 2007; October 2007; December 2007; December
2008; December 2009; September 2010. Data from the Italian Internal Revenue Agency.
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Figure B3: Comparison with other estimates of tax evasion
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Note: This figure compares the ghost building intensity indicator (y-axis) with regional-level measures
of the tax gap (x-axis) as computed by Galbiati and Zanella (2012) and Carfora, Pansini Vega and Pisani
(2018). The ghost building indicator is the municipal population weighted regional average.
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Table B1: The Ghost Buildings program
Building type # of registered buildings Total rental value Average rental value
(euros) (euros)
Residential 446,093 (35%) 181.337.943 (22%) 407
Warehouse 395,482 (31%) 60,447,057 (7%) 153
Garage 215,601 (17%) 28,887,614 (3%) 134
Other 203,920 (16%) 554,592,000 (67%) 2,721
Total 1,261,096 825,624,614 655
Note: This table presents information on the type of buildings detected by the Ghost Buildings pro-
gram and subject to registration requirement. Data from the Italian Internal Revenue Service (Agen-
zia delle Entrate).
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B2 Data and results appendix
Table B2: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on government grants and tax
base
OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
& DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log of government grants
Posti,t × GBi -2.607*** -1.775*** -1.560*** -1.915*** -1.618*** -1.555***
(0.516) (0.514) (0.512) (0.529) (0.549) (0.551)
log of tax base
Posti,t × GBi 0.629*** 0.672*** 0.237*** 0.378*** 0.387*** 0.382***
(0.068) (0.068) (0.050) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 119,670
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls × Post No No No Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Election year × year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table shows the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on log of government grants (top
panel) and log of tax base (bottom panel). Posti,t × GBi is the interaction between a dummy for the
(municipality-specific) post-program period and the share of ghost buildings detected in a municipality.
Column (5) reports estimates from an instrumental variable approach where the post-program dummy
is instrumented by the provincial modal year of the program inception year. Column (6) combines the
2SLS approach with a triple difference approach that exploits the fact that one region did not participate
into the program. The sample covers 7,709 municipalities (7,978 in last column) over the 2001-2015
period. First-stage coefficient is 0.958 (0.007). Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
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Table B3: Validity of Difference-in-discontinuity
Pop For Mayor Town council
female college age female college age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Posti,t × Di -0.010 -0.001 -0.037 -0.004 1.971 0.007 -0.020 0.420
(0.008) (0.002) (0.042) (0.072) (1.410) (0.011) (0.015) (0.429)
Observations 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549
...× GBi -0.308 -0.003 -0.720 -1.355 34.526 0.016 -0.299 2.685
(0.185) (0.039) (0.665) (1.175) (27.719) (0.193) (0.336) (10.620)
Observations 549 549 549 549 549 549 549 549
Note: This table reports difference-in-discontinuity estimates of the impact of the Ghost Buildings pro-
gram on the difference in population (column 1), share of foreign residents (column 2), mayor sex (col-
umn 3), mayor education (column 4), mayor age (column 5), share of women in town council (column
6), share of college degree in town council (column 7), average age in town council (column 8) across
municipalities below and above the cutoff defining eligibility for fiscal rules. We run local linear regres-
sions with optimal bandwidth estimated following Calonico et al. (2014). Standard errors clustered at
municipality-level.
A
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Table B4: Effects on other items of public spending
log of per-capita spending on:
Police Culture Sport Tourism Transp. Envir. Social Develop. Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Posti,t × GBi 2.252*** -0.517 0.186 -1.038 -0.295 0.090 -0.050 -0.673 -0.109
(0.630) (0.601) (0.603) (0.595) (0.362) (0.371) (0.553) (0.549) (0.739)
Observations 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635 115,635
Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Election year × year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Note: This table shows the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on the log of municipal spending per-capita on police, culture, sport activities, tourism,
transportation, environment and waste disposal, social activities, development activities, and services. Posti,t × GBi is the interaction between a dummy for
the (municipality-specific) post-program period and the share of ghost buildings detected in a municipality. The sample covers 7,709 municipalities over the
2001-2015 period. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
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Figure B4: Composition of municipality revenue and spending
39%
34%
19%
8%
Tax revenue Transfers
Assets disp. & K tran. Loans
Revenue
24%
3%
8%
24%
2%
11%
23%
Adm Dev Edu Env
Sec Soc Tra
Spending
Note: This figure depicts the composition of municipality revenue (left-hand side graph) and invest-
ment spending (right-hand side graph). The following budget items are illustrated: administration
(”Adm”); development (”Dev”); education (”Edu”); waste management and environment protection
(”Env”); security (”Sec”); social, cultural and sport activities (”Soc”); public transportation and roads
(”Tra”). Values are mean values over the 2001-2015 period. These budget items refer to the following
4-digit code in the municipal balance sheets (2014 format): administration (4190); development (4290
and 4357); education (4240); environment protection (4125); security (4225 and 4230); social, cultural
and sport activities (4080, 4090, and 4150); public transportation and roads (4110 and 4180). Data from
balance sheets of Italian municipalities.
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Figure B5: McCrary test
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Note: The figure shows the distribution of the municipal population around the eligibility threshold
for fiscal rules (red vertical line) in municipalities with population between 3,000 and 7,000 in 2001 and
2011 Census. Circles represent the difference between the municipal population and the 5,000 threshold.
Circles are average observed values. The central solid line is a kernel estimate; the lateral lines represent
the 95 percent confidence intervals. Discontinuity estimate (standard errors) is -.061 (.120).
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Figure B6: Distribution of mayor and local council’s ability
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of mayor (top panel) and town council (bottom panel) prob-
ability of having a college degree, calculated during the period before the Ghost Buildings program’s
inception. The horizontal axis is the actual population size minus 5,000. Scatter points are sample aver-
age over intervals of 100 population size bins.
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Figure B7: The impact of mayors’ salary change
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Note: This graph compares the effect of the Ghost Buildings program on tax revenue in municipali-
ties having population size close to 10,000 (top graph) and 15,000 (bottom graph), where mayor’ salary
changes discontinuously. The horizontal axis is the normalized population size. Scatter points are sam-
ple average over intervals of 100 population size bins.
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Figure B8: Scope for ghost buildings’ registration
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of ghost buildings intensity. The horizontal axis is the actual
population size minus 5,000. Scatter points are sample average over intervals of 100 population size
bins.
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Figure B9: Distribution of tax rates before the program
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Note: This graph shows the distribution of local tax rates, calculated during the period before the Ghost
Buildings program’s inception. The horizontal axis is the actual population size minus 5,000. Scatter
points are sample average over intervals of 100 population size bins.
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Figure B10: Rental value and buildings’ characteristics
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Note: This graph depicts rental value (proxied by the selling price in euros / square meters) and the
share of owner occupied buildings. The horizontal axis is the actual population size minus 5,000. Scatter
points are sample average over intervals of 100 population size bins.
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Figure B11: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on government grants
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Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost buildings program on log of government grants. The
figure plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation (1) and the confidence intervals: each point
shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy j years
before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at municipality-
level.
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Figure B12: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on tax base
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Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost buildings program on log of municipal tax base. The
figure plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation (1) and the confidence intervals: each point
shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy in j
years (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at municipality-
level.
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Figure B13: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on other local public finance
outcomes
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Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost buildings program on log of advances from loans;
new mortgages; external fundings; loans. The figure plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation
(1) and the confidence intervals: each point shows the effect of having implemented the program for j
years (if j > 0) or of starting the policy j years before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting
year. Standard errors clustered at municipality-level.
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Figure B14: Robustness to clustering choice, tax revenue
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Note: The figure depicts coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals computed clustering
the standard errors at three different levels: i. municipality (as used in the baseline analysis); ii. province;
iii. region. We report these estimates for three different empirical models: i. municipality fixed effects
and year fixed effects (top panel): ii. + time-varying municipality-level control variables (middle panel);
iii. + province-year fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects (bottom panel).
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Figure B15: Yearly RD estimates for tax revenue
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Note: This graph shows the effect of eligibility for balanced budget rules on tax revenue. The figure
plots the estimated year-to-year δ0 coefficient obtained from equation (3) and the confidence intervals:
each point shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the
policy j years before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at
municipality-level.
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Figure B16: Bandwidth sensitivity
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Note: The figure reports difference-in-discontinuities coefficient on the impact of the Ghost Buildings
program on the difference in log of tax revenue. The horizontal axis is the bandwidth used to estimate
the difference-in-discontinuities coefficient.
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Figure B17: Robustness to clustering choice, public spending
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Note: The figure depicts coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals computed clustering
the standard errors at three different levels: i. municipality (as used in the baseline analysis); ii. province;
iii. region. We report these estimates for three different empirical models: i. municipality fixed effects
and year fixed effects (top panel): ii. + time-varying municipality-level control variables (middle panel);
iii. + province-year fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects (bottom panel).
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Figure B18: The impact of the Ghost Buildings program on police spending
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Note: This graph presents the effects of the Ghost Buildings program on log of municipal police spending
per-capita. The figure plots the estimated β j coefficients from equation (1) and the confidence intervals:
each point shows the effect of having implemented the program for j years (if j > 0) or of starting the
policy j years before (if j < 0) relative to the actual program starting year. Standard errors clustered at
municipality-level.
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Figure B19: Robustness to clustering choice, tax rates
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Note: The figure depicts coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals computed clustering
the standard errors at three different levels: i. municipality (as used in the baseline analysis); ii. province;
iii. region. Each specification includes municipality fixed effects, time-varying municipality-level con-
trol variables, province-year fixed effects and election year-year fixed effects.
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C Appendix for Knocking on Parents’ Doors: Regulation
and Intergenerational Mobility
Since the 1990s, the OECD has been constructing a system of indicators to measure
stringency and ongoing development in product market regulation across the OECD
countries. See Nicoletti et al. (1999), Conway and Nicoletti (2006) and Koske et al.
(2015) for more details on the spirit of the indicator and on the methodology adopted
to turn qualitative data on laws and regulation into quantitative indicators.
Following the OECD methodology, we develop a novel (time-varying) measure of
regulation for 14 professions in Italy. Namely, the indicator has a pyramidal structure
and it is aimed at summarizing regulations by regulatory domain.
At the top of the pyramid there is the overall regulatory environment of profes-
sional services that, in turn, is based on two main broad regulatory domains: the entry
requirements into the profession and the regulation of the market behavior (i.e. con-
duct); these domains, finally, cover different sub-domains regarding specific classes of
regulatory interventions, as shown in Figure C1.
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Figure C1: Domains and sub-domains considered in the regulation index
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For each sub-domain, different questions have been included in the analysis. The
answers to these questions are all designed to express the stringency of regulations,
from least to most restrictive (along a 0-6 scale), with regard to their impact on market
competition. The aggregate indicators are built as mean of the values of the related
sub-domains.
With respect to the OECD indicator we innovate along two main dimensions. First,
we consider a broader set of professions: accountants, agronomists, architects, biolo-
gists, chemists, doctors, engineers, geologists, lawyers, notaries, pharmacists, psychol-
ogists, social assistants and veterinarians. Second, we enrich the sub-domains of the
regulatory environment along several directions.
For entry regulation we consider the following five sub-topics: exclusive rights (i.e.
reserves of activities), education requirements, professional exam, compulsory cham-
ber membership and quantitative restrictions. For conduct regulation we consider
the following five sub-topics: prices and fees, advertising, form of business, inter-
professional cooperation and disciplinary power. The content of each sub-domain is
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reported in Table C1. In the following we provide further details and we discuss the
main element of novelty.
For entry regulation, the first sub-domain concerns exclusive rights (1.1). The min-
isterial decrees report the reserves of activities for each profession and set the reference
price for each of them (either a fixed price or price range). For example, the ministerial
decree regarding veterinarians sets the price of an examination of a cat or a dog at 30
euros; with regard to lawyers, the compensation is based on the value of the litigation.
In the indicator, we have considered how many groups of similar activities are men-
tioned in the decrees (1.1.1) and, for each group of activities, we have estimated the
value of the most common activities, based on the price set by the decree (1.1.2).27 For
education requirements (1.2), we consider the length of the university degree (1.2.1),
whether an undergraduate degree of 3 years enables to register at the chamber (1.2.2),28
whether the university program which leads to pass the professional exam is free or
with limited enrollment (1.2.3), the length of the compulsory practice (1.2.4). With re-
gard to the professional exam, we have considered not only whether it exists or not but
also – as a proxy of its difficulty and independence with respect to the local pressure
of professional bodies – the number and types of tests it is composed of (1.3.1), the
composition of the examining board (1.3.2), the national or local level of organization
of the professional exam (1.3.3) and the pass rate (1.3.4).29 With reference to chamber
27The ministerial decrees cover, for each profession, a number of groups of activities varying from two
to twelve. In each group, different activities are listed and different value ranges are set. Let’s con-
sider the case of notaries. We identify five groups of activities (e.g. real estate deed, corporate deed,
inheritances, etc.). For each group of activities, we consider different items. For example, as far as
real estate sales are concerned, the compensation of the notary is parameterized with respect to the
value range to which the sale belongs. Then, to build the value of the exclusive rights we proceed as
follows. First, we select the most common activity within each group of activity. For real estate sales,
we consider those in the value range 25,000-500,000 Euros. Second, we compute the compensation
of the notary for the average sale in this bracket. Third, we replicate the exercise for other groups of
activities. Finally, we get the simple average across the groups of activities as overall indicator of the
values of the exclusive rights.
28This is a more accurate information than only the length of the university degree, as it allows to con-
sider whether after three years it is possible to register at the chamber and, after that, how many years
does the university degree last. People who register at the chamber after an undergraduate degree of
3 years are generally identified as “junior” professionals.
29These items have been added using the following assumptions. First, we assume that if the examin-
ing board is not composed of professionals the exam would be fairer and less subject to pressure by
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membership (1.4), we consider whether it is compulsory or not (1.4.1) – this provides
little information, because for all professions such membership is compulsory – but
also the costs related to the membership itself (1.4.2). We have calculated the latter for
each profession as a mean of the cost of first-five-year membership using information
drawn from the websites of the professional bodies in each region’s capital.30 We also
include the extent of quantitative restrictions (1.5). Namely, we include not only the
quotas for foreign professionals or firms (1.5.1) as done by the OECD, but also whether
the running of the business by the professional is subject to quotas within the country
(1.5.2), 31 and, if so, to what extent (1.5.3). The latter is measured as the number of
inhabitants for each business activities as in some professional activities (notably for
notaries and pharmacists) the entry in the market is parameterized to the population
following a demographic criterion.
For conduct regulation, the first sub-domain is represented by the regulation on
prices and fees (2.1). The answer to this question strictly follow the OECD structure.
As far as regulation on advertising (2.2) and that on legal form of business (2.3) are con-
cerned, we enrich the answers to have them more tailored to the Italian context. We no-
tably distinguish, on the one hand, the different kinds of advertising (comparative, on
the characteristics of the professional and services or on the professional) and, on the
other hand, the different legal forms of business that have been introduced in the Ital-
ian law (sole proprietorship, partnerships, capital companies) and the existence of re-
strictions on shareholders for capital companies. The sub-domain of inter-professional
cooperation (2.4) has the same questions and answers of the OECD indicator, based
on the number of forms of inter-professional cooperation allowed. Finally, we added
incumbents. Second, we assume that if there is a national examining board there is less risk of connec-
tions than in a local context. Third, a lower pass rate indicates higher difficulty to enter the profession
(data drawn from CRESME).
30We consider the first-five-year average as for some professions the costs vary between the first and
subsequent years. The average cost of membership varies from about 150 euros per year for social
assistants to 1,500 euros per year for notaries
31This means that the running of the business is subject to a decision of the public authority (i.e. a
license). We also consider whether such license can be inherited by the child of a professional or not.
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a novel sub-domain on the disciplinary power (2.5). As a proxy of the effectiveness of
such power, failing data on disciplinary proceedings run and penalties imposed by the
chambers, we consider whether such power exists and, if so, whether it is entrusted to
a specific body, that is deemed more independent, or not.
A
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Table C1: Coding of answers and weight of the indicator
Coding of answers TW STW QW
1. Entry 1/2
1.1. Exclusive rights 1/5
1.1.1 How many services does the profession provide under an exclusive right? Number of reserved activities (*) 0-6 1/2
1.1.2. What is the average value of the most common reserved activities? Average value (*) 0-6 1/2
1.2. Education and training requirements 1/5
1.2.1. What is the duration of the University degree? Number of years 0-6 1/4
1.2.2. Does an undergraduate degree (3 years) enable passing of the professional exam? Yes 0 1/4
No 6
1.2.3. Is access to University program free or selective? Percentage of Universities with entry restrictions (*) 0-6 1/4
1.2.4. What is the length of compulsory practice / postgraduate education? Number of years 0-6 1/4
1.3. Professional exam 1/5
1.3.1. Which tests comprise the professional exam? There are no professional exams 0 1/4
One or more oral tests 1
A written test 2
A written test and an oral test 3
Two written tests and an oral test 4
Two written tests, an oral test and a practical test 5
Three or more written tests and a practical test 6
1.3.2. How is the examining board composed? Mostly by non-professionals 0 1/4
By members suggested by the chamber (also not professionals) 3
Mostly by professionals 6
1.3.3. Is the professional exam centralized or organized at local level? Centralized 0 1/4
Organized locally and evaluated by non-local examination boards 3
Entirely organized at the local level 6
1.3.4. What is the pass rate of the professional exam? Percentage of candidates who pass the exam (*) 0-6 1/4
1.4. Compulsory chamber membership 1/5
1.4.1. Is membership in a professional organization compulsory to legally practice? No 0 1/2
Yes 6
1.4.2. How much is the annual cost of the membership? Average membership fee (*) 0-6 1/4
1.5. Quantitative restrictions 1/5
1.5.1. Is the number of foreign professionals/firms restricted by quotas? No 0 1/3
Yes 6
1.5.2. Are quantitative restrictions on the number of businesses provided for? No 0 1/3
Yes 3
Yes with heritability of the business license 6
1.5.3. What is the extent of quantitative restrictions? Strictness (*) 0-6 1/3
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Coding of answers TW STW QW
2. Conduct 1/2
2.1. Prices and fees 1/5
2.1.1. The charged fees or prices are regulated by the government or self-regulated? No regulation 0 1
Non-binding recommended prices for some services 1
Non-binding recommended prices for all services 2
Maximum prices for some services 3
Maximum prices for all services 4
Minimum prices for some services 5
Minimum prices for all services 6
2.2. Advertising 1/5
2.2.1. How is advertising and marketing of professional services regulated? All kinds of advertising admitted 0 1
Only advertising on professionals and services admitted 2
Only information on professionals admitted 4
Forbidden 6
2.3. Form of business 1/5
2.3.1. How is the legal form of business regulated? Capital companies allowed with no restrictions on shareholders 0 1
Capital companies allowed with restrictions on shareholders 2
Capital companies forbidden 4
Sole practitioners only 6
2.4. Inter-professional cooperation 1/5
2.4.1. How is inter-professional cooperation regulated? All forms allowed 0 1
Most forms allowed 2
Allowed between comparable professions 4
Generally forbidden 6
2.5. Disciplinary power 1/5
2.5.1. Is the chamber entitled with disciplinary power? Yes, entrusted to a specific body 0 1
Yes, entrusted to the chamber board 3
No 6
TW = topic weight; STW = sub-topic weight; QW = question weight. (*) continuous values obtained normalizing each figure and letting the variable varies between 0 (minimum) and 6
(maximum).
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Figure C2: Regulation and labor market outcomes in Europe
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Authors’ elaboration on data from the EU-SILC and OECD. We consider as professionals those
employed in the ISCO group 21 and 24. Wage premium has been calculated on gross incomes,
expect for Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal for which we use net incomes; moreover, wage
premium has been bounded to 100% for graphical reasons.
